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INTRODUCTION

In the eyes of Hollywood and the press, hostile acquirers are
personifications of evil. However, if we think of the great hostile
acquirers of all ages, hostile acquirers with a long record of violence and
predation are often treated better by history. The Roman Empire,
Charlemagne, the Great Discoverers and the colonial expansion of the
seagoing European powers, engaged in an enterprise very similar to
hostile acquisitions. Each one observed resources that were underused
because of the technological limitations of their controllers. The new
user would take control of the resources, apply the new technology to
them, and render them more productive. I must say that Rome's road and
aqueduct technology increased the productivity of the resources of the
Hellenistic society, despite some destruction of culture and the rollingin-graves of my distant ancestors. Charlemagne's governance pyramid
of feudalism, as distasteful as it may seem in the hindsight of today's
democratic and liberal reality, could be argued to be a superior
governance technology for the conditions of those times. The colonial
expansion of Europe was precisely the application of a multitude of
superior technologies to otherwise underused resources.
These powers changed the world by accelerating growth. Imagine if
the response, in each step, had been analogous to the building of the
Great Wall of China. It is worth speculating about the shape of the world
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had the defenders succeeded in these and many other instances. Roman
roads and aqueducts would not dot the Mediterranean, but more
importantly, commerce, growth, and knowledge would not have
propagated through the ancient world. Without Charlemagne, the
Germanic tribes might have remained just that for quite some time. If the
indigenous people of the Americas and the Far East had managed to turn
away the colonial powers, many areas might still be in archaic stages of
development and welfare. The advancement of knowledge for which we
admire these hostile acquirers may be nothing loftier than a direct
consequence of a quest for productivity.
The praise of historical hostile acquirers for material gains is
countered by ire over violence, plunder, and destruction of cultural and
social values. Perhaps the targeted societies could have done better if
they had a defense system akin to modem corporate takeover defenses.
They might have been able to implement new technologies and preserve
their cultural, artistic, and social heritage, albeit at the cost of slowing
the growth of material comforts. I will make an argument justifying
takeover defenses that produce the same compromise. I will argue that
the reduction of growth speed caused by defenses is justified from an
economic perspective. Pursuing immediate productivity gains at all costs
is a simplistic argument, but one that seems to have swept modem
corporate scholarship.
This simplistic quest for productivity has led numerous academics
to argue that defenses are undesirable, either altogether' or at least if they
do anything more than facilitate the auction of the target corporation by
its management. 2 Investors, however, have refuted these arguments by
consistently producing initial public offerings ("IPOs") of corporations
that include defensive measures in their corporate fabric.' Furthermore
and very notably, shareholders prefer defenses over "golden
I. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 196-98 (1991); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The ProperRole of a
Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1195 (1981).
2. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against
Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 867-70 (1981).
3. See LAURA CASARES FIELD, CONTROL CONSIDERATIONS IN NEWLY PUBLIC FIRMS: THE
]IMPLE IENTATION OF ANTITAKEOVER PROVISIONS AND DUAL CLASS SHARES BEFORE THE IPO 2

(Pa. St.Univ. Vorking Paper Series, 1999), availableat http://papers.ssm.com (last visited Dec. 30,
2001); JOHN C. COATES IV, EXPLAINING VARIATION IN TAKEOVER DEFENSES: FAILURE IN THE
CORPORATE LAW MARKET 1-2 (Harvard L. Sch., L. & Econs. working Paper Series, Discussion
Paper No. 297, 2000), available at http://papers.ssm.com (last visited Dec. 30, 2001); ROBERT
DAINES & MICHAEL KLAUSNER, Do IPO CHARTERS MAxmifzE FumM VALUE? ANTITAKEOVER
PROVISIONS IN IPOS 4 (N.Y.U. Ctr. L. & Bus., L. & Econs. Working Paper Series, Working Paper
No. 99-015, 1999), availableat http://papers.ssm.com (last visited Dec. 30,2001).
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parachutes,'" which compensate managers for being taken over. Thus
compensated for losing their jobs, the managers' interests would align
with those of shareholders. This Article, by finding several advantages in
takeover defenses, explains these paradoxical contradictions between
theory and practice. For the first time, defenses are shown to be socially
desirable from an economic perspective in their own right, rather than a
prevention of useless takeovers.6 Even previous studies that attempted to
explain the popularity of defenses did not explain their use at the IPO
stage, their supremacy over golden parachutes, or their social
desirability.!
4. Cf. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties That Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of
Shareholder Choice, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1, 17 (1988) (noting that the golden parachutes "may reduce
shareholder wealth" because they "may reduce management's incentive to obtain the highest price
for the shareholders").
5. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 700 (7th ed. 1999).
6. In the law and economics family only Reinier Kraakman with Ron Gilson and John
Coffee have pursued "discounted price" and "inefficient takeovers" as justifications of defenses,
with little persuasion within the academy. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman,
Delaware's Intermediate Standardfor Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality
Review?, 44 Bus. LAW. 247, 267 (1989). Comparing the reception of that article in academia and
the Delaware judiciary reveals the relative anti-defense bias of academia. The Gilson & Kraakman
article has been cited by 101 law review articles and has 7 citations in Delaware. Compare this 7 to
101 ratio of pro-defense scholarship with the 8 to 1828 ratio that anti-defense scholarship has.
Searching for Easterbrook within four words from (w/4) Fischel produces 1828 law review articles,
but only 8 Delaware cases, even though their articles start earlier and date from the early eighties.
See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics, and
Shareholders' Welfare, 36 Bus. LAW. 1733 (1981); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 1. The
searches were conducted on January 16, 2001, in Westlaw's law review database (identifier JLR)
and Delaware opinions (identifier: DE-CS).
7. Some argue that defenses entail negative externalities that explain their use but do not
justify them from a social perspective. See generally LUCIAN ARYE BEBCHUK & LUIGI ZINGALES,
CORPORATE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES: PRIVATE VERSUS SOCIAL OPTIMALITY (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W5584, 1996), available at http://papers.ssm.com (last visited
Dec. 30, 2001). The reduction of the pressure to produce short-term results is related to the
arguments I make based on takeover threats due to low prices, but it depends on a fairly stylized set
of verifiable and unverifiable information. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Lars A. Stole, Do Short-Term
Objectives Lead to Under- or Overinvestment in Long-Term Projects?, 48 J. FIN. 719, 719 (1993).
Other arguments explain defenses based on the private benefits of control, but those have not been
elaborated so as to explain the variations from locks on control to strong and weak defensive
structures. Ronen Israel and Qiang Ma formulate an argument that controllers, in response to the
fear of a future takeover attempt, are biased in favor of risky long-term projects because they induce
higher takeover prices and reduce the probability of a takeover. See generally RONEN ISRAEL &
QIANG MA, INVESTMENT HORIZON AND THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CON7TROL: THE DEFENSIVE

ROLE OF LONG-TERM INVESTMENTS (Univ. of Mich., Interdisciplinary Ctr. Herzliya, Working
Paper, 2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com (last visited Dec. 30, 2001). Similarly, in "Breach
of Trust" in Takeovers and the Optimal CorporateCharter,the author, Monika Schnitzer finds that
the level of defenses chosen will deviate from the socially optimal. See Monika Schnitzer, "Breach
of Trust" in Takeovers and the Optimal CorporateCharter,43 J. INDUS. ECON. 229, 250-53 (1995).
Fearing a takeover, the manager makes too little firm-specific investment and defenses allow the
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The contribution of this Article is the explanation of the function of
corporate defenses. This explanation cures the stark contrast between
theory and practice discussed above. Moreover, this thesis of defenses'
desirability is bolstered by observed investor preferences. Investors
choose defenses in transactions where managers do not have conflicting
interests, such as at IPOs. Investors choose defenses compared to
compensating managers for an increased risk of changes of control, such
as by golden parachutes. Thus, this thesis is distinguished from
explanations of the use of defenses that rely on a divergence of the
managers' desire for entrenched control from the shareholders' desire
for no defenses. If shareholders do not benefit from defenses, they can
restrict management's ability to implement defenses. Even if the
implementation of such restrictions in firms that are already public could
be impeded by management, nothing explains the lack of restrictions on
defenses at the moment of the IPO, when the revenues from selling
shares to the public is directly determined by how attractive the
corporation with its defenses is for public investors.
The contrast between the scholarship that considers defenses
undesirable for shareholders, and the consistent practice of venture
capitalists and entrepreneurs taking firms public after already equipping
them with defenses, is sharpened by the lack of popularity of golden
parachutes. Shareholders can compensate managers for giving managers
indefensible ephemeral control. If shareholders preferred managers to
have ephemeral control, and managers balked at the prospect of losing
control in a hostile takeover, shareholders could compensate managers
with golden parachutes, the lucrative severance clauses triggered by a
change of control.' Corporate practice, however, is not that of weak
defenses and rich golden parachutes; it is the opposite: strong defenses
and small golden parachutes.9
manager to devote more to the firm, but weak defenses and golden parachutes are necessary to
allow value-increasing takeovers. See id. at 252. The level of defenses and golden parachutes
deviates from the socially optimal because shareholders benefit in the form of a higher premium by
making a takeover more difficult. See id. at 253.
8. See BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY, supranote 5, at 700.
9. See, e.g., M.P. NARAYANAN & ANANT K. SUNDARAM, A SAFE LANDING? GOLDEN
PARACHuTES AND CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 6 (Univ. of Mich. Bus. Sch., Working Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 98015, 1998) (claiming that the opposition to golden parachutes is due to a fear
that management will destroy corporate value in order to induce a takeover; showing that golden
parachutes did not lead management to destroy corporate wealth but to take more desirable risks),
available at http://papers.ssm.com (last visited Dec. 30, 2001); see also Jeffery A. Born et al.,
Golden Parachutes:Incentive Aligners, Management Entrenchers,or Takeover Bid Signals?, 16 1.
FIN. REs. 299, 305 (1993) (indicating that the adoption of golden parachutes after a firm is "in play"
has no impact on price, suggesting no effect on the outcome of the contest; adoptions of golden
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Investors choose to have defenses because, contrary to previous
academic commentary, defenses are good for investors for a long array
of reasons.'0 First, they facilitate financing." Defenses promote dispersed
ownership by encouraging the reduction of controlling stakes. 2
Dispersed ownership facilitates diversification and furthers market
liquidity. 3 Diversification reduces shareholders' exposure to risk with
beneficial consequences.' 4 Shareholders' greater willingness to invest
translates into a lower cost of capital for firms. Ownership by
shareholders, who have neutralized their aversion to risk by being
diversified, means that managers should run the firm in a risk-neutral
way. Managers should not give up opportunities in order to avoid risk.
Shareholders, moreover, provide managers with risk-taking incentivesas indeed they do by compensating managers with instruments such• as16
options, that become more valuable as managers take more risks.
parachutes by firms not "in play" produces increases; contrary to the authors' conclusion this shows
that golden parachutes do induce firms to become "in play"); Lane Daley & Chandra Subramaniam,
Free Cash Flows, Golden Parachutes,and the Discipline of Takeover Activity, 27 J. BUS. FIN. &
ACCT. 1 passim (2000) (showing that the existence of golden parachutes leads to wasteful
overinvestment occurring prior to a takeover); Wallace N. Davidson III et al., Golden Parachutes,
Board and Committee Composition, and Shareholder Wealth, 33 FIN. REV. 17, 29 (1998) (showing
that the market reaction to golden parachutes depends on the composition of the compensation
committee of the board of directors; unaffiliated outsiders lead to gains supporting a beneficial
alignment of interests with those of shareholders, an insider committee leads to price drops that
support value-destruction); Ellie G. Harris, Antitakeover Measures, Golden Parachutes,and Target
Firm ShareholderWelfare, 21 RAND J. ECON. 614, 623 (1990) (showing a theoretical model based
on the premise that defenses enable target shareholders to extract a greater share of the surplus from
corporate combinations; the prediction is that firms will give managers defenses to extract this
surplus, but also golden parachutes, so as to insulate them against the loss of their jobs); Craig E.
Lefanowicz et al., Golden Parachutes and Managerial Incentives in Corporate Acquisitions:
Evidencefrom the 1980s and 1990s, 6 J. CORP. FIN. 215, 217-18 (2000) (studying two decades of
defense use and golden parachutes, finding that they do induce more frequent takeovers); L. Mick
Swartz, The Massachusetts ClassifiedBoard Law, 22 J. ECON. & IN. 29 passim (1998) (studying
the imposition of a classified board by Massachusetts; all firms lost 16% of value on average, but
firms with golden parachutes overcame the entrenching effect and outperformed their peers by
23%).
10. The existing arguments only explain the use of defenses without justifying them. The
argumentation is summarized in COATES, supra note 3, at 8-10, as defending against mispricing and
attempting to retain private benefits of control.
11. See infra Part W.A.
12. See infra Part IV.A. 1.
13. See infra Part IV.A.3; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects
for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REv. 641,
648 n.24 (1999).
14. See infra Part IV.A.4; see also Jeffrey N. Gordon, ShareholderInitiative:A Social Choice
and Game TheoreticApproach to CorporateLaw, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 347, 368-69 (1991).
15. See id.
16. The most readable introduction to options is in RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S.
BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUIsITIONS 231-50 (2d ed. 1995). A recent
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Dispersed ownership furthers market liquidity by producing large
"floats" of traded shares. Large floats satisfy investors' demands for a
vehicle in which to store their savings. Investors' trades attract informed
speculators who, because of large floats, can profit from correcting
prices. The resulting accurate prices further reduce investors' risk,
increasing the attractiveness of the market and allowing firms to raise
capital with less cost. Dispersed ownership is also inextricably entwined
with potent legal protection for minority shareholders that reduces the
discount of minority stakes compared to controlling stakes. Reduced
minority discounts combine with takeover defenses to foster capital
formation by making venture capital arrangements more attractive. The
lack of deep discounts allows venture capitalists to disperse their
controlling stake at an IPO instead of selling it as a controlling block,
and allows entrepreneurs to credibly believe this will happen. Defenses
enhance the value of the venture capital arrangement by assuring the
entrepreneur to whom control reverts at the IPO that this control is not
indefensibly ephemeral.
Defenses are also desirable because they add value to the
managerial contract, a value that also drives some of the advantages for
corporate financing mentioned above. The advantage of defenses for the
managerial contract stems from the possibility of false takeovers,
meaning takeovers that are not a result of managerial incompetence or a
failure of the corporate strategy. 7 This is because share prices may be
unduly low, either despite an accurate valuation by the market or
because of inaccurate pricing. Share prices can be accurately depressed
in anticipation of corporate choices among alternative strategies. Share
prices can be falsely depressed, despite the evidence of market
efficiency, because the evidence regards averages rather than proving the
accurate valuation of each firm. Protection against false takeovers would
empirical confirmation that options are more effective at inducing risk-taking than grants of stock is
in Stephen Bryan et al., CEO Stock-Based Compensation: An Empirical Analysis of IncentiveIntensity, Relative M, and Economic Determinants,73 J. Bus. 661, 664-70 (2000) (comparing
options and restricted stock as managerial compensation devices).
17. This justification of defenses bears a distant relation to Ron Gilson's justification of dual
class capitalization structures for hard-to-value firms with growth potential in Ronald J. Gilson,
Evaluating Dual Class Common Stock: The Relevance of Substitutes, 73 VA. L. REv. 807 (1987).
According to Gilson, the difficulty of valuation justifies a lock on control, lest an undeserving buyer
acquire the firm and put its assets in a wasteful use. See id. at 811. If we follow my argument here,
however, we see that Delaware law produces a superior outcome by allowing managers to defend
their control. See infra Part HIl.The superiority lies in the enhancement of the equity markets due to
the dispersed ownership and, even more importantly, due to the fact that the market for control still
exerts its disciplining effect on management. Of course, a dual class recapitalization would give
management a lock on control and would imply a loss of this disciplining effect.
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not have value if managing a private corporation or a subsidiary were
equivalent to heading a public firm. Heading a public firm is vastly
different because the chief s tenure depends not on the opinion of a
single boss, but on the consensus of the market, which has an effect
equivalent to a diversification of the evaluators of the chief s human
capital.
Defenses are also desirable because, by temporarily protecting
management, they grant management the luxury of delaying the
implementation of new technology. In the case of radical new
technologies, this otherwise wasteful delay may be socially desirable
because it alleviates the retraining bottleneck. Retraining to use new
technology is a social problem because the general use of the new
technology implies that it is a general and transportable skill that firms
will not provide.
Finally, defenses are not as costly ex ante as the ex post takeover
premiums indicate. Takeovers subject investors to a host of tax
disadvantages, to express and implied transaction costs, and to the
adverse selection problem of buyout firms removing the most attractive
firms from public investors' diversified portfolios ("cherry picking").
Part II of this Article describes the different mechanisms of control.
The variation is very large, but it reveals a range of safety of control.
Majority ownership or pyramid holding structures, for example, allow a
lock on control. If ownership is dispersed, however, the permanence of
control depends on the strength of takeover defenses, ranging from
ephemeral control to entrenched control, with Delaware law providing
an interesting middle ground of semi-entrenched control.
Part Ill examines how defense law influences dispersion of
ownership. Part III.A reveals the permissive attitude of Delaware courts
regarding defenses. Part llI.B shows that Delaware courts make an
about-face when the threat to control does not involve the potential to
concentrate ownership. Pure proxy fights-that are not accompanied by
a tender offer-do not allow similarly powerful defenses by
management. Part III.C looks at the European experience. Despite the
slower and more decentralized legal developments, defenses of an
intensity similar to those used in the United States are unlikely to be
sanctioned in Europe. The crucial difference is that European targets
have a more concentrated ownership structure while acquirers may offer
a chance to induce more dispersed ownership. Thus, legal systems on
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both sides of the Atlantic seem to aim for the same substantive result, of
either preserving or inducing dispersed ownership."
Part IV of this Article examines the benefits of dispersed ownership
and of defenses in the context of the U.S. tax and capital market system.
While defenses preserve the vitality of equity markets by preserving a
large publicly traded float of shares, they also provide strong incentives
for founders to take their firms public, and support venture capital
arrangements. These are preconditions for liquid and efficient markets.
Defenses also prevent accidental replacement of efficient management at
times of temporarily low prices. Dispersed ownership and defenses also
produce dynamics which induce gradual retooling in the face of
technological change. Thus, they alleviate the retraining bottleneck that
would be induced by firms that, subject to concentrated ownership and
hostile acquisitions, would rush to implement new technology.
Dispersed ownership and defensive tactics, therefore, mitigate the costly
shocks of transitioning to new methods of production. Finally, defenses
prevent tax and transaction cost burdens that hostile takeovers would
place on investors, indicating that their cost is not as large as hostile
premiums.
Part V reflects on the interaction of the above arguments. Optimal
defense intensity depends on three factors. It depends on ownership
dispersion, on the expected speed of technological change, and on the
quality of the equity markets. These conclusions allow an evaluation of
various aspects of United States and European Union defense law.
II.

OWNERSHIP DISPERSION AND MECHANISMS OF
CORPORATE CONTROL

Control can either be locked or contestable. Locked control means
that the control of the firm is determined with certainty in that no

18. Professor John C. Coffee has made a related point by arguing that, while the corporate
governance systems of different jurisdictions may not be converging in terms of their rules, the
outcomes they produce are converging in function because of the practices of firms, such as their
choices regarding in what exchanges to list their shares for trading. See Coffee, supra note 13, at
679, 681. The convergence I analyze in this Article regards the outcome of dispersed ownership. In
legal systems that produce immediate creation of dispersed ownership, such as the United States and
the United Kingdom, arming managers with defenses preserves the dispersed ownership that these
systems amply produce. Legal systems that fail to directly produce dispersed ownership may hope
to induce some dispersion by means of hostile acquisitions, because some may be conducted by
dispersed acquirers. Thus, the functional convergence of dispersed ownership is induced by
divergent rules. Note that to the extent that the European attitudes are actually motivated by a desire
to induce dispersed ownership, their strategy is criticized below. See infra Parts M.C., V.B.
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insurgent group of shareholders can gain control of the corporation.19 If
the possibility exists, however remote, that insurgents may gain control,
then control is contestable. 2° Before examining the variations of
contestable control, a closer look at the types of locked control is
needed.
A.

Locked Control

Locked control results from the entrepreneur's desire not to risk
losing control. The countervailing force is the ability to diversify. The
entrepreneur's financial risk can be reduced dramatically by shifting
wealth to other investments. The great impetus for maintaining control is
that it has value. The value of control depends partly on the quality of
protection that the legal system provides to minority shareholders. If
minority shareholders are adequately protected from managerial abuse,
control loses the value it has due to its potential to abuse minority
shareholders. Three mechanisms allow entrepreneurs to maintain a lock
on control: retaining majority ownership of the firm's common stock;
having dual class capitalization with different voting powers, thus
retaining voting control without majority; and creating pyramid holding
companies in which control of a parent corporation leads to control of an
ultimate subsidiary several layers below. These mechanisms are
explored below.
1. Majority Ownership
The conventional way of retaining a lock on control is majority
ownership. Without any unusual holding structures or voting powers, the
entrepreneur simply retains a majority of the common stock. In annual
director elections, the entrepreneur's votes elect the directors who run
21
the corporation.
Limitations are imposed by a drive to retain majority control. As
the firm raises capital, it may issue stock, but only to the point where the
founder's block of stock is reduced to a bare majority. As the firm makes
acquisitions, it can use its stock as consideration, but again, only so far
19.

See PETER MOLES & NICHOLAS TERRY, THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL

TERMS 110 (1997).
20. See id.
21. See Clifford G. Holderness & Dennis P. Sheehan, Constraints on Large-Block
Shareholders, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 139, 146-47 (Randall K. Morck ed.,
2000); Arthur R. Pinto, Section III: Corporate Governance: Monitoring the Board of Directors in
CorporateGovernance, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 317, 344 (1998) (discussing problems with controlling
shareholders in the election of directors).
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as the founder's block does not get diluted below absolute majority.
These limitations on raising capital and on the form of corporate
combination transactions are very significant.
Even more significant is the fact that ownership of an absolute
majority implies an enormous investment in the firm for the founder in
the case that the firm is successful. This also implies that the founder's
exposure to firm-specific risk is very large. The size of this exposure is
clearer if we compare it with the founder's risk if the founder could
move some of this wealth to other investments, a move that would
diversify the founder's portfolio and partially insulate it against risks
idiosyncratic to the founder's firm.
A real world example illustrates the size of the risks that a majority
owner runs. Consider BM's strategic refocusing in the early nineties in
response to the switch of the computer market from mainframes to
personal computers22 IBM now has about 1.76 billion shares outstanding
and, adjusted for stock-splits, had reached a pre-1992 high price of about
$44 in 1987.23 In late 1993 and early 1994 its price had tumbled to well
below $15.24 If BM had a 51% stockholder, the price drop would
correspond to a reduction in wealth of at least $26 billion, a drop
roughly equivalent to Bill Gates's wealth at that time.
The enormity of the entrepreneur's risk is of little direct concern for
society, other than for the fact that it provides the desirable incentive to
diversify and disperse the corporation's ownership. Society cares about
productivity and the productivity incentives of such a large and littlediversified stake in a single firm. Those push the founder toward riskaverse management of the firm, and create a bias toward obtaining
diversification through the firm's activities rather than through
alternative investments. For example, the founder can obtain
diversification through the firm's activities in various ways: through
internal expansion, through retention of business lines that might be

22. See Ira Sager, It's Hot! It's Sexy! It's... Big Blue?, Bus. WK., Mar. 4, 1996, at 39, 39.
23. The calculation in the text is probably an underestimation, because IBM has been on
extensive stock repurchase programs since the late eighties. The repurchases suggest that IBM had
more shares outstanding during this drop in price, so that its effect was much larger than this
estimate. The number of outstanding shares was obtained from MARKET GUIDE, MARKET
GUIDE/PROVESTOR PLUS COMPANY REPORT: IBM 2 (Oct. 6, 2000), available at
http:/vww.iulaw.indy.indiana.edu/instructors/georgakopoulos/prof/ProvestorIBM.pdf (last visited
Feb. 22, 2000).
24. See Stock Chartingfor InternationalBusiness Machines Corp., WALL ST. J. (Sept. 30,
2001), at http://www.bigcharts.comcustom/wsjie/public-charting.asp? (last visited Sept. 30, 2001).
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productively separated from the rest of the firm, and, generally, through
wasteful conglomeration.'
Internal diversification is common. The most vivid example of such
strategies of diversifying through the activity of the controlled company
can be found in the Japanese and Korean family groups, the pre-World
War II zaibatsu26 (precursors of the keiretsu) and the chaebol.27 For
example, the Mitsubishi Group has over forty major corporations (which
regrouped after the original family of affiliated corporations was split
during the U.S. occupation into 139 companies);28 and the Mitsui Group
has over 880 subsidiaries and associated companies (after a split during
the occupation into more than 200 companies)." The families behind the
Mitsubishi and Mitsui zaibatsu were not exposed to the same risk as
they would have been if their entire wealth were exclusively invested in
a single one of these firms.

25. Recent evidence on conglomeration shows that conglomerates allocate capital to the
divisions that face inferior opportunities instead of allocating their resources where the greatest
opportunities lie. See Raghuram Rajan et al., The Cost of Diversity: The Diversification Discount
and Inefficient Investment, 55 J. FIN. 35, 45-48 (2000).
26. The keiretsu are groups of firms that have informal understandings rather than the strong
common ownership and cross-ownership of the zaibatsu, which the United States dissolved after
World War II. See Evolution of Keiretsu and Their Different Forms, at
http://www.mgmt.utoronto.ca/-baum.mgmt2005/keiretsu.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2001). For a
recent recounting of the attempt to break up the zaibatsu and the reconstitution of the Mitsubishi,
Mitsui, and Sumitomo groups in new quasi-zaibatsu, see Andrew H. Thorson & Frank Siegfanz,
The 1997 Deregulation of Japan'sHolding Companies, 8 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 261, 270-73
(1999); see also W. CARL KESTER, JAPANESE TAKEOVERS: THE GLOBAL CONTEST FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL 54-55 (1991); Erik Berglif & Enrico Perotti, The Governance Structure of
the Japanese FinancialKeiretsu, 36 J. FIN. ECON. 259, 260 (1994); Michael Bradley et al., The
Purposesand Accountability of the Corporation in Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance
at a Crossroads, 62 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 9, 57 & n.283 (1999) (collecting sources for
additional details on the Japanese keiretsu); David Flath, Shareholdings in the Keiretsu, Japan's
FinancialGroups, 75 REV. ECON. & STAT. 249 passim (1993); Hesna Genay, Japan's Corporate
Groups, ECON. PERSP. Jan.-Feb. 1991, at 20, 20-23; Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe,
Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate Governance and Industrial
Organization, 102 YALE L.J. 871, 899 (1993); James R. Lincoln et al., Evolving Patterns of
Keiretsu Organizationand Action in Japan,20 RES. ORG. BEHAV. 303, 311-14 (1998); James R.
Lincoln et al., Keiretsu Networks and CorporatePerformance in Japan,61 AM. Soc. REV. 67, 7172 (1996).
27. See Kwang-Rok Kim, Korean Hostile Takeovers and the Friendly Internationalizationof
the Securities Market: An Investor Protection Perspective, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 357, 368
(2001).
28. See Hoover's Company Profile Database, World Companies,Mitsubishi Group, available
at LEXIS, Market & Industry Library, Directories (2001).
29. See Hoover's Company Profile Database, World Companies, Mitsui Group, available at
LEXIS, Market & Industry Library, Directories (2001).
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2. Dual Class Voting
Founders, however, can reduce their stakes to below majority and
retain a lock on control if their firms can offer different classes of stock
with different voting powers. The ultimate example would have firms
issue stock without any voting rights to the public and allow founders to
retain all or a majority of the voting stock." Such a maneuver would
allow the founders' wealth to be separated from the firm, since the size
of the voting class of stock can be arbitrarily small. Thus, dual class
voting would allow the entrepreneur to retain a lock on control with an
arbitrarily small investment. Founders can convert the rest of their stock
into nonvoting stock and sell to the public, thus diversifying their wealth
and losing the undesirable incentives for risk-averse management and
conglomeration.
This advantage of dual class voting is very large, and when the
legal environment allows it, dual class voting will be the preferred
method of retaining a lock on control. Nevertheless, locked control
through dual class voting does have undesirable ramifications, but it
shares those mostly with the next form of maintaining a lock on control,
pyramid groups.
3. Pyramid Groups
If founders cannot release wealth from the firm by means of dual
class voting, they may still be able to reduce their exposure by creating a
pyramid holding structure. The pyramid works by having layers of
holding companies, each owning 51% of the next, the last one of which
owns 51% of the operating company. The 49% of each layer of holding
company is sold to outside investors, and the founder can have a lock on
the control of the operating company with a very small investment in the
ultimate parent corporation.33 An example of a pyramid structure with
three holding company layers will make the function of the pyramid
obvious.
Suppose the operating company is worth $100 million. A 51%
stake in it would imply that $51 million of its founders' wealth would
have to be tied up in the firm. The creation of a holding company relaxes
this constraint. A first parent company can be created to own the 51%
controlling stake in the operating company. This first parent allows the
30. See Gordon, supranote 4, at 3, 10.
31. See id.
at 74.
32. See, e.g., ALEXANDER H. FREY Er AL.,
(2d ed. 1977).
33. See id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2001

CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS

398

13

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 2
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:11

founders to control the operating company with 51% in this first parent.
Since the first parent's assets are $51 million, the founders' stake is
worth 51% of $51 million, or $26.01 million. A second layer holding
company will allow the first parent to be controlled with a 51% in this
second parent, which involves an investment of $13.27 million. A third
holding company reduces the investment necessary to maintain a lock on
control even further to $6.77 million.
The reduction of financial exposure to risk that founders can obtain
by means of either a pyramid or dual class is not costless. Since the drive
to retain control is partly motivated by the legal system's failure to
adequately protect minority shareholders, the noncontrolling stakes that
are sold through either scheme are valued at a discount by their buyers.
The estimates of such discount range from 5% in the United States to
over 80% in other leading Western jurisdictions.'4 Even if the buyers are
paying exactly the value of what they are receiving, the selling of the
minority stakes creates the appearance that the entire enterprise is being
discounted and creates a paper loss for the entrepreneur.
If, for example, the enterprise is worth $100 million, $20 million of
which is the value of control, the noncontrolling shares being soldminority shares in the case of pyramids, weak or nonvoting shares in the
case of dual class stock-are shares in an $80 million asset, the business
without control. The greater a fraction of the control-denuded business
that the entrepreneur sells, the stronger the appearance that the
entrepreneur is accepting $80 million for an asset worth $100 million. If
this entrepreneur's stake is reduced to 10%, the appearance is created
that the entrepreneur's stake in the firm is worth $8 million, because the
$20 million value of control is not denominated. Depending on the
circumstances, entrepreneurs may find such an appearance undesirable.
For example, the undenominated value of control would not serve as
collateral for financing.
Creative corporate planning may be able to allow the founders of
large firms to shield large parts of their wealth from their firms' risk, but
34. See Luigi Zingales, The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the Milan Stock Exchange
Experience, 7 REv. FIN. STUD. 125 passim (1994) (stating the Milan average control premium of
86%, world average 10% to 20%, U.S. premium about 5.24%); see also MARTIN HOLMtN & PETER
HOGFELDT, A LAW AND FINANCE ANALYSIS OF INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS 1 (2001), availableat
http://papers.ssm.com (last visited Dec. 30, 2001); TATIANA NENOVA, THE VALUE OF CORPORATE
VOTES AND CONTROL BENEFITS: A CROSS-COUNTRY ANALYSIS 3-4 (Harv. Univ., Working Paper
Series, 2000) (estimating the value of control in Brazil, Chile, France, Italy, Mexico, and South
Korea between a quarter and a half of a finn's capitalization, while the value of control in common
law and Scandinavian countries is under 10%, and the value of control in the United States and
several other countries is under 4%), available at http://papers.ssm.com (last visited Dec. 30, 2001).
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not without cost.35 Moreover, founders will still have risk-aversion and
conglomeration incentives because they would still retain a very
significant investment in the firm. Thus, dual class voting and pyramids
may well alleviate, but by no means do they eliminate, the principal
undesirable consequences of having a lock on control. Locked control, in
all its forms, has disadvantages for society. These exceed the lack of
diversification which leads to risk-averse management and
conglomeration. The drawbacks of locked control are principally the
nepotism, and the undermining of the venture capital
tendency toward
36
arrangement.
Nepotism is a natural consequence of a lock on control. The
founders' family takes control as a matter of the intergenerational
passing of wealth. This is, of course, contrary to the social interest of
control passing on a meritocratic basis. Recent evidence from Sweden
illustrates pointedly this effect: the minority discount in cases where
subsequent generations are in control is much greater than the discount
when the founder is still in control. 37
B. Contestable Control
When it is at all possible for an outsider to obtain control of the
corporation, the control is contestable.38 Contrary to locked control,
contestable control implies some risk for the controller that control may
be lost, but that risk varies from significant to trivial. The variation is not
only due to market circumstances that may make large purchases
prohibitively expensive, for example, through lack of liquidity, or that
may, through poor communications, hamper attempts to organize a
dissenting group. The variation in the contestability of control comes in
large part from the legal system, most pertinently, the law regarding the
defensive measures that the target management can use to fend off an
acquirer.
Contestability is determined by the intensity of defensive measures
that the target corporation's board of directors can implement without a
& HoGFELDT, supranote 34, at 7.
35. See HOLMNU
36. See infra Parts IV.A.1 & IV.A.5. For the dynamics of the implicit commitments in the
venture capital arrangement, see, for example, Joseph Bankman & Ronald J. Gilson, Why Startups?, 51 STAN. L. REV. 289, 299-301 (1999); Erik Bergl6f, A Control Theory of Venture Capital
Finance, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 247, 248 (1994); Lisa Bernstein, The Silicon Valley Lawyer as
Transaction Cost Engineer?,74 OR. L. REv. 239,248-50 (1995).
37. See HOLMIN & HOGFELDT, supra note 34, at 5.
38. See, e.g., John C. Coates IV, Team Productionin Business Organizations:Measuringthe
Domain of Mediating Hierarchy: How Contestable Are U.S. Public Corporations?,24 IOWA J.
CORP. L. 837, 849-50 (1999).
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shareholder vote. Potent defenses would require various measures:
issuance of new securities, the rights of which may be contingent on
control events; the offering of new classes of stock, with potentially
superior voting powers; varying the voting rights of existing securities;
triggering contingent voting rights of previously issued securities; or
creating corporate liability to friendly shareholders, that is perhaps
contingent on control events. Other defensive mechanisms would
interfere with the electoral process and prevent or delay shareholder
votes or director nominations, or extend the terms of the current
directors. Many of these actions may contradict the basic premises of a
legal system's corporate law and others may not be expressly within the
board's powers. Legal systems vary from expressly prohibiting
defensive measures to expressly creating defensive capacity. 40
Although contestability is a question of degree, there are three
important segments along its spectrum, which are classified by the risk
to control that they pose. The complete absence of defenses produces
maximum contestability and ephemeral control. Entrenched control is
the extreme opposite--extraordinary defenses and little contestability. A
strikingly successful middle ground is that produced by mediumintensity defenses, which produce semi-entrenched control-control that
is not ephemeral but, unlike entrenched control, is realistically
contestable.
1. Ephemeral Control: United Kingdom
"Ephemeral control"4' is produced by rules which prevent
management, acting through the board of directors, from using any
defensive measures. The prime example is Rule 21 of the British City
Code on Takeovers and Mergers which prohibits all defensive measures
once a hostile offer is imminent.42 Rule 21 applies through selfregulation to listed corporations in the United Kingdom.43
39. See id.
See HOLMIN & HCOGFELDT, supranote 34, at 6.
41. Control is "ephemeral" when it is essentially "transient" and has "no lasting significance."
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICIONARY 388-89 (10th ed. 1996) (defining "ephemeral");
see also Ronald H. Jensen, Of Form and Substance: Tax-Free Incorporations and Other
Transactions Under Section 351, 11 VA. TAX REV. 349, 372 (1991) (stating that when applying the
"step transaction doctrine," the courts have "acted as 'hard-headed realists' who are not going to be
duped by afleeting, ephemeralcontrol' (emphasis added)).
42. See Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of CorporateLaw, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1962 (1996).
40.

43. See

PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, CITY CODE ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS

R. 21 (1985), available at http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk (last visited Feb. 6, 2002). It is
applicable only to publicly traded corporations ("listed corporations") with contestable control.
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The result of management's inability to erect defenses means that a
hostile offer will reach the shareholders. Whether this is a hostile offer to
purchase enough shares to promote the acquirer's stake into majority or
an insurgent shareholder's nomination of alternative directors and the
invitation to other shareholders to vote for them, the besieged board of
directors cannot interfere. The contest may be lost as soon as enough
shareholders sell or at the time shareholders vote. Control will at that
time pass to the hostile suitor. The inability of the target's controller to
stop the suitor, makes control ephemeral.
2. Entrenched Control
The opposite extreme to ephemeral control is produced by legal
systems which provide managers with ammunition to avoid changes of
control. When the defensive measures are strong enough, change of
control can be delayed or thwarted. 44 Indiana, for example, has enacted a
statutory provision denuding hostile buyers of their shares' votes
indefinitely; only an affirmative vote by a supermajority of the minority
can restore the purchaser's votes, and bestow control on the purchaser. 4
After Indiana's provisions withstood a constitutional challenge," twentyfive more states created similar control share acquisition statutes47 and
See 1d. Control contests can arise in corporations whose stock is not publicly traded. Those contests
will involve closely held corporations which engender an entirely different set of relations between
its shareholders and the corporation. Thus, little functionality is lost because Rule 21 is limited to
listed corporations. Rule 21 does imbue the decision of a corporation to go public with a defensive
quality. Remaining private, even if the minority stake is fairly broadly dispersed, would preserve the
defensive capacity of the board.
44. See COATES, supranote 3, at 5.
45. See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-9 (West 1989). Corporations can elect in their charter or
bylaws not to be subject to this defensive measure. See id § 23-1-42-5. The acquisition threshold
is 20%. See id. § 23-1-42-1(1).
46. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69,93 (1987).
47. Only Hawaii limits the time during which the acquired shares do not have voting rights,
while twenty-five states remove voting powers indefinitely (but Arizona and Nebraska allow the
voting in director elections only). See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-2725(A) (West 1996) (retaining
voting power for election of directors and no other matter); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0902(9)(a)
(West 2001); HAw. REV. STAT. § 415-172(b) (1993) (mandating no voting and no transferability for
one year from acquisition); IDAHO CODE § 30-1607(1) (Michie 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-1294(b)(1) (2000); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:140(A) (West 1994); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS.
& AS'NS § 3-702(a)(1) (Supp. 2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 1l0D, § 5 (West 1999); MCH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1794 (-Vest 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.671(1)(b) (West Supp.
2001); MISs. CODE ANN. § 79-27-7 (1999); MO. ANN. STAT. § 351.407(5)-(1) (West 1991); NEB.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-2451 (Michie 1999) (Nebraska, like Arizona, allows voting on director
elections only); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 78.379 (Michie 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-9A-01
(1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.831(A) (Anderson 2001) (making purchase conditional on
approval); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1149(1) (West 1999); OR. REv. STAT. § 60.807 (1999);
15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2564(a) (West 1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-2-109(a) (Law. Co-op.
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over forty more have some state antitakeover protection.48 Other
measures with defensive character are also available, such as the
obligation on the acquirer to buy all minority shares at a "fair value" that
can be defined by the target corporation beforehand and cannot be lower
than the highest price that the acquirer has paid per share. 9
Pennsylvania, for example, in addition to its control share statute,50
forces disgorgement of greenmail and short-term control premiums, and
gives terminated employees and collective labor contracts special
protection.51 Delaware does not adopt these most entrenching versions of
defenses, but does restrict mergers for three years after a hostile
acquisition. 2
Measures such as the control share acquisition statutes are
draconian. They render the risk to control trivial. Control is so safe that
it is entrenched.
3. Semi-Entrenched Control: Delaware
Delaware does give managers defensive powers, but not quite to the
same extent as Indiana and other states with control share statutes.
Delaware limits the amount of time during which hostile acquirers'

Supp. 2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-33-8 (Michie 2000); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-103-307
(1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-6-10 (2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-728.3 (Michie 1999); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 180.1150(b)(2) (West 1992 & Supp. 2000) (limiting control shares to 10% of their
normal voting power); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-18-306 (Michie 2001).
The drafting of the Model Control Share Act is discussed in Evan M. Kjellenberg, The
Model State ControlShare Act: The Best State Takeover Law Alternative, 8 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 329,
338-41 (1988). The political economy of the adoption of control share acquisition statutes is
discussed in William J. Carney, The Political Economy of Competition for Corporate Charters,26
J. LEGAL STUD. 303, 321-23, 328 (1997), and William J. Carney, The Production of Corporate
Law, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 715,735-36 (1998).
48. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with
Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REv. 857, 861 nn.9-10 (1993) (providing a
comprehensive list of citations).
49. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-44-8 (West 1989). Other states that give dissenters such
a right to "fair value" are Florida, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Oregon, South Carolina,
Virginia, and Wyoming. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.1302 (West 2001); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 12:131(C)(2) (West Supp. 2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1762(1) (vest Supp. 2001);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.471(1) (West Supp. 2001); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-13.02(a) (1999);
OR. REV. STAT. § 60.813 (2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-13-102 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2000); VA.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-728.8 (Michie 1999); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-18-308 (Michie 2001).
50. See 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2564 (West 1995).
51. See id. § 2575 (disgorging short-term profits of new control groups and making them
recoverable by the corporation); id. § 2582 (providing severance for terminated employees);
id. § 2587 (preserving labor contracts).
52. See DEL. CODE ANN. fit. 8, § 203(a)-(b) (Supp. 2000) (allowing the corporation to opt out
via amendment to either the certificate of incorporation or the bylaws).
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rights are restricted-no merger for three years53-and
allows
corporations to opt out of defenses if they wish. "4The shape of Delaware
defense law will be examined in detail in the next section, but the results
for the controller are clearly intermediate. Control is safe enough not to
be ephemeral, but not so safe as to be entrenched. Thus, this brand of
contestability can be appropriately called semi-entrenched control.
This feature of Delaware law will be apparent in Part H. The
principal purpose of Part III is to show how the law of Delaware and of
some European jurisdictions promotes dispersed ownership. Part IV
returns to the quest for optimal defense intensity. Not surprisingly,
neither extreme is optimal. The extreme safety of defenses that produce
entrenched control eliminates the disciplining effect of the market for
control. The extreme risk of no defenses produces ephemeral control and
has a host of ill effects for the firm and society.
I.

DEFENSES AND DISPERSION

Dispersed ownership and contestable control arose much before
merger and acquisition law developed the sophistication it has today.
The conventional view is that the principal feature that promotes
dispersed ownership and contestable control is the protection of minority
shareholders.55 While this cannot be disputed, the importance of takeover
defenses cannot be denied. Defense law is inextricably bound with
entrepreneurs' and financiers' incentives to create, finance, and take
companies public 56 Defense law, which determines the value and the
control rights of equity securities,57 is a consideration in every
transaction and decision that might lead to public stock offerings. These
indirect incentives are generic and attach to any form of defense law.
This section will examine various legal systems for more direct evidence
of the relation between dispersed ownership and defense law. Not

53. See id. § 203(a).
54. See id. § 203(b).
55. The Asian crisis has provided quantifiable evidence of the importance of minority
protection. Jurisdictions with worse shareholder protection experienced greater drops in prices. See
Simon Johnson et al., CorporateGovernance in the Asian FinancialCrisis, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 141,
184-85 (2000). For a general discussion of the discount of minority shares and corporate law, see
John C. Coates IV, "FairValue" as an Avoidable Rule of Corporate Law: Minority Discounts in
Conflict Transactions,147 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1273-77 (1999).
56. See generally Stephen Mahle, Proxy Contests, Agency Costs, and Third GenerationState
Antitakeover Statutes, 15 J. CORP. L. 721, 728-31 (1990) (discussing the rationale behind
antitakeover laws).
57. See Henry N. Butler, Corporation-SpecificAnti-Takeover Statutes and the Market for
CorporateCharters,1988 Wis. L. REV. 365, 376-77.
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surprisingly, such evidence exists on both sides of the Atlantic. In the
United States's predominant corporate forum, Delaware, the availability
of defenses in some types of transactions depends on the ownership
dispersion of the corporations that are involved. After the extensive
analysis of Delaware law in the next section, Europe appears relatively
insensitive to dispersion, but the analysis in Part II.C will show an
implicit relation between defense law and dispersed ownership in
Europe.
A. DelawareAttitudes: Difficult Acquisitionsfrom Dispersed Owners
During the gradual rise in the frequency of hostile takeovers, the
Delaware courts did not expressly distinguish between hostile threats
that would concentrate ownership and hostile threats that would not.5 8
This distinction would eventually rise in prominence. Even in the early
cases, however, the courts displayed sensitivity to threats that would
concentrate ownership. In fact, the Delaware courts had already
addressed dispersion when they dealt with greenmail.
1. Pivotal Choice
a. Greenmail
The first break with conventional corporate law came when
corporate management tried to buy the friendship of threatening
shareholders.5 9 Giving corporate assets to a shareholder for no apparent
consideration is problematic. It contradicts the classic principle of
corporate law that assets go to the shareholders proportionately. 6 One
could easily argue that this so-called "greenmail" payment to a
shareholder in exchange for what has come to be known as a "standstill
agreement ''61 is no different than a dividend that discriminates among
shareholders, awarding more value to some for unverifiable and
evanescent reasons. Basic corporate law ensures the even division of
corporate wealth among shareholders.62 The long stream of cases about
58. See infra notes 119-25 and accompanying text.
59. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 956 n.13 (Del. 1985) (describing
greenmail as "the practice of buying out a takeover bidder's stock at a premium that is not available
to other shareholders in order to prevent the takeover").
60. See, e.g., Alcott v. Hyman, 208 A.2d 501,508 (Del. 1965).
61. Greenmail, of course, has practically disappeared now that it is taxed at 50% in the United
States. See I.R.C. § 5881 (West 2000).
62. Leading cases preventing uneven division of corporate wealth are Nixon v. Blackwell, 626
A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993) (en bane), and Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, 328
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"watered stock"63 typifies this principle of even division. It is motivated
by the notion that each shareholder should6 4 receive a claim truly
proportional to each shareholder's contribution.
Nevertheless, the threat to control was not sufficiently unverifiable
and evanescent to take the Delaware courts back to the mode of
discourse used in the watered stock cases. In the classic greenmail case,
Cheff v. Mathes,6' instead of a threat to the proper distribution of
corporate assets, the court was more concerned with the role of the board
of directors.6 Should this greenmail transaction that led to the standstill
agreement receive the benefit and near-immunity that the business
judgment rule provides, according to which the courts do not secondguess the directors' business decisions? 67 Indeed, if we are thinking
along the lines of dilution of shareholder value, the members of the
board as shareholders would be hurt by the disproportionate greenmail
distribution to the hostile suitor and self-interest does not appear as the
likely motive for the transaction. Nevertheless, the courts did suspect
that it would be possible for the board to be engaging in some subtle
form of self-dealing."s
How could the board be self-dealing while losing money as
shareholders? They are because they are receiving something worth
more than their loss. What the board receives in the greenmail situation
is entrenchment in their position as controllers of the corporation.
Accordingly, the Delaware Supreme Court stated in Cheff that only
greenmail payments that are supported by valid business purposes will
be upheld:
The question then presented is whether or not [the directors] satisfied
the burden of proof of showing reasonable grounds to believe a danger
to corporate policy and effectiveness existed by the presence of the
[hostile] stock ownership. It is important to remember that the directors

N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975). An extensive discussion of shareholder oppression exists in Edward B.
Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Waitingfor the Omelette to Set: Match-Specific Assets and Minority
Oppression, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP, supranote 21, at 201,201-40.
63. See, e.g., Haselbush v. Alsco of Colo., Inc., 421 P.2d 113, 114 (Colo. 1966) (en banc).
64. See, e.g., Bing Crosby Minute Maid Corp. v. Eaton, 297 P.2d 5, 7 (Cal. 1956) (en bane);
see also DEL.CODE ANN. tit. 8,§ 162 (1991 & Supp. 2000) (holding shareholders liable for watered
stock issuance). But see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 152 (1991) (making the determination of the
board of directors regarding the value of the shareholders' contribution only assailable for "actual
fraud").
65. 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964).
66. See id. at 556.
67. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY, supranote 5, at 200.
68. See Cheff, 199 A.2d at 554.
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69

The Delaware Supreme Court would not uphold greenmail
payments if primarily motivated by a desire for entrenchment in
control.7 °

This treatment of greenmail by the Delaware courts was a defining
moment in the evolution of corporate law. Had Delaware insisted on
equal treatment of shareholders, practically none of the modem
defensive tactics (both recapitalizations and securities) would be
conceivable. Typical is the treatment by the Delaware courts of the
paradigmatic defense of a coercive self-tender and the exemplary
defensive security known as the poison pill.7' Both defenses operate by
discrimination, by treating friendly and hostile shareholders differently. 2
b. The Coercive Self-Tender
The coercive self-tender consists of a buy-back offer by the target
corporation to its own shareholders.7 3 The hostile suitor is excluded from
the offer. The corporation repurchases (or simply threatens to
repurchase) its own shares at a premium. As a result, the surviving
shares are worth less: the corporation "lost" the premium. Shareholders
do not mind this reduction in value because they are the recipients of this
premium. The hostile
suitor bears the loss and is left holding the
' 74
proverbial "bag.

c.

The Poison Pill

The "poison pill" is a security which operates very similarly. It
entitles its holders to contingent rights which would have similar dilutive
effects to the distribution of a premium.75 The contingency is a hostile

69. Id. at 555.
70. See id. at 554.
71. See, e.g., Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1056-60 (Del. Ch.
1988) (stating that poison pills may be valid in Delaware if they meet several factors, including the
reasonableness of the poison pill defense in relation to the threat posed).
72. See Michael B. Regan, Note, DeadEnd: Delaware'sResponse to the Recent Innovation in
CorporateAntitakeover Measures, the So-Called "DeadHand" Poison Pill, in Carmody v. Toll
Brothers, Inc., 44 VILL. L. REV. 643, 643 & nn.2-3 (1999).
73. See Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278,287 (Del. Ch. 1989).
74. I will discuss a coercive self-tender in greater detail below. See infra notes 93-107 and
accompanying text (discussing the Unocal case).
75. See, e.g., 3 JAMES D. Cox ET AL., CORPORATIONS § 23.7 (Supp. 2000).
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acquisition of a given percentage of shares in the target. 76 Holders
usually receive the right to buy additional shares at a discount.77 The
hostile suitor, whose stake shrinks in value as well as in percentage
ownership of the target, does not have this right. Despite the unequal
division of shareholders value, the poison pill was
considered an
7
appropriate defense by the Delaware Supreme Court. 1
The ability to discriminate between shareholders is instrumental for
the defensive tactics that are used most often by American corporations.
Very different defenses would have to be used if corporate law
mandated the equal treatment of friendly and hostile shareholders.
Without the ability to discriminate among shareholders, defensive
measures would need to include outside entities. These would be third
parties who would enter into contractual relations that would have
contingencies producing deterrent effects on hostile buyers. Such
contracts exist; they do not have to be imagined. Not only have target
corporations often used outside entities to protect control, but also in the
context of a merger of similarly sized corporations, each merging
corporation acts to protect the control of the other against the possibility
that a third party tries to buy one of the two.79
Some outside entities provide such protection, and are thus known
as "white knights."80 Typically management agrees to sell the
corporation to the white knight. The hostile suitor may still buy control
with a tender offer. To prevent the hostile suitor from outbidding the
white knight, the target enters into contracts that give value of the target
to the white knight (known as "locknps").8' A characteristic example is
the value that Revlon gave to Forstmann Little in order to fend off
Perelman's hostile acquisition. 82 Forstmann received the right to buy a
unit of Revlon for a discount of $100 to $175 million from its estimated
value, plus a $25 million "cancellation fee" that would be due to

76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1357 (Del. 1985) (indicating that the
propriety of the poison pill's use is to be determined on a case-by-case basis).
79. See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., Nos. 10866, 10670, 10935,
1989 Del. Ch.LEXIS 77, at *28 (Del. Ch. July 17, 1989), aff'd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
80. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 1591 (defining a "white knight" as "a
person or corporation that rescues the target of an unfriendly corporate takeover, [especially] by
acquiring a controlling interest in the target corporation or by making a competing tender offer").
81. See id.
at 951 (defining "lockups" and "lockup options").
82. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 178 (Del. 1986).
For a discussion of Revlon, see infra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2001

23

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 2
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:11

Forstmann Little if it lost the takeover battle." This reduced the value of
Revlon to the competing bidder by $125 to $200 million.8
Similar lockups are used in mergers. Each corporation grants the
other side rights to stock, property, intellectual property, or other rights
and entitlements. The effect is to reduce the value of the two merging
corporations to potential hostile bidders. A typical example is the share
exchange used by Time and Warner before their merger, by which they
contracted to exchange blocks of stock of about 10% in each other.8 One
of the effects of the share exchange agreement is the transfer of value to
the other side if one party becomes subject to a hostile bid. 86 If, for

example, a bidder for Time were to increase dramatically the value of
Time shares but not of Warner shares, the share exchange would benefit
Warner. The share exchange also makes the acquisition of the control of
one of the merging entities harder, because the issuance of the shares
will dilute the acquirer's stake. Viacom's subsequently enjoined bid for
Paramount provides one more example of a lockup." The merger
agreement contained a termination fee of $100 million that would be due
to Viacom if the merger fell through." Viacom also received the right to
buy almost 20% of Paramount's shares for $69.14, close to the initially
agreed upon consideration for the buyout.s9 Viacom could elect to pay
with subordinated debt for this stock or to demand an equivalent cash
payment instead of exercising its option. 90 The effect was that a hostile
acquirer for Paramount would consider Paramount less appealing to the
tune of $100 million plus one-fifth of the difference between the hostile
bid and Viacom's initial bid.91
83. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178.
84. Resulting from the addition of the $25 million cancellation fee to the $100-$175 million
discount.
85. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., Nos. 10866, 10670, 10935, 1989 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 77, at *28 (Del. Ch. July 17, 1989), aft'd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). For a more
extensive discussion of Time, see infra notes 115, 117-21 and accompanying text.
86. See id. at *28.
87. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 39 (Del.
1993). For a more extensive discussion of QVC, see infra notes 116, 122-25 and accompanying text.
88. See id. at 39.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. The cost to the hostile acquirer of one-fifth of the amount by which its bid exceeds
Viacom's initial bid corresponds to the effect of the options and becomes clearer if we consider that
Viacom would simply demand a cash payment so that no additional shares would have to be issued.
Suppose Paramount had 100 million shares outstanding. Viacom's option was for the appreciation
corresponding to 20% or one-fifth. Someone who bids $10 higher than Viacom's initial bid would
cause the price of Paramount shares to rise by $10 above Viacom's bid. Then Viacom would
demand a payment corresponding to its option to buy 20%, or 20 million shares in this example, for
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Once Delaware had taken the step of allowing discrimination
among shareholders for the purpose of protecting corporate policy, the
arena within which the law of corporate defenses would evolve had been
chosen. This choice largely predicted the outcome: defensive tactics
founded on discriminating between shareholders would be much more
likely to be undertaken than defensive tactics which rely on an outside
entity. Not only do discriminatory defensive tactics prevent the diversion
of corporate value to outsiders but outsiders also pose a threat to the very
control they have protected. Outsiders cannot be relied upon to tolerate
ineffective management for long. If the European trend of prohibiting
shareholders
will produce a
discrimination
takeover regime among
very different
from thatcontinues,"
of the Unitedit States.

$10 below the acquisition price. Paramount would owe $10 for each share to which Viacom had an
option, which is one of every five shares. This debt is equal to one-fifth of the total increase in value
due to the competing bid, i.e., 20% of the increased capitalization of Paramount beyond the
capitalization implied by Viacom's first bid. In other words, the acquired Paramount would owe
Viacom one-fifth of the extra value that the buyer considered Paramount to have above Viacom's
bid.
The calculation is slightly different in the case that Viacom is assumed to have the stock
issued so that Viacom would purchase it at the price specified by the option. Suppose that
Paramount had 100 million shares outstanding and the competing bidder, as above, offers $10 per
share more than Viacom, or $79.14. To fulfill Viacom's option, Paramount would issue 20 million
shares at $69.14. Thus, Viacom would get slightly less than 20% (actually 20 - 120 = 16.67%) in
the enterprise that the competing buyer considered worth $79.14 * 100 million = $7914 million.
Paramount would also become slightly more valuable by virtue of Viacom's payment for the shares.
That payment would be $69.14 * 20 million = $1382.8 million. The net effect is that Viacom would
obtain 16.67% of an enterprise worth $9296.8 (7914 + 1382.8) million, of existing value plus value
injected by Viacom's purchase. Viacom's share would correspond to about $1549.78 million, and
would have been purchased for $1382.8 million. This would be a windfall of about $167 million.
This corresponds to Viacom's 16.67% share in the increased valuation. The formula for the
calculation of Viacom's windfall would be (bid * out + .2 * out * $69.14) * (.2 -1-1.2) - (.2 * out *
$69.14) which simplifies to .2 * out * (bid - 69.14) + 1.2, where (out) is the number of outstanding
shares and (bid) is the per share value of the winning bid. Note that Viacom prefers the previous
outcome where it receives the full 20% of the increased valuation, while if it exercises its option it
only receives 16.67%. The competing bidder adjusts its bid the same way regardless of which
choice Viacom would make. The competing bidder with a valuation (v) will take Viacom's option
to buy a fraction (op) of the shares for a "strike price" (str)into account and will bid (v + op * str)+
(1 + op) per share rather than his full valuation v because it values the enterprise after Viacom's
exercise at (v * out + op * out * str)and this value would be divided among (1 + op)out shares. If
Viacom were to elect to take cash, the bid would have to be equal to the valuation minus Viacom's
extraction of value which is op(bid - str). The solution to bid = v - op(bid - str) for (bid) is identical
to the previous calculation of the competing bidder's bid (which assumed Viacom would exercise
its option).
92. See infra Part IlI.C.
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2. Fine-Tuning Discriminatory Defenses
Although the principle of allowing strong defensive moves had
already been established by allowing discriminatory defenses, not every
defense would survive scrutiny. The rule would be fine-tuned as
management would try increasingly strong defenses. Defenses would
need not to exceed an intensity proportional to the threat posed by the
hostile acquirer. An end-point would also be imposed to the contest,
after which defenses would need to be withdrawn.
a. The Proportionality of Defenses: Unocal
In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,93 Unocal, a petroleum
company, became the target of a hostile takeover bid by Mesa
Petroleum. 94 T. Boone Pickens, whose notoriety as a takeover artist is
partially due to this very fight, had working control of Mesa.95 Mesa had
acquired 13% of Unocal by the time it announced a bid for the 37% that
would give Mesa majority control of Unocal.96 In the associated
disclosures, Mesa announced that it would complete a merger with
Unocal.97 The consideration that the remaining minority shareholders of
Unocal would receive in the merger included debt securities. 98
Unocal's defense was to threaten a discriminating transaction that
would reduce the value of Mesa's position." Unocal would make a
tender offer for its own stock at a price well above market to which
Mesa would not be allowed to tender its shares.' °° This overpriced
buyback from public shareholders would dramatically reduce the value
of surviving shares. While public shareholders would be compensated
for the reduction in value by means of the premium they would receive
for the shares they did sell, Mesa would suffer this drop in value
unmitigated.
An example will clarify the effect of the transaction. Suppose
Unocal has assets of $100, equivalent capitalization of $100 and 100

93. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
94. See id. at 949.
95. See id. Pickens's working control was not enough to prevent his own ouster when Mesa's
performance became unsatisfactory. See Allen R. Myerson, Revamping is Approvedfor Mesa, N.Y.
TIMES, June 26, 1996, at D4.
96. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 949-50.
99. See id. at 950-51.
100. See id.
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shares outstanding.'0 ' Mesa owns thirteen of those shares and makes its
offer for thirty-seven more. Mesa's position is worth $13. Unocal offers
to buyback fifty shares, pro rata from each non-Mesa shareholder for
$1.50 by using corporate assets (in actuality it was mainly borrowing
funds by pledging assets, which would have the same effect).r12 Thus,
Unocal's assets would be reduced by 50 * $1.50 = $75 to $25 of
remaining assets. The fifty shares that would survive as outstanding after
the buyback would share in this value. They would be worth $25 +50 =
$0.50 each. The effect on Mesa is that its thirteen shares drop in value
from $13 to $6.50. The public shareholders, however, do not mind the
transaction because they participate in the distribution through the
buyback. Moreover, since Mesa is excluded from the buyback, public
shareholders participate in the distribution of value through the buyback
disproportionately, to the extent Mesa is excluded.
Not only is this transaction detrimental to Mesa, but it is also
coercive to shareholders. Public shareholders who believe Mesa's offer
superior to the position in which Unocal's counter would leave them,
cannot afford to pass Unocal's self-tender. Thus, the fight for control is
no longer an auction in which the superior offer will win, but a foregone
conclusion in favor of Unocal.
Before turning to the Delaware courts' treatment of this transaction,
it is worth thinking about its effect on the concentration of ownership.
Mesa was controlled by Pickens.' °3 The ownership of Unocal was
dispersed." 4 Thus, if Mesa were to take over Unocal in exchange for
cash and debt, the combined entity would be under the working control
of Pickens.
The ostensible reason that the court allowed the Unocal counter was
that Mesa's offer was a threat because it had two tiers. The first tier, the
cash that Mesa offered in the tender offer for the shares it needed to
reach 50%, did not match the consideration in the second tier which
included securities. Unocal argued that Mesa's offer was coercive. '

101. Capitalization is the value of all the outstanding shares of the corporation. See BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 202. Here, each share is worth $1 and 100 shares exist, making
the capitalization $100.
102. The buyback is prorated according to SEC Rule 14d-8, which requires a tender offeror to
repurchase proportionate amounts from all shareholders in cases of oversubscribed tender offers.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (2001). Unocal's offer would be oversubscribed because all shareholders
would tender in order not to lose the premium.
103. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
104. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949.
105. See id. at 956.
106. See id. at953.
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Shareholders could not afford to get stuck with the less liquid and the, in
Unocal's view, less valuable securities, and they would, therefore,
accept Mesa's inadequate offer despite preferring the alternative, which
was keeping their Unocal shares.
Under this reasoning, Unocal's much more coercive defensive offer
was a proportional response to the threat. Management are not entitled to
coerce their own shareholders, but in these circumstances, the coercive
offer was allowed. The true source of the court's decision could well be
that the transaction would lead to a concentration of ownership."r
b. The You-Lost-You-Must-Sell Endpoint: Revlon
The alternative to a discriminatory defense is a friendly merger. For
target management, the problem lies in ensuring that the friendly buyer
outbids the hostile one. To secure a high bid, the target needs to grant
valuable lockups to the friendly bidder.0 8 The Delaware courts reviewed
the use of this tactic in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc.'°
The hostile acquirer, Ronald Perelman's corporation Pantry Pride,
kept increasing its bids for Revlon."0 Revlon sought protection from a
private leveraged buyout partnership, Forstmann, Little, & Co."' In
order for Forstmann Little to keep outbidding Pantry Pride, greater and
greater lockups were required. At some point, according to the court, it
became clear that Revlon would have to be, broken up."2 The increasing
bids and ever greater lockups implied that the buyer would have to sell
parts of the target.
Since the target corporation would not survive the transaction,
target management was not entitled to protect corporate policy by
biasing the process in favor of the bidder it preferred."3 When the

107. The SEC has used its authority to regulate tender offers so as to ban discriminatory tender
offers, precluding a repetition of the Unocal defense. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4(f)(8)(i) (2001);
id. § 240.14d-10(a)(1) (2001) ("No bidder shall make a tender offer unless ... [t]he tender offer is
open to all security holders of the class of securities subject to the tender offer .... "). I discuss the
desirability of this prohibition below, see infra note 424 and accompanying text.
108. See David A. Skeel, Jr., A Reliance DamagesApproach to CorporateLockups, 90 Nw. U.
L. REv. 564, 600 (1996).
109. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del. 1986).
110. Seeid. at 178-79, 181.
11. See id. at 177-78.
112. Seeid.at182.
113. See id.
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breakup of the target became clear, its management was obligated to step
back and let the auction go on without bias."4
3. Concentration Matters: From Revlon, to Time and QVC
The holding in Revlon had very much to do with preventing
concentrated ownership, but that becomes more apparent if Revlon is
juxtaposed with two seemingly contradictory decisions, Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. Time,
Inc."5 and ParamountCommunications,
6
Inc."
Inc. v. QVC Network,
In Time, Warner and Time had decided to merge."7 Paramount
decided to make a hostile bid for Time and let the shareholders decide
between the lackluster merger and its lucrative cash offer."8 The bid was
conditioned on removal of lockups and other measures safeguarding the
pending Time-Warner merger.9 Perhaps Paramount was hoping for a
broad interpretation of Revlon: that management of the target must not
bias the auction if a sale of the corporation is unavoidable.
The Delaware Supreme Court foiled Paramount's hopes and stated
that the merger of Time with Warner constituted a strategic alliance.
The strategic alliance was a long-term plan that would survive the
transaction. The shareholders of Time would participate in its success or
failure. Therefore, the strategic alliance was a sufficient corporate
interest for target management to protect with the lockups and the other
transaction-protecting terms of the Time-Warner agreement.'
Soon after, the Delaware Supreme Court would distinguish Time
from a very similar transaction. Having learned its lesson from Time,
Paramount set up a strategic alliance with Viacom and erected the usual
lockups and other defenses to guard it.'2 QVC, however, made
a bid for
3
Paramount contingent on the removal of the deal's defenses.

114. See id. (describing the director's role as changing from defenders of the "corporate
bastion" to "auctioneers" with a duty to get the best price possible for the stockholders from the sale
of the company).
115. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). The effects of the Time decision on conglomeration
incentives and market liquidity are briefly discussed below, see infra note 399.
116. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993).
117. See Time, 571 A.2d at 1147.
118. Seeid.
119. Seeid.
120. See id. at 1149-51.
121. See id. at 1151.
122. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 39 (Del.
1993).
123. Seeid. at40.
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In an abrupt turnaround, the Delaware Supreme Court held in QVC
that the merger with Viacom was unlike the merger of Time with
Warner.' 2 The difference lay in that Viacom was over 70% controlled by
a single individual, Sumner Redstone, and the resulting entity would be
under his majority voting control."z Since the shareholders of Paramount
would never again have the opportunity to receive a premium for
control, its sale should be conducted by auction. By contrast, the
shareholders of Time could still receive a premium for control because
someone could bid to take over the combined Time-Warner entity.
In its prior cases-Cheff v. Mathes 26 and Moran v. Household
International, Inc., 27 as well as in Unocal, Revlon, and Time-the
protection of dispersed ownership was never overt. However, in the
QVC opinion, the Delaware Supreme Court finally expressed its desire
to avoid concentrated ownership. In QVC, the court stated that a sale by
merger that would result in an individual owning majority voting control
could not be protected.' By contrast, in Time, the Delaware court held
that a sale by merger which preserved dispersed ownership could be
protected by lockups and other defensive measures. 9
Revlon, the case which first imposed a duty to auction, does not
seem to fit in that continuum. Either buyer would lead to concentrated
ownership. A purchase by Pantry Pride would lead to control by Ronald
Perelman and a purchase by Forstmann Little would lead to control
being exercised by the Forstmann Little firm which is organized as a
professional partnership.
The Revlon puzzle unravels if we consider it as the test of white
knight defenses. Leveraged buyout firms ("LBO firms") are typically
organized as partnerships, just like Forstmann Little. 130 Target
management, pressed to find a white knight, would tend to turn to these
vehicles of concentrated ownership. Revlon stopped such a trend toward
concentrated ownership from forming. LBO firms would not become an

124. See id. at43.
125. Seeid. at38, 43.
126. 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964); see also supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
127. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). Moran upheld the use of the poison pill. See supra note 78
and accompanying text.
128. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43
(Del. 1993).
129. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1151 (Del. 1989).
130. See Jason M. Klein, When the Board Should Just Say Yes to Management: The Interplay
Between the Decision of Whether to Conduct an Auction and Transaction Structure, 5 STAN. J.L.
BUS. & FIN. 45, 46 (1999).
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effective defensive tool. Thus, the Delaware courts preempted such a
trend toward concentrated ownership.
4. Delaware's Bias Against Uncontested Unilateral Privatization
All the discretion that the Delaware courts appear to give managers
in the context of defenses disappears before a different threat to
dispersed ownership. If managers attempt to take their own company
private, the Delaware courts will be as exacting as they were permissive
in defensive tactics.
The definitive Delaware case on privatizing transactions is
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,' where shareholders of UOP, Inc. challenged
the buyout of their minority shares by Signal, the parent and majority
owner of the corporation. 32 The standard that the Delaware Supreme
Court articulated demands not only that the substantive terms of the
buyout transaction be fair, but also that the procedure used to achieve it
be fair.' This substantive and procedural fairness is illustrated nicely in
the shortcomings of the privatization of UOP.' 34
The first stumbling block for the court was the use by the parent of
the subsidiary's information collected by directors of the subsidiary that
were employees of the parent. 35 Not only was the parent given this
information, but there was no disclosure to the subsidiary that its own
directors played this role that was adverse to the subsidiary's interests.'36
Quite contrary from an attempt at "puffery" initiated for the benefit of
the subsidiary, this information was kept from it because it could be used
to justify a higher price than was ultimately accepted.137 Indeed, the court
notes:
Since the study was prepared by two UOP directors, using UOP
information for the exclusive benefit of Signal, and nothing whatever
was done to disclose it to the outside UOP directors or the minority
shareholders, a question of breach of fiduciary duty arises. This
problem occurs because there were common Signal-UOP directors
participating, at least to some extent, in the UOP board's

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
Seeid. at703.
See id. at711.
See id. at 711-14.
See id. at 709.
See id.
See id.
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decision-making processes without full disclosure of the conflicts
they faced. M

The court proceeds to examine the decision-making process that led
the subsidiary to accept the parent's offer. What surfaces is that the
parent not only tried to profit from the subsidiary's information at the
subsidiary's expense, but it also set a harried pace for the subsidiary's
reaction, and indirectly forced 1an
excessively speedy valuation by the
39
banker.
investment
subsidiary's
Thus, the Weinberger court banishes any cavalier attitude that a
majority shareholder may have about its capacity to force a buyout of the
minority's shares. Unless the subsidiary negotiates in a truly
independent fashion, the procedure is suspect. Even a favorable vote by
the majority of the minority shareholders-as existed in Weinbergercannot cure this failure. Finally, even if this exacting procedure is
followed, an unfair price will still be unacceptable.
The Weinberger test of fairness received a trial by fire in Kahn v.
Lynch CommunicationSystems, Inc., 4° which addressed the attempt of a
large shareholder, Alcatel (with 43%), to buy Lynch. 14 ' The relationship
between Lynch and Alcatel was not quite that of a subsidiary and parent.
Nevertheless, Alcatel dominated Lynch because it held a crucial veto
right.'4 2 By virtue of a supermajority provision, Lynch could not
effectuate any corporate combination without Alcatel's support. 43 This
right was crucial because the telecommunications industry was at such a
juncture that Lynch needed to merge with another company in order to
exploit the evolving technology.'" Alcatel had already blocked one
attempt of Lynch to merge with another telecommunications company,
and had counterproposed a merger with a subsidiary of Alcatel.' 45 That
deal did not materialize when Lynch's independent negotiating
committee refused Alcatel's offers.' 6 In response, Alcatel offered to
purchase Lynch. 47 When negotiations were about to fail because the
138. Id. at 709. In a footnote at the end of this excerpt, the Delaware Supreme Court explained
that had UOP conducted negotiations with Signal through a committee of disinterested directors,
this conflict of interests would probably be cured. See id. at 709 n.7.
139. Seeid. at711.
140. 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994).
141. See id. at 1112.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 1113.
147. See id.
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independent negotiating committee did not consider its bid7 adequate,
Alcatel made it clear that it would proceed with a lower hostile offer.148
Faced with this threat, the resolve of the independent negotiating
committee broke.
When sued by the minority shareholders, Alcatel offered what
appeared to be a Weinberger defense: The terms of the merger were
approved by an independent committee of the board. 149 The Delaware
Supreme Court, however, explained that an independent committee that
is strong-armed by the controlling shareholder will not insulate the
controlling shareholder's inadequate bid: "'[T]he special committee
must have real bargaining power that it can exercise with the majority
shareholder on an arms length basis.""' Indeed, Alcatel had robbed
Lynch of any alternative. Mergers with non-Alcatel companies were
blocked by Alcatel;' 5' mergers with Alcatel-controlled entities were only
available at disadvantageous terms; 5 2 and independence for Lynch in the
face of a hostile Alcatel offer required a poison pill that the independent
committee considered impractical.'53 This was a classic breach of
fiduciary duties.
The question arises, however, how precisely does the exacting
standard of minority protection of Weinberger and Kahn promote
dispersed ownership? After all, the issues appear circumscribed to
corporations that already have a majority owner, and are, therefore, not
under dispersed ownership. The seamless web of corporate law does not
cover this point. Courts have not spoken precisely about the standards
that govern management's attempts to purchase not majority but only
working control from the public. It is quite paradoxical that this crucial
transition in a corporation's affairs is below the radar screens of the legal
system.'-M Even that question, insofar as it applies to hostile acquisitions,
148. See id. at 1119.
149. See id.
150. Id. at 1117 (quoting Rabkin v. Olin Corp., No. CIV.A.7547, 1990 WL 47648, at *14-15
(Del. Ch. Apr. 17, 1990), aftd,586 A.2d 1202 (Del. 1990)).
151. Seeid.atlll2.
152. Seeid. atlll8.
153. See id. at 1113 n.3 (indicating that the independent committee considered the resulting
debt unacceptable).
154. One may consider the question of whether an acquirer's purchases constitute a tender
offer similar to the question of whether management's expanding (but still minority) stake crosses
some threshold of scrutiny. As soon as the Williams Act's amendments to the securities laws
imposed a delay and other regulatory constraints on tender offers, see rWilliams Act, Pub. L.
No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), hostile
acquirers attempted to circumvent them by not making a general solicitation to shareholders to
tender their shares and, instead, tried to make "creeping" acquisitions of control. The ensuing
litigation left the question of what constitutes a tender offer as vague as it ever was, but the advent
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is outdated due to the proliferation of poison pills that prevent creeping
acquisitions of control.15 ' Nevertheless, not only the argumentation of

of poison pills precluded the strategy and the issue never received the attention that it probably
should have. See generally Dale A. Oesterle, The Rise and Fall of Street Sweep Takeovers, 1989
DUKE L.J. 202, 256 (explaining that although poison pills originated as a means of stopping hostile
acquisitions, they have not been very successful in stopping hostile acquisitions but they have been
significant in regulating the forms that the hostile acquisitions have taken). Typical cases are
Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), afftd, 682 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1982),
where the court held that a 34% acquisition from twenty-two sellers out of twenty-eight solicited
was a tender offer; and Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1985). In Hanson
Trust, the acquisition of 25% of the target in a single transaction from five sellers after termination
of a tender offer was not considered to be a tender offer. See id. at 52, 60.
155. The 1998 poison pill of American General Insurance Corporation, for example, is
triggered either by an acquisition of 15% of the stock or by a tender offer resulting in holdings
greater than 25%:
The Rights are not exercisable or transferable separately from the shares of Common
Stock until the "Distribution Date" which will occur on the earlier of(i) 10 business days
following the first public announcement that a person or group of affiliated or associated
persons (an "Acquiring Person") has acquired beneficial ownership of 15% or more of
the outstanding Common Stock and any other shares of capital stock of the Company
entitled to vote generally in the election of directors or entitled to vote in respect of any
merger, consolidation, sale of all or substantially all of the Company's assets,
liquidation, dissolution or winding up of the Company (the "Voting Stock") or (ii) 10
business days following the commencement of, or the first public announcement of an
intention to commence, a tender or exchange offer the consummation of which would
result in the beneficial ownership by a person or group of affiliated or associated persons
of 25% or more of the then outstanding Voting Stock.
AMERICAN GENERAL CORP., REGISTRATION STATEMENT, FORM S-3, at 63-64 (Feb. 9, 1998),
available at http:l/www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/5103/0000950129-97-004921.txt (last visited
Oct. 16, 2001). The pill entities friendly shareholders to 100 times the votes, dividends, or any other
distributions to common stock by giving them "junior preferred shares":
The Junior Preferred Shares will be non-redeemable and rank junior to all other series of
the Company's Preferred Stock. Each whole Junior Preferred Share will be entitled to
receive a quarterly preferential dividend in an amount equal to the greater of (i) $0.25 or
(ii) subject to certain adjustments, 100 times the dividend declared on each share of
Common Stock. In the event of the liquidation, dissolution or winding up of the
Company, each whole Junior Preferred Share will be entitled to receive a preferential
liquidation payment in an amount equal to the greater of (i) $1.50, or (ii) 100 times the
aggregate amount to be distributed per share to holders of Common Stock, plus, in either
case, an amount equal to all accrued and unpaid dividends thereon. In the event of any
merger, consolidation or other transaction in which Common Stock is exchanged for or
changed into other stock or securities, cash or other property, each whole Junior
Preferred Share will be entitled to receive 100 times the amount received per each share
of Common Stock. Each whole Junior Preferred Share will be entitled to 100 votes on all
matters submitted to a vote of the shareholders of the Company, and Junior Preferred
Shares will generally vote together as one class with the Common Stock and any other
voting capital stock of the Company on all matters submitted to a vote of shareholders of
the Company.
Id. at 65.
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this Article, but also voluminous economic evidence,1 56 points to the
accumulation of a controlling minority block as a very significant event.
That the legal system is oblivious to "friendly creeping
acquisitions" of working control is not hard to explain. A friendly
creeping acquisition of working control requires a series of purchases.157
The particular purchase that produces working control is exceptionally
hard to locate. Corporate management, holding a small fraction of
shares, probably in the neighborhood of 0.1% to 5%, decides to increase
its stake to perhaps 25% or even 40%. Excluding the overt tender offer
that will trigger disclosure and attention, management can use any
technique to increase its stake, including use of the corporate machinery
it controls. Thus, the corporation itself can help management by means
of buying back its own shares from its shareholders, resulting in an
increase of management's percentage of outstanding shares. Moreover,
management has the luxury to stretch its purchases over time. Unlike
hostile creeping acquisitions, management does not have to fear the
adoption of defensive tactics. Quite the opposite, management can erect
roadblocks before any outsider's attempt to purchase control while
adjusting its strategy and continuing to increase its holdings. The full
impact of ostensibly defensive measures can be easily hidden in such a
long-term strategy. A supermajority provision that requires 75% for all
156. Evidence shows that ownership concentration is important for overall firm value, and that
not the same concentration is desirable for every firm. The most recent support is from Japanese
evidence. See YORsHIRO MIwA & J. MARK RAMSEYER, DOES OWNERSHIP MATrER? EVIDENCE
FROM THE ZAIBATSU DISSOLUTION PROGRAM passim (John M. Olin Ctr. L. Econ. & Bus., Working
Paper Series, Discussion Paper No. 314, 2001) (indicating that after the break up by the U.S.
occupation of the zaibatsu, restructured firms had suboptimal ownership structures and their value
varied with ownership concentration; once concentration returned to its optimal point, different for
each
firm,
it
no
longer
had
an
effect
on
valuation),
available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin-center (last visited Feb. 8, 2002); see also John C.
Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The InstitutionalInvestoras CorporateMonitor, 91 COLUM.
L. REV. 1277, 1294-1302 (1991); Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lehn, The Structure of Corporate
Ownership: Causes and Consequences, 93 J. POL. ECON. 1155, 1159 (1985) (arguing that optimal
ownership structure is firm-specific); John J. McConnell & Henri Servaes, Additional Evidence on
Equity Ownership and CorporateValue, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 595, 601 (1990) (indicating that firm
value peaked at an inside ownership of 37.6% in 1986); John J. McConnell & Henri Servaes, Equity
Ownership and the Two Facesof Debt, 39 J. FIN. ECON. 131, 156 (1995) (noting that the allocation
of equity ovnership stakes is more important in low-growth firms than in high-growth firms; high
growth firms are more valuable if they have less debt, low growth firms are more valuable if they
have more debt, supporting a discipline effect of debt on low growth, and a financing constraint
effect on growth); Randall Morck et al., Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An
Empirical Analysis, 20 J. FIN ECON. 293, 311-14 (1988) (studying the valuation of Fortune 500
corporations and finding that firm value increases, then decreases as the directors' ownership stake
increases).
157. See, e.g., Glenn E. Coven, Taxing Corporate Acquisitions: A Proposalfor Mandatory
Uniform Rules, 44 TAXL. REv. 145, 180-81 (1989); Oesterle, supra note 154, at 208 n.43.
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corporate combinations looks innocuous when management has only
10%. The same provision becomes an absolute bar to a hostile corporate
combination when management's stake later exceeds 20%."'
In the series of purchases that produce working control, identifying
the one that solidifies working control is also futile. Indeed, the use of
the word "solidifies" next to "working control" is paradoxical. Working
control is never absolutely solid. Even with the privilege of the
contemporary well-stoked defensive arsenal, the controlling group is
vulnerable. Defenses may make working control less vulnerable to a
hostile tender offer, but working control can still be defeated in a proxy
fight. Thus, it is not hard to understand why the courts, even if they had
been given the opportunity to examine creeping acquisitions of working
control, would likely avoid drawing any lines. A rule hinging on a
nefarious and mercurial concept such as working control is exactly the
kind of quicksand that courts would avoid. We are much more likely to
see the courts becoming involved in an ex post examination of the
controlling group's actions using the well-developed methodology of
fiduciary obligations.
Working control is an intermediate threat to minority shareholders.
Working control is a greater threat than management with a truly small
stake, but a smaller threat than a majority controller. Thus, the Delaware
courts would (and should) require a higher standard in conflicted
transactions regarding working control than from a management team
with a truly small stake."5 9 We can visualize the courts' stance by
considering the treatment of the same action, the adoption of a 75%
supermajority provision for corporate combinations, as management's
stake increases. When management has 3%, a 75% supermajority
provision for corporate combinations will in all likelihood be subject to
the permissive business judgment rule. The same supermajority
amendment becomes more likely to be considered an entrenching
transaction as management's stake increases. When management has
over 25% of the voting power, the same supermajority provision is
clearly subject to scrutiny. It may entrench management and create a
conflict of the interests of management with those of the shareholders
that it represents16" Similarly, the business judgment rule that inoculates
158. A similar issue did arise in a defensive repurchase proposed by Unitrin, see infra notes
160,418-22 and accompanying text.
159. See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1995).
160. See, e.g., Am. Gen. Corp. v. Unitrin, Inc., No. CIV.A.13699, 13656, 13663, 13665,
13676, 13685, 13684, 1994 WL 512537, at *3 (Del. Ch. Aug. 26, 1994). Corporate buyback from
the public would increase management's stake from 23% to 28%, enough to veto corporate
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directors' actions against shareholder attack, 6 1 would apply in fewer
circumstances as a management team increases its stake. Ultimately, the
transaction by which actual majority control 6is2 acquired will be
subjected to the strict scrutiny akin to Weinberger.
5. The Dispersion-Preserving Choices of Delaware Law
The development of the Delaware law on takeover defenses has
been very gradual. Not every decision comes out in favor of dispersed
ownership. 63 Nevertheless, every major step that the Delaware courts
have taken in their gradual shaping of defensive tactics can be seen as if
designed to preserve dispersed ownership against trends favoring
acquisitions from concentrated owners.
The courts' first choice was to allow greenmail. Some have
criticized greenmail because of its inherent destabilizing effect: the
acquirer is turned away but made richer; the target preserves
independence but to its shareholders' financial detriment.' 64 The Cheffv.
Mathes 65 case should not be read as being about greenmail but about
defensive tactics that discriminate between shareholders. The notion that

combinations given the target's 75% supermajority provision. See In re Unitrin, Inc., S'holders
Litig., Nos. CIV.A.13656, 13699, 1994 WL 698463, at *3 (Del. Ch. Oct. 14, 1994), rev'd, 651 A.2d
1361 (Del. 1995). It was challenged by shareholders and by the hostile bidder it was intended to
thwart. See id. at *4. The buyback was temporarily enjoined by the Court of Chancery with an
analysis consistent with that above. See id. at *13-14. The Delaware Supreme Court, however,
reversed the decision of the chancery court because the buyback program was not "preclusive' nor
"draconian." See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1367. In other words, although it precluded a merger, it was
not draconian because it did not preclude victory in a proxy fight; and because the actual voting
power of the board, due to low turnout at shareholder meetings, already exceeded the 25% veto
block. See id. at 1387-89. Note that if the board's holdings could already veto mergers, then the
buyback has no sinister purpose. See id.
The Delaware Supreme Court's reversal of the lower courts, however, remains somewhat
problematic because American General is dispersedly owned; the board of directors in aggregate
owns about 1.5% and the largest shareholder only owns about 6% of the outstanding shares. See
AMERICAN GENERAL 2000 PRoXY STATEMENT 10-11 (Mar. 21, 2000), available at
http:llwww.investquest.comliq/alagclfinlproxylagcxOO.txt (last visited Aug. 22, 2000).
161. See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1373.
162. See supranotes 131-56 and accompanying text.
163. See, e.g., infra notes 175-83 and accompanying text (discussing Canada S. Oils, Ltd. v.
Manabi Exploration Co., Inc., 96 A.2d 810 (Del. Ch. 1953)).
164. See generally Jonathan R. Macey & Fred S. McChesney, A Theoretical Analysis of
Corporate Greenmail, 95 YALE L.J. 13 (1985) (discussing greenmail extensively). Macey and
McChesney also analyze four statistical studies of greenmail and argue that the greenmail payment
in some cases causes gains to shareholders and in some cases, albeit the majority, it is detrimental.
See id. at 43-48. More recent evidence on golden parachutes is discussed supra notes 4-7 and
accompanying text.
165. 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964).
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an acquisition poses a threat to corporate policy was crucial.'6 This led
to the next
step, that the board of directors is entitled to defend corporate
67
policy.
The protection of corporate policy justifies discrimination between
shareholders. This humble birth of discriminatory defensive tactics was a
crucial first step because without discriminatory defenses, the only
avenue that target management could pursue to preserve control in the
face of a hostile threat would be to enlist the assistance of a friendly
acquirer, one of the white knights. Discriminatory defenses allowed
target self-help, because they allowed the target corporations to protect
their control with no outside assistance. Without this crucial choice,
targets would be effectively forced into the arms of LBO funds and into
concentrated ownership.
Not only were sales to concentrated LBO funds prevented from
becoming the only available defense, but with Revlon they were
rendered a defense that was unlikely to succeed. Thus, after preventing
concentrated ownership from becoming the only foolproof defensive
tactic, the Delaware courts also biased the choice of defenses by making
the defensive merger less appealing.
Once concentration as a matter of course is prevented, the next
issue becomes the preservation of ownership in the face of two
competing acquirers. The Time and QVC pair suggest that target
management will be allowed to defend mergers that preserve dispersed
ownership and will not be allowed to defend mergers that concentrate
ownership.
All this protection of dispersed ownership would be pointless,
however, if friendly buyers, like management, were able to get to
concentrated ownership unchecked. Again, the Delaware courts block
this path to concentrated ownership by giving strong protection to the
minority-protection that combined with the uncertainty of the law
makes managerial acquisitions of control a delicate and costly
endeavor.
Managers, however, cannot be left to run the corporation with no
checks. The only way to remove management without concentrating
ownership is through proxy fights. 169 Indeed, Delaware takes a very
different stance on managerial interference with proxy fights than it does

166.
167.
168.
169.

See id. at 556.
See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946,955 (Del. 1985).
See infra Part m.B.3.
See, e.g., Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971).
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on hostile takeovers.' 70 Again, however, management is given much
more latitude if the proxy fight is part of a strategy that will lead to
concentrated ownership.7
B. Delaware'sNeutrality to Dispersion-PreservingChangesof
Control: Easy Proxy Fights
In contrast to acquisitions, proxy fights alone do not change
concentration. The insurgents start out as a minority and remain one,
regardless of the proxy fight's outcome. More recently, proxy fights
have been coupled with tender offers. 72 This would make them part of a
transaction that may concentrate ownership. Predictably, the courts
would treat defenses to such proxy fights very differently.
The early disputes that arose in the context of proxy fights in
Delaware produced dicta that denounced any interference that would
tend to bias shareholder voting.'73 More recently, however, the Delaware
Court of Chancery placed the review of defenses to proxy fights in the
scheme of the enhanced business judgment rule of Unocal. 74
Nevertheless, what triggers the switch from no-interference to allowing
defenses is a threat to dispersed ownership in the form of a tender offer
that will follow the proxy fight.
1. The Early Cases: Dicta Strictly Prohibiting Interference
The early cases span the years when the cash tender offer was not
yet widely used as a method for hostile acquisitions. Their language
protects an absolute entitlement of the shareholders to vote without any
interference by the board of directors.
The early example of Canada Southern Oils, Ltd. v. Manabi
Exploration Co."' reveals the attitudes of the Delaware judiciary.
Canada Southern, controlled by the Buckleys, held 50.4% of Manabi's
shares.'76 The Buckleys, and Hagan, the president of both Canada
Southern and Manabi,' 77 had a mild disagreement about the management
of Manabi.' Soon thereafter, a resolution authorizing the board to issue

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

See infra notes 189-215 and accompanying text.
See infra Part IHLB.3.
See infra Part III.B.3.
See infra Part llI.B.1.
See infra notes 230-32 and accompanying text.
96 A.2d 810 (Del. Ch. 1953).
See id. at 810-11.
See id.
Seeid. at811.
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more shares at its sole discretion was adopted at a shareholder vote in
which the shares of Canada Southern were voted by proxy given to a
director and lawyer of Manabi. 179 The Buckley-Hagan rift grew deeper
and Hagan resigned from his position at Canada Southern but not from
Manabi 8 ° Hagan then engineered a board meeting of Manabi, that the
Buckleys could not attend, and at which the board authorized the sale of
shares representing an additional 18%."8" The Delaware Court of
Chancery dismissed Manabi's claim that the issuance was driven by a
need for financing, and granted Canada Southern a preliminary
injunction blocking the issuance and transfer of the new shares, saying:
When the undisputed facts are viewed cumulatively I find it reasonable
to infer that the primary purpose behind the sale of these shares was to
deprive plaintiff of the majority voting control. Hagan and his
associates did too much
2 too soon with too little disclosure to justify a
contrary conclusion.1
The court assumed and the defense conceded that, if the issuance
was motivated by a desire to deprive Canada Southern of control, it was
an improper interference with shareholder voting.'83
A few years later, the Delaware Court of Chancery would express
its dismay at a dilutive exchange of stock in the midst of a takeover
battle. The transaction in Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co.'84 involved
an attempt of Condec to acquire Lunkenheimer through a hostile tender
offer."" Lunkenheimer reached an agreement with a friendly alternative
18 6
buyer and exchanged newly issued shares with the friendly acquirer.
Condec complained that the result of the exchange was to dilute the
control of Lunkenheimer that Condec had already acquired.'87 The court
determined that the friendly transaction
was clearly unwarranted because it unjustifiably strikes at the very
heart of corporate representation by causing a stockholder with an
equitable right to a majority of corporate stock to have his right to a
proportionate voice and influence in corporate affairs to be diminished
by the simple act of an exchange of stock which brought no money
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

See id.
Seeid. at812.
See id.
Id. at 813.
See id.

184. 230 A.2d 769 (Del. Ch. 1967).
185. Seeid. at771.
186. See id. at 772-73.
187. Seeid. at773.
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into the Lunkenheimer treasury, was not connected with a stock option
plan or other proper corporate purpose, and which was obviously
designed for the primary purpose of reducing Condec's stock holdings
in Lunkenheimer below a majority."'
Thus, Condec prohibits interference with voting control. Both
Canada Southern and Condec, however, dealt with situations where
existing management turned against an entity that had or was about to
acquire actual voting control. By contrast, Schnell v. Chris-Craft
Industries,Inc. 9 applies directly to the setting of a proxy fight, where
the insurgents do not have voting control and are simply seeking to
nominate directors opposed by management.
The management of Chris-Craft, faced with the prospect of a
hostile proxy fight, moved the scheduled shareholder meeting to an
earlier date. The meeting was moved by over a month, from January 11,
1972, to December 8, 1971."0 The Delaware Supreme Court relied on
the lower court's conclusions that management's actions left little
chance of a successful proxy fight:
[T]hose conclusions amount to a finding that management has
attempted to utilize the corporate machinery and the Delaware [1]aw
for the purpose of perpetuating itself in office; and, to that end, for the
purpose of obstructing the legitimate efforts of dissident stockholders
in the exercise of their rights to undertake a proxy contest against
management. These are inequitable purposes, contrary to established
principles of corporate democracy. The advancement by directors of
the by-law date of a stockholders' meeting, for such purposes, may not
be permitted to stand. 9 '

With the authority of its supreme court, Delaware repeats that no
interference with shareholder voting powers will be allowed.'2 This
teaching was applied directly in Lerman v. Diagnostic Data, Inc.,'93
where management postponed the shareholder meeting, but extended the
notification requirements so as to preclude the insurgent plaintiff from
being able to meet them.'9 Although this was not necessarily intentional,
it was a sufficient interference with voting for the court to interpret the
above quotation from Schnell to mean that changes in the annual
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id. at 777.
285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971).
See id. at 438.
Id. at 439.
See id.
421 A.2d 906 (Del. Ch. 1980).
See id. at912.
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meeting mechanism (such as its date and the notification deadline)
"cannot be put into operation in such a manner that those wishing to
wage a proxy fight are required to be in a state of 'shelf-readiness' in
order to meet a sudden advancement of the date."'95 The Lennan court,
thus, indicates that the corporate machinery cannot be used in such a
way as to require insurgents to have all their documentation ready ahead
of time (i.e., to be in "shelf-readiness") in order to wage a successful
proxy fight.'96
These extremely protective statements that safeguard the pure
exercise of shareholder voting rights would be diluted in the mideighties. The recent cases perceive justifications for deviating from this
absolute protection from interference with corporate democracy.
2. Recent Cases: Blasius and the Intermediate Standard
Delaware started qualifying the previously absolute protection of
voting from interference with In re Anderson, Clayton Shareholders'
Litigation.9 7 Despite siding with the insurgent plaintiffs, the court
interjected language suggesting the possibility that the protection of the
undisturbed exercise of voting was not absolute.'
The management of Anderson, Clayton suggested a recapitalization
plan, on which its shareholders were to vote on June 3, 1986.' 91 An
alternative bidder was announced to the board on May 29, and on June 2
the shareholders received proxy statements to the effect that negotiations
with the hostile bidder would continue but that the recapitalization
should be voted on in case the negotiations did not reach fruition.20 The
vote was extended to 5 p.m. on June 5.2°'The negotiations, however,
failed to proceed because the potential acquirer refused to abide by
management's condition that the acquirer not pursue a hostile offer, nor
challenge the recapitalization.m The board met on June 7.203 Its
independent directors, after hearing revised (upward) estimates of the
value the shareholders would receive in the recapitalization and after

195. Id. at 914.
196. See id.
197. 519 A.2d 669 (Del. Ch. 1986).
198. See id. at 675.
199. See id. at 672.
200. See id. at 672-73.
201. Seeid. at673.
202. See id.
203. See id. at 674.
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hearing from financial and legal advisers of Anderson, Clayton, decided
to proceed with the recapitalization.",
The court indicated that the disclosure to shareholders, that
negotiations were proceeding with the potential acquirer, was
misleading.205 Shareholders were led to vote in favor of the
recapitalization under the impression that if a preferable outside offer
materialized, it would be pursued.20 The actions of management were to
prevent the outside offer. Thus, Anderson, Clayton appears to have been
decided on a rationale of adequacy of disclosure. After all, Chancellor
Allen writes, "what does concern me is whether the shareholders would
have approved the recapitalization if they had been told .. . 'we won't
bother to explore the [higher outside offer].'" '
The factor that makes Anderson, Clayton not a direct support of
unhindered shareholder democracy is that the board could have
reasonably refused to deal with the outside acquirers. If the board could
fashion the restructuring so that no shareholder vote was required, it
would not even have had to make the hypothetical disclosure that
Chancellor Allen suggests.
The next step qualifying the right to an unhindered vote is Blasius
Industries,Inc. v. Atlas Corp.203 It is important to note that Blasius did
not involve an immediate threat of a hostile acquisition. The insurgents
sought to increase the number of seats on the board from seven to
fifteen, the maximum that Atlas's bylaws allowed, and to appoint
nominees to the eight new seats.2 The change of control that would
ensue would not result from a new majority control of the shares, but
from a new majority on the board of directors.1 °
The incumbent board of directors was faced with the threat of loss
of control.21 ' To defeat the insurgents' efforts they appointed two
additional members to the seven-member board.2 12 Thus, even if the
insurgents were able to capture the rest of the new seats, they would not
have a majority. 3

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

See id.
See id. at 677-78.
See id. at 678.
Id.
564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).
See id. at 654.
See id.
See id. at 655.
See id.
See id.
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This action of the incumbents was challenged and the Delaware
Court of Chancery struck the defense for unjustifiable interference with
the "shareholder franchise. 2 14 Blasius leaves us with the idea that the
board of directors cannot implement measures to distort the free exercise
of the voting powers of the shareholders. In Blasius, however, this
prohibition was perceived as being qualified:
In my view, our inability to foresee now all of the future settings in
which a board might, in good faith, paternalistically seek to thwart a
shareholder vote, counsels against the adoption of a per se rule
invalidating, in equity, every board action taken for the sole or primary
purpose of thwarting a shareholder vote, even though I recognize the
transcending significance of the franchise to the claims to legitimacy
of our scheme of corporate governance.15
In other words, the board of directors may, in exceptional
circumstances, be justified in interfering with shareholder democracy.
This exception that the Blasius court could not foresee-the exception to
the rule prohibiting interference with the corporate franchise-would
arise when the proxy fight is accompanied by a takeover that would
result in concentrated ownership.
3.

Proxy Fights Accompanied by Hostile Takeover Attempts:
Defenses are Permitted
Chancellor Allen authored two opinions that have shaped our
understanding of the reaction of Delaware courts to defenses when the
target is faced by both a proxy fight and a tender offer. Both opinions
come from the same dispute, the fight of Stanley Stahl over the control
of Apple Bancorp.216 The Delaware Supreme Court has remained
unusually
silent with respect to proxy fights used in tandem with tender
217
offers.
Stahl came to own 30.3% of Apple Bancorp before Apple Bancorp
considered implementing a poison pill.218 Stahl's response was to seek
214. See id. at 659-60, 662.
215. Id. at 662.
216. See Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115 (Del. Ch. 1990) ("Stahl T'); Stahl v.
Apple Bancorp, Inc., No. CIV.A.1 1510, 1990 WL 114222 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 1990) ("Stahl I").
217. Not even the Delaware Supreme Court's opinion in Unitrin is relevant. The defensive
measure was a response to a threat that had not materialized and it may well not take the shape of a
joint tender offer and proxy fight. While the defense Unitrin allowed would concentrate ownership
in a very slight degree, the company remained 72% publicly owned. See Unitrin v. Am. Gen. Corp.,
651 A.2d 1361, 1378 (Del. 1995), discussed supra notes 160-62 and infra 418-22 and
accompanying text.
218. SeeStahll,579A.2dat 1118.
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control by means of a proxy fight.219 Stahl also commenced a tender offer
at $38 per share when the shares were trading at $321 , namely for an
18% premium.220 The tender offer was conditioned on Stahl's success in
the proxy fight and elimination of the poison pill." The board sought to
improve its negotiating position by trying to find an alternative buyer
and by trying to delay Stahl.m The board had not set the date for the
annual meeting but had already set a record date, that is, the date as of
which share ownership determines voting rights at the meeting.' In
response to Stahl's threat, the board removed the record date. 4
Stahl complained about the board's removal of the record date.' It
is important to note that in the recitation of the facts, the court stressed
that Stahl responded to an inquiry of the Apple board that he was
unwilling to offer to buyout Apple Bancorp at book value.226 Later, the
court stressed that Stahl had not committed to using his best efforts to
cash-out any nontendering shareholders in a second-step merger and that
he may not even conduct a second step.227 Stahl's offer was, however, for
all stock
and Stahl did express an intent for a second-step cash-out
228
merger.
The dynamics of this situation are delicate. An offer for part of the
stock with no prospect of a buyout of the minority shares would be
coercive. Shareholders would feel pressured to tender their shares for
fear of being stuck with less liquid and less valuable securities after the
takeover. Here the offer was for all of the stock.22 9 Just as in Mesa's
attack on Unocal,230 the Stahl court considers coercive the absence of a
guaranteed cash-out for shareholders who elected not to tender or who
overlooked the offer.22
Stahl attacked the removal of the record date as an interference with
shareholder voting 22 The court's response was that since the
shareholder meeting had to occur by September, the board had only
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

See id.
See id. at 1119 & n.4.
See id. at 1119.
See id.
at 1119-20.
See id.
at 1120.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1118.
See id.
at 1119.
See id.
See id.
See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 956-57 (Del. 1985).
See Stahl L 579 A.2d at 1119, 1124.
See id. at 1121.
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postponed the exercise of the vote without precluding a victory by Stahl,
a victory which was not certain.23' That Stahl's victory is not certain is
important in order to distinguish this case from Canada Southern Oils
and Condec. Both involved board actions against majority owners.2 The
interference was considered improper, but the victory of the majority
was certain.
Finally, the Stahl court explains that a board selling the corporation
must act in an informed way. It is justified in forcing the same on the
shareholders:
Were the directors to undertake to sell the company they would be
obliged to act in an informed way ....
Where the shareholders are in
effect to be asked to decide whether the company should be sold in a
given transaction, the board may properly recognize the shareholders
need for information, other than the market prices of their stock,
relevant to that decision. The disaggregated shareholders are incapable
of obtaining appropriate information on alternatives other than the
Stahl proposal and the market for their stock; only the board can
accomplish that task. Thus, the absence of relevant information, in my
opinion, may reasonably be seen as posing a threat to the vote of the
Bancorp shareholders in the particular context presented. 3'
Essentially, given the threat of an uninformed shareholder decision
to sell at a low price, the board's response of delaying the annual
meeting was not only proportionate but, in the court's words, "extremely
mild."236
After this defeat in the Court of Chancery, Stahl attacked the term
of the poison pill that Apple Bancorp had adopted. 237 The pill determined
beneficial ownership of stock as including any shares "which are
beneficially owned, directly or indirectly, by any other person with
which [the suitor] ..
has any agreement, arrangement or
understanding.. . for the purpose of acquiring, holding, voting or
disposing of any securities of [Apple Bancorp]." ' '
Stahl was not attacking the application of this language to actual
enforceable agreements regarding voting. He was attacking its
terrorizing effect, which precluded him from participating in discussions
that might lead to informal and nonbinding understandings regarding the
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

See id.
at 1123.
See supranotes 175-88 and accompanying text.
Stahl 1, 579 A.2d at 1124 (citations omitted).
Id.
See Stahl II, 1990 WL 114222, at *2.
Id. at *3 (second omission in original).
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election.29 Effectively, Stahl could not talk about Apple Bancorp with a
friend who owned any of its stoclk4° lest the friend be deposed and state
that Stahl's proposals sounded reasonable and that an understanding had
been reached that the friend would support Stahl.
Stahl was effectively conceding that the board needed time to find
an outside buyer, as was the premise of his defeat in Stahl L24' Since
nonbinding understandings between shareholders have no effect on the
board's ability to find an outside buyer, how could this restriction be
reasonable?
The court's response was that an outside deal was not the only way
to improve shareholder value. The board could also try to extract a
higher price from Stahl himself. When negotiating with Stahl, however,
the board would be limited by Stahl's perception of his likelihood to
succeed at the current price. Essentially, if 21% of the shareholders were
to tell Stahl that they found his current offer acceptable and would vote
for it, Stahl would have no incentive to increase his bid. To this effect,
the court quoted the board's investment banker: "'[Ihf Stahl is able to
lock up enough votes, the Board will lose any ability to extract a higher
proposal from Stahl."' 2 42
The court is clearly saying that it allows the interference of the
board with the shareholders' decision to sell the corporation because it is
in the shareholders' own interests.2 43 The factual setting of Stahl is a
world away from the factual setting of Blasius because no uninformed
sale was feared in Blasius. The change of control that would take place
in Blasius was one where no sale was involved and where dispersion
remained constant.2 4
In sum, Delaware law, despite its circuitous route, appears
consistently motivated by a simple concern: that transactions which
concentrate dispersed ownership are problematic. Faced with a
concentrating hostile threat, management can adopt powerful defensive
tactics. Faced with a managerial attempt to concentrate ownership,
minority shareholders receive powerful weapons. Accordingly, the
treatment of proxy fights depends on their substantive outcome. Proxy
fights that do not involve attempts to concentrate ownership are
239. See id.
240. Actually, since Stahl owned 30.3%, his conversant had to own 0.7% or more to put the
two together over the threshold of increasing Stahl's voting power past the next percentage point.
See Stahl 1,579 A.2d at 1118.
241. Seeid.at 1123.
242. Stahl II, 1990 WL 114222, at *4 (quoting Mr. Jackson of Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette).
243. See id. at *7.
244. See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp, 564 A.2d 651,654 (Del. Ch. 1988).
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facilitated. Proxy fights that would lead to concentrated ownership allow
management a strong response.
It is interesting to note that European attitudes, as varied as they
are, lie quite far from the protection to incumbent management that
Delaware provides. 245 The next section provides a brief overview of

245. The positive thesis of this Article was explored above using the conventional approach of
legal scholarship, examining each case closely. All the significant opinions about defenses that have
been produced by the Delaware courts were examined, although some more closely than others.
Other opinions consistent with this thesis may exist outside the set of defense cases, but those were
not discussed.
In particular, the one consistent opinion that stands out is Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d
858 (Del. 1985), where the directors were held personally liable for selling the corporation for too
low a price to a concentrated acquirer that pushed the transaction too fast and aggressively. See id.
at 874. The court practically goes so fak as to say that the board's responsibility is to protect the
shareholders from such pressures at times that the stock price is depressed:
mhe fact of a premium alone does not provide an adequate basis upon which to assess
the fairness of an offering price. Here, the judgment reached as to the adequacy of the
premium was based on a comparison between the historically depressed [target
corporation] market price and the amount of the ... offer. Using market price as a basis
for concluding that the premium adequately reflected the true value of the Company was
a clearly faulty, indeed fallacious, premise .... The record is clear that before
September 20, ... members of [the target]'s Board knew that the market had consistently
undervalued the worth of [the target]'s stock, despite steady increases in the Company's
operating income in the seven years preceding the merger.
Id. at 875-76. A dispersed buyer, of course, could have used stock as consideration. The result
would be that instead of a false price, the shareholders would have to allege both a false exchange
ratio (price) and a bad strategy. Claiming only that the price was too low would be insufficient
because the directors could argue that the strategic success of merger was underestimated by the
market and the future success of the merged entity was determined to be adequate in the informed
business judgment of the directors. The larger the target as a part of the combined entity, the
stronger this defensive argument becomes because it is assisted by the fact that the influence of the
value of the acquired firm on the value of the whole increases. The directors of the target are the
best judges of this, of course, because it is value that flows from the target. An example will
illustrate.
Suppose that the target is worth $150 but the market values it at $85. The Van Gorkom
facts would have the directors sell it for $100 cash and be liable for not selling it for $150. Compare
this, however, to agreeing to a merger the terms of which would have the firm's shareholders
receive 100 shares of the combined entity, which are valued by the market at $85. When the
shareholders make the same complaint, the directors can argue that the true value of their stake is
greater, say $150. Moreover, the directors would argue that the combination offers a unique
opportunity that makes the value that the shareholders receive greater even than the $150 that they
should get in cash. Consider the strength of these arguments if the other merging corporation's
shareholders will hold 900 shares, 100 shares or 10 shares in the merged firm. Our shareholders
would hold, respectively, 10%, 50%, and 89% of the merged firm in these cases. One may doubt the
directors' views about the combined firm if the part of it they know best is 10% of the whole, but
their credibility increases vastly when they vouch for 90% of it.
On the whole, the bias against dispersion was dominant in these cases and present in
practically every case examined in this Article. My thesis is proven, unless a similarly important
group of Delaware cases can be shown to have a bias in favor of concentrated acquirers.
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European jurisdictions' reactions to control contests. It is clear that the
push is for more easily contestable control, but the reader must
remember that European capital markets do not start from the dispersed
ownership common in Anglo-American jurisdictions. 6 Thus, the
common goal may well be for Europe to achieve the dispersed
ownership that failed to develop spontaneously. In Europe hostile
acquisitions may provide a hope for the achievement of dispersed
ownership.
C. EuropeanAttitudes: Easy Acquisitionsfrom ConcentratedOwners
Corporate combinations must be put in perspective by noting the
background of ownership structure in which they operate. The United
States and the United Kingdom, and to a lesser extent perhaps Canada
and Australia, all approach corporate defenses via a structure of
ownership where not only majority stakes, but even large shareholders
are rare. 47 To this we must not forget to add a vibrant environment of
corporate formation. Many of the largest U.S. corporations were not in
existence thirty years ago.24' For example, CISCO Systems, Microsoft,
This is unlikely because all the major takeover cases were covered above, as shown by the
fact that the leading casebook on mergers and acquisitions law, by Professors Ronald Gilson and
Bernard Black, has Delaware court opinions in two chapters, "17: Corporate Law Concerns in
Hostile Transactions," and "19: Corporate Law Concerns in Friendly Acquisitions." The cases
reviewed in the casebook are Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Moran v. Household Internationa Inc., 500 A.2d 1346
(Del. 1985); City CapitalAssociates Limited Partnershipv. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch.),
appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988); ParamountCommunications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571
A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan,
Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988); and ParamountCommunications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637
A.2d 34 (Del. 1993). See generally GILSON & BLACK, supra note 16. The only one of these cases
that was not discussed in this Article is Macmillan, because it deals with favoritism during an
auction process rather than the unfolding of a hostile confrontation. See Macmillan, 559 A.2d at
1264.
In other words, this Article's exposition is objective.
246. See Clas Bergstrdm et al., The Regulation of Corporate Acquisitions: A Law and
Economics Analysis of European Proposalsfor Reform, 1995 COLum. BUS. L. REV. 495,498 n.11.
247. See id. at498 & n.11,502.
248. The venerated venture capitalist, Arthur Rock, recounts the creation of Fairchild
Semiconductor, in 1957, and the founding of Intel, in 1968, by Rock and two of the "Fairchild
Eight" founders. See Arthur Rock, Arthur Rock & Co., in DoNE DEALS: VENTURE CAPrrALISTS
TELL THEIR STORIES 139, 140, 144-45 (Udayan Gupta ed., 2000). Of course, Fairchild
Semiconductor being the progenitor of venture capital, was not financed by an organized group, but
by a corporation of an individual investor, Sherman Fairchild. See id. at 141. A few years later Rock
invested "the princely sum of $60,000" in a company being started by "Steve Jobs and Steve
Wozniak-[, who] weren't very appealing people in those days." Id. at 146, 145. That company was
Apple. It was founded in 1976. See Jane M. Rolling, Comment, No Protection, No Progressfor
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Apple, Oracle, and Dell are corporate giants despite being newborn
compared to the established corporations of continental Europe.
Moreover, in the economies that produce these breakneck speeds of
corporate growth, corporate formation has created a new industry. The
venture capital that feeds the seedlings,
some of which grow to these
249
dimensions, is an industry into itself.
To this we must juxtapose the continental European environment.
The norm in continental Europe is concentrated ownership, the usual
presence of a majority owner, the frequent use of capital structures that
preserve control (pyramids in Italy,2'0 interlocking stakes and directorates
in France,"' and dual class capitalizations in Greece and Swedene 2). The
replication of the venture capital atmosphere has been achieved only
lately. Neither the German Neuer Markt nor the French Nouveau
Marchg, which were to emulate NASDAQ's ability to foster venture
capital by allowing early public offerings, have yet to produce
corporations of a size comparable to the largest American venture capital
success stories. 3
These dramatically different backdrops matter for the law regarding
takeovers and defensive measures. Hostile acquirers can have
concentrated ownership as well as dispersed ownership. When dispersed
ownership is abundant and is continuously created in new corporations,
the legal and economic system feels little pressure to ensure that the
hostile offers from dispersed owners are not impeded. By contrast, in a
system where dispersed ownership is rare, the possibility of hostile
acquisitions by dispersed owners may be a meaningful avenue for
inducing the dispersed ownership that the legal and economic system
has been unable to produce in the stages of corporate formation and
growth. It is against this dramatically different potential to generate new
corporations of dispersed ownership that the attitudes of European laws
GraphicalUser Interfaces, 2 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 157, 162 n. 2 6 (1998). Mitch Kapor
founded Lotus in 1981. See Mitch Kapor, Accel Partners,in DONE DEALS, supra,at 83, 85.
249. In 1997, Venture Capital funds had over $50 billion in assets (held and promised). See
PAUL A. GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 5 (1999).

250. See Marco Pagano et al., The Market as a Source of Capital: Some Lessonsfrom Initial
Public Offerings in Italy, 40 EUR. ECON. REV. 1057 passim (1996); Marco Pagano et al., Why Do
Companies Go Public?An EmpiricalAnalysis, 53 J. FIN. 27, 31 (1998).
251. See, e.g., Lauren J. Aste, Reforming FrenchCorporate Governance:A Return to the TwoTier Board?, 32 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1, 18 (1999).
252.

See HOLMtN & HOGFELDT, supra note 34, at 3-4.

253. See Vanessa Fuhrmans, Playing by the Rules: How Neuer Markt Gets Respect, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 21, 2000, at C1. In three years the NeuerMarkt has increased to 302 traded corporations
with capitalization of $172 billion. See id. That is still less than a third of the capitalization of Apple
Computer, Cisco, Dell, and Gateway. See infra note 313.
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toward defenses must be analyzed. Three interesting facets appear in EU
law, the Proposed Thirteenth Directive, the Proposed Fifth Directive,

and some tax developments.
1. The Star-Crossed Thirteenth Directive
After wrangling over takeover defenses since 1989, the European

Union Council of Ministers produced direct takeover regulation through
the Thirteenth Directive on Company Law and Takeover Bids.'
Formerly, the dominant feature of the Proposed Thirteenth Directive was
an obligation on a buyer to offer to buy 100% of the target when the
buyer's ownership exceeds one-third (33.3%) of the voting power of the

target.2S In the final version of the directive, the threshold for an
obligation to bid for the minority shares has been raised to a controlling
stake.t 5' This is, in effect, an obligation that leads to the sharing of the

control premium with the minority, which hinders acquisitions that
increase productivity.7'
254. See Proposed Thirteenth Council Directive on Company Law Concerning Takeovers and
Other General Bids, 1989 O.J. (C 64) 1 [hereinafter Thirteenth Directive]; Amended Proposal 1990
O.J. (C 240) 1; Amended Proposal, COM(95)655 final at 1-4 [hereinafter Amended Thirteenth
Directive), available at http:llwww3.europarl.eu.intldg7/doclegconsdata/word/1995/0341/1995034
l(COD)-PE2-en.doc (last visited Feb. 6, 2002). A new final version passed the Council of
Ministers. See EU Passes 13th Directive, FIN. TIMES (London), June 20, 2000, at 28. It
subsequently was amended by the European Parliament in such a way that its implementation
became again unlikely. See Paul Meller, Europe Move on Hostile Takeovers is Faulted, N.Y.
TINiEs, Dec. 14, 2000, at W1.
255. See generally Thirteenth Directive, supra note 254, passim.
256. Article 5, paragraph 1 of the proposed directive, as amended by the European Parliament
on December 13, 2000, reads:
where a natural person or legal entity ... [or group] holds securities of a
company... which ... conferfl on him the control of that company, Member States
shall ensure that rules are in force which oblige this person to make a bid as a means to
protect the minority shareholders of that company. This bid shall be addressed to all
holders of securities for all their holdings at an equitable price. An equitable price is at
least the highestprice paid by the offeror... in the twelve months preceding disclosure
of the bid... when the consideration offered by the offeror does not consist of liquid
securities admitted to trading on a regulated market, such consideration has to include a
cash consideration at least as an alternative.
Amended Thirteenth Directive, supranote 254, art. 5, para. 1.
257. An obligation to make a bid for 100% of the target company is a sensitive subject because
it is equivalent to an obligation to share the control premium, i.e., the amount above the market
price that is paid because this block of shares is not simply a passive investment but allows its
holder to control the company. Sharing the control premium has been shown to prevent
productivity-increasing purchases of control. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Efficient and Inefficient
Sales of CorporateControl, 109 Q. J. ECON. 957, 984-87 (1994). If the premium is shared, a buyer
who will not extract private benefits of control but is slightly more skilled than the current
controller, cannot make an offer to the current controller if the controller extracts significant private
value from control. The owner of control will demand compensation for the private benefits to be
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As passed, the primary thrust of the Thirteenth Directive was to
prohibit defensive measures after a takeover bid is imminent.25 s Thus, the
Thirteenth Directive expands Rule 21 of the Takeover Code of the City
of London to apply throughout the European Union. This form of the
Thirteenth Directive would prohibit defensive issuance of securities,
defensive transactions that would significantly alter assets or liabilities
of the company, and defensive repurchases.
The European Parliament, however, thwarted these plans.
According to the early reports of the press, it not only reinstated
management's ability to resist hostile offers without a shareholder vote,
but it also imposed an obligation to consult with their unions when
negotiating25 9 Naturally, the prospects for reconciling these two
diametrically opposed positions through the European Union
Commission were considered unlikely. 26°
2. The Proposed Fifth Directive
The Fifth Directive on Company Law has been discussed without
being adopted since 1972.261 In its original form it injected employee
participation in corporate governance.6 2 The German model of "coforegone, but the sharing rule would force the buyer to compensate all shareholders the same way.
Therefore, a premium-sharing rule is ill-advised.
258. The obligation for hostile bids to reach shareholders remains in the Thirteenth Directive,
although muted by the addition of the interests of the constituencies. For example, article 3,
paragraph 1(c) of the version passed by the Council on June 19, 2000 read "the board of an offeree
company is to act in the best interests of the company as a whole, and must not deny the holders of
securities the opportunity to decide on the merits of the bid." Proposed Thirteenth Council Directive
on Company Law Concerning Takeovers and Other General Bids, art. 3, para. 1(c), 2001 O.J.
(C 23) 4, availableat http:lleuropa.eu.intleur-lexlprilenloj/dat2001/c_023/c_02320010124en00010
014.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2002). The version passed by the European Parliament on December
13, 2000 amended the above to read:
[T]he board of an offeree company is to act in the interests of the company as a
whole, in particular in the interests of corporate policy and its continuation, shareholders
and staff, and with a view to safeguarding jobs, and must not deny the holders of
securities the opportunities to decide on the merits of the bid.
Amended Thirteenth Directive, supranote 254, art. 3, para. 1(c).
259. See Meller, supra note 254.
260. See id.
261. For a history of the Fifth Directive, see J.J.
Du Plessis & J.Dine, The Fate of the Draft
Fifth Directive on Company Law: Accommodation Instead of Harmonisation,1997 J.BUS. L. 23.
262. This is, of course, still the focus of the directive. Even as it has been amended, the
directive would still oblige every European legal system to provide the option of a two-tier system
akin to the German system-of an executive board and a supervisory board with worker
participation. Article 2, section 1 provides that:
The Member States shall provide that the company shall be organized according to a
two-tier system (management organ and supervisory organ) in accordance with Chapter
Im.They may, however, permit the company to have a choice between a two-tier system
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determination" is that of a supervisory board, senior to the board of
directors, with equal shareholder and worker representation. 63 The polar
opposite experience of the United Kingdom does not mandate the
involvement of employees in the administration of the corporation. The
vastly different attitudes on this matter still prevent its adoption.
The Fifth Directive would not seem to involve takeovers, but in its

third amendment, of November 1991,

4

it would prevent dual class

common stock as a defensive strategy. The bar on dual voting power
stock would extend to all corporations whether incorporated before or
after the adoption of the Fifth Directive.
The prohibition on dual voting power recapitalizations is a repeated

theme in European law267 It also appears in the proposed legislation for
the supranationally-chartered Societas Europae.2 6 Action on this matter,
however, is unlikely because of the sharply divergent views of the
members. The Fifth Directive is an example of what many EU states
would like to advance as a proposed bar on takeover defenses, but one
where the current impasse is unlikely to be overcome soon.

organized in accordance with Chapter III and a one-tier system (administrative organ) in
accordance with the provisions of Chapter IV.
Amended Proposal for a Fifth Directive Founded on Article 54(3)(G) of the Treaty Concerning the
Structure of Public Limited Companies and the Powers and Obligations of their Organs, 1983 O.J.
(C 240) 2 [hereinafter 1983 Fifth Directive].
263. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89
GEo. L.J. 439,445 (2001).
264. See COM(91)372 final, art. 33.
265. The proposed Fifth Directive creates a presumption against stock with dual voting power
and requires statutory authorization of dual voting power.
(1) The shareholder's right to vote shall be proportionate to the fraction of the subscribed
capital which the shares represent.
(2) ...The laws of the Member States may authorize the memorandum and the articles
of association to allow:
(a) restriction or exclusion of the right to vote ....
Id. Moreover, additional voting shares cannot be issued in a hurry for defensive purposes because
section 3 of article 3 requires a one month prepayment for the exercise of the right to vote: "Any
shareholder who, at the date of the general meeting, has not paid up calls made by the company at
least one month earlier may not exercise his right to vote." Id.
266. The 1983 version of the proposal, unchanged by the 1991 amendments, requires that all
firms be subject to the Fifth Directive, even if incorporated before its adoption, with a transition
period of eighteen months (and up to four years for the two-tiered board): "The Member States may
provide that [the rules governing the directive] shall not apply to companies already in existence
until the end of a period of 18 months ....
" 1983 Fifth Directive, supra note 262, art. 64.
267. See Deirdre Curtin & John Davies, CapitalStructures Threatened,FIN. TMES (London),
Feb. 6, 1992, at 10.
268. See id.
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3. Tax Developments
In addition to the direct prohibition of defensive measures,
takeovers in Europe are facilitated by tax rules, such as article 4 of the
Directive on the Taxation of Cross-Border Mergers,269 which prevents
the merger from being a tax event if certain conditions are met. Thus,
both the shareholders and the corporations that merge will not realize
gains leading to a tax liability because of the merger.
A dramatic change is in the process of being implemented in
Germany. A tax reform abolishes all long-term capital gain taxation for
stock owned by corporations.2 0 According to arguments for this change,
it aspires to break cross-holdings and to allow large banks to divest from
their stake in firms that they have financed decades ago.27' Crossholdings and large bank ownership are accused of stifling the operation
of corporate governance, of preventing the smooth operation of the
equity markets, of hampering the development of the market for younger
companies and venture capital, and of lending an incestuous aura to the
relation between banks and industrial firms. 2
If it operates as intended, the elimination of capital gains liability
will remove a huge impediment on divestitures. Since friendly mergers
would practically always be nontaxable, 27' this change will be felt
primarily in the context of hostile acquisitions. While the concentrated
ownership indicated by accounts from the early nineties has already
eroded significantly, cross-ownership stakes are still very significant.2 4
269. See Council Directive 90/434/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the Common System of Taxation
Applicable to Mergers, Divisions, Transfers of Assets and Exchanges of Shares Concerning
Companies of Different Member States, art. 4(1), 1990 O.J. (L 225) 1, 5 ("A merger or division
shall not give rise to any taxation of capital gains calculated by reference to the difference between
the real values of the assets and liabilities transferred and their values for tax purposes."), available
at http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga~doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=EN&num
doc=31990L0434&model=guichett (last visited Dec. 31, 2001).
270. The proposed provision is part of the 2000 Tax reform (Steuerreform2000). It reads in the
relevant part "[i]n determining the income, gains from the sale of an interest of the corporation in
another corporation or partnership ... shall not be considered income." See § 8b
Ktirperschaftssteuergesetz in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 22.April 1999 (BGB1. 1999
Teil I S. 817) (translation of Leo Plank). A description of the tax reform in English is available at
http:lwww.bundesfinanzministerium.de/infosltaxref.pdf (last visited Aug. 29, 2000), where the
reference to the elimination of capital gains from corporate cross ownership appears on page 2.
271. See Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or
Function,49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329, 342 (2001).
272. See Towards an Easing of FiscalPolicies in Europe?, BANQUE PARIBAS CONJONCTURE,
Dec. 31, 2000, at 13.
273. See Walter D. Schwidetzky, A Comparison of Corporate Taxation in the United States
and Germany: Different Ways Up the Mountain,28 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 217, 240 (2000).
274. DaimlerChrysler's ownership dispersion has been significantly increased by the merger of
Daimler-Benz with Chrysler. For example, Mark Roe reports that Deutsche Bank had a 28% stake
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It is wrong, however, to conclude that cross-ownership and large
stakes render European corporations invulnerable to hostile takeovers.
The dual phenomenon of large aggregate stakes held by U.S.
institutional investors and of the possible defection of traditionally
friendly shareholders, has recently shown that firms of conventional
European-style concentrated ownership may be vulnerable to hostile
acquisitions. 275 This possibility suggests that European companies may
suddenly find that they are significantly more vulnerable than U.S.
corporations.
In sum, the review of U.S. and EU defense law shows mirror
images. The European Union inhibits defenses while Delaware gives
directors ample authority to implement defensive measures. This
difference, however, in the substantive law may well produce the same
substantive outcome, namely greater dispersion of ownership. The U.S.
defenses protect the dispersed ownership that arises spontaneously in the
process of corporate formation, while the EU lack of defenses allows
takeovers to disperse the concentrated ownership that seems endemic in
the economies of continental Europe. The question, thus, becomes
whether dispersed ownership is a valuable goal, and by what methods it
should be pursued.
IV.

WHY DISPERSED OWNERSHIP WITH SEMIENTRENCHED CONTROL?

Dispersed ownership appears as such a consistent choice that it
seems to be a fundamental goal of corporate law at the turn of the new
millennium. The economic motivations of dispersed ownership are,
therefore, an important topic. Only by understanding the function of
dispersed ownership can a cogent critique of the legal system be made,
and only in view of the goal of dispersed ownership can academic
criticism provide constructive proposals. Until now, academic criticism
of corporate law has seemed unrelated to the actual choices of judges
in Daimler-Benz in 1990, which had by 1999 turned into a 12% interest in the combined entity,
followed by the Emirate of Kuwait with 7%. See Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate
Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States, 102 YALE L.. 1927 app. at 1998 tbl.VfIl
(1993); see also DAIMLERCHRYSLER AG, 1999 ANNUAL REPORT 63 (1999) (reporting that
Deutsche Bank's stake decreased from 22% to 12% as a result of the merger, and Kuwait's from
13% to 7%), availableat http:llwww.daimlerchrysler.de/investor/reports/annual99/download20_F.
pdf
(last visited
Aug.
31,
2000);
DaimlerChrysler
Investor
Relations,
at
http:lwww.daimlerchrysler.comlindex-e.htm?/investor/meeting200ihvglossar.e.htm
(last visited
Aug. 31, 2000).
275. The same view is offered and elaborated by Tim Jenkinson & Alexander Ljungqvist, The
Role of Hostile Stakes in German CorporateGovernance, 7 J. CORP. FIN. 397 (2001).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2001

55

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 2
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:11

and legislators. 6 The tools of the academy appeared insensitive to the
goals and aspirations of the policymakers.
Dispersed ownership, however, is beneficial. To see these benefits,
it is important to juxtapose the dispersed ownership that defensive
tactics allow with the alternatives that might replace dispersed
ownership if the control it conferred were too ephemeral. To do this we
must examine the controllers' incentives at the moment the firm goes
public and at the moment divisions may be spun off as independent
companies. The initial public offering of a firm's stock is crucial because
the controller's incentives determine the shape that public ownership
will take.2 7 The spin-off decision is important because it requires that the
instinct for empire-building and conglomeration that would lead top
management to retain control has been countered. Of course, these
decisions are also determined by the price that buyers are willing to pay
for the stakes being sold, the shares offered to the public, and the shares
of the spun-off subsidiary. Contrary to the expectations of the legal
academy that shareholders would prefer defenseless firms, we
consistently see savvy entities making public offerings of firms with
takeover defenses.2 This suggests that the market forces favor takeover
defenses and empirically bolsters the arguments in favor of the dispersed
ownership they preserve.
Numerous advantages flow from dispersed ownership that is
combined with the semi-entrenched control of Delaware defenses. First
we will examine the fact that dispersed ownership is a condition for the
vitality of equity markets. Without dispersed ownership equity markets
will not become the arbiters of control, power, and capital allocation that
they are in the United States and the United Kingdom, nor will they
offer investors the possibility of investment at a reduced-risk through
diversification. Unless control has some permanence, entrepreneurs
would resist dispersing their ownership, and the attractiveness of venture
capital would be weakened.

276. See, e.g., Michael R. Klein, Takeover Abuses Demand Congressional Reform, LEGAL
TIMES, June 25, 1984, at 12.
277. See, e.g., Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Market for Innovation in the United States and Japan:
Venture Capitaland the Comparative Corporate Governance Debate, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 865, 868
n.14, 883 (1997).
278. Several studies report that firms go public with defensive measures as part of their
corporate machinery, and even more so when backed by venture capitalists. See COATES, supra note
3, at 60; DAINES & KLAUSNER, supra note 3, at 4.
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A. DispersedOwnership with Semi-Entrenched Controlas a
Preconditionfor the Vitality of the Equity Markets
Well-functioning equity markets are vital for the economy's
productivity. They provide firms with cheap capital.2 9 They allocate
capital among competing users. Most importantly, they reward
entrepreneurs for their success, and by allowing diversification, they
enable risk-neutral management of society's resources.20 Dispersed
ownership and takeover defenses that bestow semi-entrenched control
are instrumental for the vitality of equity markets.
1. Dispersed Ownership as a Condition for Diversification
If we study the ills of concentrated ownership, the necessity of
dispersed ownership for the good functioning of equity markets becomes
obvious. Two forms of concentrated ownership are possible.
Concentrated ownership implies that each corporation's stock is owned
by few individuals. The corporations in the economy, therefore, may be
owned by a small set of individuals. This setting, where a narrow group
of people own all the corporations, can be termed "narrow ownership."
The second setting of concentrated ownership would have a broad
segment of the population own stocks, the same number of investors as
under dispersed ownership. Each investor, however, would hold shares
in few corporations. This can be termed "broad undiversified
ownership."
Narrow ownership implies a concentration of power and control of
resources entirely unlike the American capitalist experience. Such
situations appear to exist in developing economies and are followed by a
host of ills. The narrow ownership of equity securities implies little
interest in trading them. The result is that equity markets atrophy.
Without equity markets there is no objective mechanism for monitoring
managerial performance.2' Moreover, even if wealth is evenly
distributed initially, the skewed distribution of power and control will
soon lead to a biased distribution of wealth and to nepotism. Nepotism

279. See Bernard S. Black, The Legal and InstitutionalPreconditionsfor Strong Securities
Markets, 48 UCLA L. REv. 781, 835 (2001).
280. See id. at 831-38.
281. The equity markets serve as an indicator of the confidence that traders have in the future
performance of the corporation. See itd at 842. In this way, the stock price reflects the market's
assessment of managerial competence. See id. at 843. Other mechanisms of assessing competence,
such as internal reviews or governmental supervision, may be flawed themselves and thus fail to
determine incompetence. Despite the errors to which the markets occasionally fall, they present a
much more objective assessment.
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prevents a meritocratic assignment of control of resources to the most
skilled. Moreover, the narrow dispersion of control suggests that society
is less diversified with respect to the managers of its resources. It is both
exposed to more downside risk and less likely to make the rare
innovation. 2
The second alternative implies a broad group of investors, but each
one holding a portfolio that is divided among fewer corporations. Thus,
investors are less diversified than they would be under more dispersed
corporate ownership. This reduced diversification means that investors
bear more idiosyncratic risk. Unlike well-diversified investors, they are
more exposed to the vagaries of chance that befall the few corporations
that they own. The influence of luck on a single firm has a minute
impact on a well-diversified portfolio, where each firm constitutes a very
small fraction of the whole. The bad luck of some firms will be
counterbalanced by the good luck of others. The portfolio as a whole
will have diversified idiosyncratic risk away, and will only be subject to
economy-wide shocks.23 The reduction in risk that comes with
diversification implies that the equity market is a more attractive
investment vehicle, meaning that investors are willing to bid prices up
and accept slightly reduced returns. Reduced returns for investors means
reduced cost of capital for firms. The reduction of the cost of one of the
inputs to production means greater economic productivity. Thus,
dispersed ownership leads to increased productivity.
2. Dispersed Ownership as a Condition for Risk-Neutral
Management of Social Resources
The diversification to which dispersed ownership leads has an even
more important function for social welfare. Generally, individuals are
282. The narrow ownership of stock and, hence, control, implies that the decisions regarding
the actions of this society's corporations are made by a narrower group of individuals than in a
society with broader ownership. The result is that society's economic resources are managed by
fewer people. Good and bad luck falling on any one of the managerial class has a greater impact on
social welfare than if control were more broadly dispersed. More importantly, however, the smaller
number of managers suggests that society is less likely to make the rare breakthroughs. If achieving
a managerial breakthrough is a chance occurring once in a million management years, a society with
a million managers will average one every year, while one with a hundred thousand managers only
one every ten years. Already this is a dramatic effect, but it is accentuated by the performance of the
market. As soon as a firm makes a breakthrough that the market recognizes, its stock price will
reflect its greater prospects and its higher-priced stock will allow it to extend its influence by using
it as consideration for acquiring resources. Furthermore, other firms are more likely to notice and
emulate the breakthrough if it is signaled by a high-flying stock.
283. For a general introduction to diversification, see GILSON & BLACK, supra note 16,
at 81-100.
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risk-averse.2 Aversion to risk implies that undiversified ownermanagers would give up some returns in order to make the expected
returns less risky. When the firm is owned by investors who are
diversified, the firms' owners are risk-neutral. They are willing to have
firm managers take cost-justified gambles. The winning gambles cancel
out the losing gambles and investors' diversified portfolios follow the
average, in other words, enjoy the expected return. Risk-neutral
investors would not favor managerial efforts to give up returns in order
to reduce risk. The owners' preferences are converted into explicit and
implicit incentives for firms' managers. Managers, for example, are
given options as part of their compensation packages. The value of
options increases with the firm's risk.25 Managers are thus given an
incentive to increase the firm's risk that will, hopefully, overcome their
risk-aversion.26 The market for control provides one more background
inducement of risk-neutrality. Managers who give up returns are
punished with lower stock prices that expose them to a contest for
control. As long as defenses are not so strong as to provide them with
entrenched control, the risk-averse managers may be replaced.
Overcoming risk-aversion, to which dispersed ownership leads, is
enormously important for society. Risk-neutrality is much more than a
change in preferences. Risk-neutral management of social resources
directly increases their productivity. Society as a whole is diversified
because its productivity depends on every one of its industries. A device
which switches management of social resources from risk-aversion to
risk-neutrality is a revolutionary improvement in society's prospects.
Dispersed ownership is exactly such a device.
3.

Dispersed Ownership as a Condition for Liquid and, Hence,
Efficient Capital Markets
Once the market becomes an attractive investment vehicle because
of the diversification that dispersed ownership allows, the quality of the
equity market will also improve. The investment-driven trading activity
produces liquidity which allows existing informed traders to make larger
trades and attracts more informed investors (rational speculators) to the
market. The increased competitive informed trading leads to greater
284. See John w. Pratt, Risk Aversion, in 3 THE NEv PALGRAVE DICrIONARY OF MONEY &
FINANCE 365 (Peter Newman et al. eds., 1992) (defining a risk-averse individual as "one who
always prefers the expected value of a monetary gamble to the gamble itself").
285. For a very readable primer on options, see GILSON & BLACK, supranote 16, at 231-52.
286. Evidence indicates that options do achieve this goal. See supra note 16 and
accompanying text.
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accuracy of prices.27 The market takes one step closer to perfect
efficiency. Investors, however, are not indifferent to the increased price
accuracy. It consists of a further reduction in risk for them, leading to
further reduction in firms' cost of capital and more investment trading
(uninformed trading).
The explanation of this chain reaction starts with the realization that
diversification brings additional funds to the market.28 The additional
funds are a result of two functions of diversification. First, it reduces the
risk of the investment in the stock market for the investor. 9 The result is
that funds that the investor would shelter from the higher risk, the
investor becomes willing to make part of a diversified portfolio. The
second way by which diversification increases funds invested in the
market is even more pronounced. If diversification is not available
within the market, then investors will obtain diversification outside it, by
considering the stock market as only one of the investments across
which they could diversify. An example would be to consider an
investment in the stock market in the late nineteenth century, when it
was dominated by railroad stocks. 29° At that time, even an investment in
every stock did not provide the investor with diversification comparable

287. I have repeatedly explained the upward spiral from liquidity to more competitive
informed trading to more accurate prices, lower risk for investors, and more investor trading
(meaning more uninformed trading) which leads back to greater liquidity. See Nicholas L.
Georgakopoulos, Frauds, Markets, and Fraud-on-the-Market: The Tortured Transition of
Justifiable Reliance from Deceit to Securities Fraud, 49 U. MIAMI L. REv. 671, 685 (1995)
[hereinafter Georgakopoulos, The Tortured Transition]; Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Insider
Trading as a Transactional Cost: A Market Microstructure Justification and Optimization of Insider
Trading Regulation, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1, 31-32 (1993) [hereinafter Georgakopoulos, Insider
Trading Regulation]; Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Why Should Disclosure Rules Subsidize
Informed Traders?, 16 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 417, 424 (1996) [hereinafter Georgakopoulos,
Informed Traders]. My work has been cited by the SEC to the United States Supreme Court, and the
Court accepted the argument without citation. See Petitioner's Brief at 31, United States v.
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (No. 96-842) (citing Georgakopoulos, Insider Trading Regulation,
supra, at 31-32); see also United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 657 (1997). The connection of
liquidity to accuracy of prices (through more competitive informed trading) is presented in a
mathematical model by Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, A Theory of Intraday Patterns: Volume
and Price Variability, I REV. FIN. STUDIES 3, 30-31 (1988).
288. See Robert A. Levy, The Prudent Investor Rule: Theories and Evidence, 1 GEO. MASON
L. REv. 1, 7 (1994).
289. See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative Corporate Governance
and the Theory of the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross Reference, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 213,224 (2000).
290. Over half of the fifty stocks in the New York Times index were railroads. See, e.g., Joseph
C. Mullin & Wallace P. Mullin, United States Steel's Acquisition of the Great Northern Ore
Properties: Vertical Foreclosure or Efficient Contractual Governance?, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 74,
92 (1997).
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with that available in today's market. As a result the investor would have
to spread risk outside the market, with other ventures.
As the stock market produces the capacity for diversification, it
attracts additional funds. These additional funds are primarily the
information-less trading that is motivated by the life-cycle reasons of
passive investors: savings during the investors' years of high income are
stowed in the market by purchases of stocks and, later, sales produce
retirement income or other compensation. The more investors are
attracted to the market and the greater a portion of their available funds
they put in the market, the more trading activity they create. The very
fact that the investors are motivated by saving and consumption shows
that their trading is not driven by information. Life-cycle trading is the
very opposite of information-driven trading. The perfect example is the
automatic trading that is triggered by the accrual of retirement benefits
while employees work. A fraction of each paycheck goes into the
employees' retirement account with no decision by the employee that the
market is undervalued and ripe for purchasing. Even more emphatically
uninformed are selling decisions. The retiring employees sell to obtain
cash for consumption, not because they consider the market or any
specific security overvalued. Furthermore, as the safety of the market
increases due to diversification and as the market attracts greater shares
of investors' investable wealth, more trading can occur accidentally due
to unforeseen events that may deviate from the cycle of buying to save
and selling to consume. Such accidents may be personal bankruptcies or
family emergencies that put an immediate demand for funds on the
investor. Those accidents force liquidations of stocks, liquidations that
are obviously not motivated by the overvaluation of the stocks.
The danger of uninformed trading is that it may lead to uninformed
prices.2 The increased information-less trading activity, however,
comes with a built-in self-correcting mechanism. The danger for the
accuracy of prices stems from the very fact that employees effectively
buy stock blindly when they receive every paycheck (a fraction of which
goes into their retirement account) and sell blindly when they need cash.
This blind trading implies the possibility that overpriced stocks are being
bought or that underpriced stocks are being sold, aggravating the price
inaccuracies.
The self-correcting mechanism is based on the fact that the
increased trading activity is an attractive environment for rational

291.

See Georgakopoulos, The Tortured Transition,supranote 287, at 698.
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speculators, traders whose activity is motivated by information.2"
Rational speculators (also called "informed traders") are the antithesis of
the life-cycle investors. Contrary to life-cycle investors who devote
infinitesimal time to the management of their investment, 293 for the
rational speculator trading is a main occupation. Contrary to the
information-less trades of life-cycle investors, the trades of rational
speculators are the response to a belief that prices are low or high, to the
identification of a profitable opportunity for the trader.
The increased trading activity due to more life-cycle trading is
attractive to rational speculators because it implies that they are able to
take advantage of false prices now and that they will be able to trade
again in the future to take their profits. The increased trading activity of
the life-cycle investors does not only result in greater present liquiditythat is, greater ability to enter into trades-but also confidence in greater
future liquidity. 294 Upon identifying an undervalued stock, rational
speculators are able to buy it because of life-cycle selling. A market
consisting of only rational speculators would imply that nobody would
be willing to sell the undervalued stock. 295 Moreover, in a market with
life-cycle trading, the speculators who buy the undervalued stock are
assured that they will be able to sell it because they are confident in the
existence of life-cycle buying in the future. Thus, the increased trading
activity of the life-cycle investors is attractive to informed traders.
The confidence in life-cycle trading translates into more active
trading by rational speculators. This additional informed trading implies
greater price accuracy, since it means more buying at low prices and
292. See Sanford Grossman, On the Efficiency of Competitive Stock Markets Where Trades
Have DiverseInformation, 31 J. FIN. 573, 573 (1976).
293. See James A. Fanto, Regulatory Implication of IndividualManagement of Pension Fund:
Comparative Investor Education, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 1083, 1096 (1998) (defining a life-cycle
approach to investing as when an investor "adjust[s] the allocation of kinds of securities in his or her
portfolio over the different stages of the life cycle").
294. See Georgakopoulos, The Tortured Transition,supra note 287, at 725.
295. Before this interaction of informed (rational speculators) and uninformed (life-cycle)
trading was identified, this idea that trading is self-contradictory was puzzling and led to a line in
the literature discussing the efficiency paradox: how come there is trading even when prices are
accurate? The answer that was being overlooked was that there is trading because of uninformed
life-cycle traders. The greater paradox is how come that strain of literature did not realize that in a
world populated exclusively by rational speculators, all trading is a paradox: if prices are too high
there would be no buying and if prices are too low, no selling. For examples from the "efficiency
paradox" literature, see generally Grossman, supra note 292 (using hypotheticals to show the
efficiency paradox); Paul Pfleiderer, Private Information Price Variability and Trading Volume 11
(1982) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University) (uninformed trading solves the efficiency
paradox); see also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency,
70 VA. L. REV. 549, 622-26 (1984).
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more selling at high prices. Prices are corrected faster and deviations
from accurate valuation are smaller. While accurate valuation is
desirable because it contributes to the optimal allocation of resources to
firms, it also implies a safer ride for the life-cycle traders. Accurate
pricing contributes to the optimal allocation of capital because it means
that firms with bright prospects are able to sell shares at appropriately
higher prices than firms with dim prospects. Thus, the market finances
bright prospects without wasting funds on the dim prospects. But
accurate pricing also provides a safer ride for life-cycle investors
because it results in smaller deviations of prices from their appropriate
level. This is nothing less than a safety increase that attracts more
capital, feeding into the chain reaction of further improvements in
market quality: more trading, greater liquidity, and more accurate prices.
4. Semi-Entrenched Control as a Facilitator of
Dispersed Ownership
Let us turn to the response of founders of firms and of managers to
the prospect of having no defenses against hostile takeovers. The owners
and managers, who want to maintain control, will retain the majority of
the corporation's shares. This would produce an investment universe
wholly different from that existing in most common law jurisdictions
that are characterized by strong investor protections.296 Majority
ownership is the norm in civil law jurisdictions where a formalist legal
tradition suggests that novel defensive tactics will not be upheld by
courts.29 7

296. See Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 511
(1999); Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 1132
(1997) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Legal Determinants].
297. See La Porta et al., Legal Determinants,supranote 296, at 1137. One might counter that it
is not reasonable to think that the original founders of large European firms more than a century ago
feared the development of hostile takeovers and the lack of defenses. Even a century ago, however,
the formalism of the civil law system was apparent. Founders knew that civil law would be less
responsive to new problems than a system where judges would be expected to evolve the law. Thus,
we can easily see that owners face a higher risk with respect to unanticipated developments in civil
law. The same developments would be addressed less abruptly by the more fluid and changeable
common law system. One way for owner-managers to address the increased risk to which civil law
exposes them is to maintain majority control and to diversify their exposure to the idiosyncratic risk
of their firm by internal diversification. Along these lines I argue for the superiority of common law.
See Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Predictabilityand Legal Evolution, 17 INT'L REV. L & EcON. 475
passim (1997). The nearly constant updating of the common law and the periodic updating of civil
law, produces law that is equally outdated on average. Nevertheless, if risk-aversion is taken into
account, individuals prefer the small frequent changes of the common law to the occasional large
changes of civil law. Since individuals do not know if they gain or lose by future legal changes, they
consider them gambles and frequent small ones are preferred to few large ones.
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Moreover, evidence indicates that in the legal-economic systems
that produce large private benefits of control (or, conversely, large
minority discounts) privately controlled firms strategically preserve their
control status. For example, Holm6n and Hgfeldt report that privately
controlled Swedish firms are more likely than others to use low-voting
shares to make acquisitions, and experience deeper discounts of their
minority shares if members of the founding family other than the
founder are in control.29 s This evidence verifies that concentrated
ownership produces wasteful nepotism, and that concentrated ownership
perpetuates itself through the structure of corporate transactions!" Not
only do firms of concentrated ownership avoid dispersing the owners'
control at the time they go public, but they also preserve the lock on
control despite growth through corporate combinations.3l
What are the ramifications of majority-owned firms, however?
What are the grounds for the intuition that dispersed control is superior?
Of the multitude of arguments, several are worth mentioning. The
reduced float of public shares may well prevent the development of a
liquid market, and, therefore, of an efficient market.3 °' Investors, without
enough common stock to go around, will have trouble creating
diversified portfolios. Firms will lose the financing capacity that a
dynamic stock market offers, and will be forced to rely more on debt
financing and internal financing. Both these effects create a bias against
dynamic upstart firms: they will not be able to access financing since
their risk precludes debt financing,3°2 and new ventures will tend to be
298. See HoLMtN & HOGFELDT, supra note 34, at 11, 19, 21. For similar evidence in the
United States, see generally Morck et al., supra note 156 (studying the valuation of Fortune 500
corporations and finding a discount for family run firms).
299. See HOLMPN & HOGFELDT, supra note 34, at 5, 32.
300. See id. at 32.
301. See supranote 287 and accompanying text (discussing how liquidity (i.e., trading activity)
leads to efficiency (i.e., accurate pricing)).
302. A simple example shows how the same risk that venture capitalists routinely finance
would lead to crippling interest rates if debt financing were used. Suppose financiers expect to
obtain a 10% return on their capital. If two of every three companies fail, the repayment of the third
and successful one must compensate for the losses of the other two as well as provide the 10%
return on the entire capital that was wagered in these companies. Consider that $33.33 is lent to each
of the three companies and that financiers recover nothing from failed firms. Since $100 was lent, if
the repayment period is one year, the single successful firm of the three would have an obligation to
pay $110, which implies an interest rate of 333.33% on its $33.33 loan.
To make a more realistic guess, even if very rough, we have to make venture capitalists
require a 30% return, give the companies they back a failure rate of 90% and use their 4.5-year
horizon, average. In 4.5 years at 30%, a $100 capital investment would need to become
$100 * (1 + .3)= $325.65, and since that must be produced by 10% of the backed corporations,
the equivalent lending interest rate would have to grow $10 into $325.65 in 4.5 years, so it must be
116.9%. This is still an underestimation because venture capitalists have a stake in their firms'
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started as in-house projects under all the stifling bureaucracy of large
firms. This may also produce some social stagnation: reduced upward
mobility by virtue of the reduced returns to young entrepreneurs. One
must not overlook the crucially important aspect of peaceful changes of
control, which are only possible if the unsuccessful controller fears
being ousted in a proxy fight, i.e., only if there is no lock on control.
Although related, we must not forget the tendency toward nepotism that
family control produces. Finally, managers that own a controlling share
of the corporation will not be perfectly diversified, which suggests that
they would tend to run the firm in a risk-averse fashion, shying away
from risk and the socially optimal stance of risk-neutral decisionmaking.
In sum, an environment of majority-controlled firms is likely to
undermine many of the contributions of capital markets to productivity.
Indeed, what the above shows is that many of these contributions are the
result not of the existence of capital markets, but of dispersed ownership.
Contrary to an ex ante incentive to maintain majority control that the
lack of defenses creates, defensive tactics allow the controller to
relinquish control. As long as the firm is run well, the controller faces
little risk of being ousted. Perhaps with the help of some cognitive biases
in favor of overconfidence, 3 the results for society are the numerous
advantages that flow from dispersed ownership.
5. Semi-Entrenched Control as a Facilitator of Venture Capital
In addition to all its other benefits, semi-entrenched control is a
crucial component of the venture capital relationship. The venture
capital relationship is much more complex than the explicit rights that
the entrepreneur and the financier (venture capitalist) agree upon. One of
the most important components of the venture capital relationship is the
control of the start-up firm. The capital infusion by the venture capitalist
allows the firm's attempt at success. Typically, the entrepreneur is
allowed to run the firm while control rests in the financier's hands, but

further success by means of their equity investment. A lender charging 116.9% would have returns
smaller than those of venture capital investors.
303. Two classic documentations of overconfidence, rating oneself as more intelligent and
skilled than average, and considering oneself an above average driver, are 2 RuTH C. WYLm Er AL.,
THE SELF-CONCEPr (1979), and 0. Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More Skillful Than Our
Fellow Drivers?, 47 ACrA PSYCHOLOGICA 143 (1981). For a recent discussion of the this literature
that is alternatively called behavioral decision theory, bounded rationality, or cognitive biases
literature, see Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and BehavioralScience: Removing the
RationalityAssumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1075-76 (2000).
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only as long as the venture goes well. 3°4 If the firm falters, the financier
may exercise control to minimize losses.3 5 If the firm succeeds,
however, the control arrangement changes. The financier will exit by
selling the controlling stake to the public in the successful firm's initial
public offering.3 6 At that point, the financier stops being the largest
shareholder. After the offering, the entrepreneur's stake is the largest,
and the entrepreneur is able to exercise working control with 20% to
40% of the firm. The entrepreneur's payoff from the successful venture
is not only the new stock wealth, but also, and with perhaps greater
importance, the control of the firm. This environment reveals that the
legal aspects of control can influence the arrangement in two ways.
Control may be too ephemeral for the venture capital arrangement to be
attractive to entrepreneurs, or minority shares may command too large a
discount for the entrepreneur to credibly believe the venture capitalists'
commitment to sell in the case of success.
The permanence of the control that the entrepreneur receives with
the IPO, depends on defensive tactics. If the entrepreneur foresees
ephemeral control because the legal system affords corporations no
defenses, then the attractiveness of the venture capital arrangement is
reduced. The magnitude of this effect cannot be measured. Nevertheless,
the creative drive of startups that venture capital produces is so
important for economic productivity, that even a marginal change in the
attractiveness of venture capital may have huge implications for social
welfare.3 7 It is also apparent from the Silicon Valley community that the
productive drive of venture capital is contagious.0 8 Thus, if control is too
ephemeral, the venture capital arrangement is not as attractive to the
entrepreneur. This shortfall cannot be overcome by the financiers'
compensating the entrepreneurs, because the reduced value of control is
not a question of how the returns from the enterprise are divided, but one
about the total production of the venture. If control is not valuable
enough, fewer ventures will be attractive. A simple hypothetical
illustrates this point. Consider two ventures that would produce the same
304. See Bergl6f, supra note 36, at 248.
305. See id.
306. See Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Meinhard v. Salmon and the Economics of Honor, 1999
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 137, 139 n.5.
307. See, e.g., James M. Dorsey, Management: This Venture Capitalist Still Believes in
Startups, COMPUTING, Mar. 8, 2001, at 52, 52 (describing Dutch venture capitalist Roel Pieper's
goal of proving "that the startup isn't dead and that there's good technology waiting to be
discovered in Europe").
308. See Dante Chinni, The Man to See, WASH. POST, June 11, 2000 (Magazine), at 6, 8
(discussing Washington, D.C. area venture capitalist Steve Walker).
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monetary returns, but only one of them offered semi-entrenched control
in case of success. If entrepreneurs found only that one were acceptable,
while venture capitalists considered both borderline acceptable, only the
one that provided semi-entrenched control would be pursued." This
shows that semi-entrenched control increases the total expected value of
the venture for the parties rather than simply reallocating value between
them.
The legal conditions that lead to dispersed ownership also
contribute to the credibility of the venture capital arrangement. The
credibility at issue is that financiers will indeed sell their controlling
stakes in successful ventures.1 In a legal system that adequately protects
minority shareholders so as to foster dispersed ownership, 1 the discount
of minority shares from controlling shares is smaller than in systems
where minority shareholders are not as well-protected. 312 The larger the
discount of minority shares, the larger the reduction in value of the
financiers' stakes when their stakes are sold to the public. Thus, poor
protection of minorities translates into greater discounts at the time of
the IPO for financiers. Financiers can avoid the discount by leaving the
controlling stake intact and either holding it or selling it to a buyer of
control. In either case, however, the entrepreneur never receives control.
Poor minority protection undermines the ability of venture capitalists to
commit to disperse their controlling stakes in successful ventures. Since
this commitment is of value to the entrepreneurs, the venture capital
arrangement loses its appeal. Thus, the minority protection necessary for
dispersed ownership is also necessary for the formation of venture
capital. The importance of venture capital cannot be overstated. Apple
Computer, Cisco Systems, Dell, and Gateway are all venture capital
successes and the competitiveness these firms infuse into their industries
disciplines every member of that industry. The capitalization of these

309. Of course, defenses influence the price at which the company would go public and would
alter the returns to the financier. I argue below, however, that the semi-entrenched control would
also be preferable from the financier's perspective. See infra notes 337-63 and accompanying text.
310. See Bergl6f, supranote 36, at 247.
311. See John C. Coffee et al., The Directionof CorporateLaw: The Scholars' Perspective,25
DEL. J. CoRP. L. 79, 98 (2000) (stating that "dispersed share ownership can only arise and persist
under highly developed legal systems that give strong legal protections to minority shareholders").
312. See Bitch v. Peoples Bank, 540 S.E.2d 667, 669 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (indicating "that
using discounts injects speculation into the appraisal process, fails to give minority shareholders the
full proportionate value of their stock, encourages corporations to squeeze out minority
shareholders, and penalizes the minority for taking advantage of the protection afforded by
dissenters' rights statutes").
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few venture capital successes, $610 billion,"' is woefully inadequate to
describe the contribution of venture capital to the economy of the United
States and the world.
In sum, in the above paragraphs I argued that dispersed ownership
with semi-entrenched control is (1) instrumental in the creation of
diversified investor portfolios that reduce risk, increase the attractiveness
of the capital market and, thus, reduce the cost of firms' capital;
(2) fundamental for the productivity of social resources by imposing
risk-neutral management; (3) necessary for large publicly traded stakes
(floats), which by virtue of the investor participation that diversification
allowed, lead to frequent trading, and liquid markets. Liquid markets
attract informed trader competition creating accurate prices, reducing the
risk of market investments for investors. The increased attractiveness of
the market further reduces firns' cost of capital. I also argued that semientrenched control is instrumental (4) for the incentives of founders to
disperse their controlling stakes so as to create dispersed ownership, and
(5) for the operation of venture capital. Ephemeral control would reduce
the value of the enterprise to the entrepreneur. Furthermore, lack of
minority protection, which is necessary for dispersed ownership, would
cancel the credibility of venture capitalists' implicit promise to disperse
their controlling stake in cases of successful ventures. In the next section
I argue that defenses also provide help in the firnm's relation with its
managers, which again is crucial for the reduction of firms' costs.
B. Defenses Provide a SuperiorManagement Contract
Corporate law academics have divided takeovers into efficient and
inefficient ones.3' 4 Strategic mergers are efficient because they create
value through synergies and other productivity gains;"5 acquisitions
motivated by financial gains are inefficient because they are not directly

313. Apple Computer's capitalization is $20.1 billion, CISCO Systems' is $465.3 billion,
Dell's $104 billion, and Gateway's $20.9 billion, which add up to $610.3 billion. I have made data
from Market Guide / Provestor for Apple, CISCO, Dell, and Gateway as of September 8, 2000
available on-line at http:llwww.iulaw.indy.indiana.edufinstructors/georgakopouloslprof (last visited
Oct. 17, 2000).
314. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Transfers of Control and the Quest for Efficiency: Can Delaware
Law Encourage Efficient Transactions While Chilling Inefficient Ones?, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 359,
363 (1996).
315. See Miriam P. Hechler, Towards a More Balanced Treatment of Bidder and Target
Shareholders, 1997 COLJM. Bus. L. REv. 319, 394; Garry W. Jenkins, The Powerful Possibilities
of Nonprofit Mergers: Supporting Strategic Consolidation Through Law and Public Policy, 74 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1089, 1091 (2001).
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associated with increased productivity.3 6 Academic analysis has long
attempted to prod corporate law in directions that would stifle financial
deals without discouraging strategic ones." 7 But little harm from
financial deals has been proposed to counter the gain in productivity that
strategic deals create. Granted, financial deals entail transaction costs
that are wasteful from a social standpoint, but they have the redeeming
virtue of aligning securities' prices. 3 8 Thus, the balancing of these
arguments could not favor defenses. What this balancing ignores,
however, is the effect of undefendable financial deals on managerial
incentives. The potential for low takeover prices means that the control
of management is at the whim of the market and its occasional errors.
Instead of management enjoying a degree of safety determined by their
performance, management's control is exposed to the vagaries of the
market.
This argument for the importance of defenses to dispersed
ownership takes two steps. First, the stock market occasionally produces
low prices. Due to uncertainty or error, the path that stock prices follow
does pass from points low enough to make financial acquisitions
worthwhile, jeopardizing the position of capable management. The next
step is to realize the difference between being the Chief Executive
Officer ("CEO") of a public corporation of dispersed ownership and a
CEO subject to a majority controller. Also interesting are the associated
dynamics on the senior management team. Members of the management
team cannot be disloyal to the CEO with the hope of protection from the
controller. The mere existence of a controller undermines the authority
of the CEO.
1. Low Prices: True and False Indications of
Managerial Performance
The evidence of the existence or occasional occurrence of errors in
stock prices is overwhelming. From deep discounts of closed-end
funds, 319 to the ability of managers to time the offering of securities to
316. See Bebchuk, supra note 257, at 959.
317. See Coffee, supranote 314, at 364.
318. Seeid. at396-401.
319. See J. Bradford De Long & Andrei Shleifer, Closed-End Fund Discounts, 18 J.
PoRTFouo MGfr. 46, 46 (1992) (arguing that the size of the discount is an index of investor
sentiment); Charles M.C. Lee et al., InvestorSentiment and the Closed-EndFund Puzzle, 46 J. FIN.
75, 82 (199 1) (indicating that the discounts are driven by investor sentiment). More recent studies of
the closed-end fund discount puzzle include: Elroy Dimson & Carolina Minio-Kozerski, ClosedEnd Funds:A Survey, 8 FiN. MARKETs, INSTrrrONS & INSTRUMENTS 1 (1999) (literature review),
and Richard w. Sias et al., Can Noise TradersSurvive? Evidence from Closed-End Funds, 1 ISE
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coincide with market highs,32 ° to the excessive fluctuation of stock
prices,2 1 there is little doubt that stock prices can be inaccurate.
Inaccurate stock prices undermine the premise of the market for control.
While stock prices that are accurately low due to poor management
trigger desirable takeovers, prices that are falsely low trigger pointless
takeovers.
Furthermore, stock prices can be low enough for profitable
financial deals because of uncertainty about future corporate choices
rather than due to any inaccuracy. If a corporation can take one of
several actions, each one of which produces different value for the
shareholders, that potential should be reflected in the price. A simple
example illustrates.
Suppose a corporation's choice involves developing a product
independently or with a partner. Independent development would be a
higher risk-reward proposition that would be favored by the risk-neutral
dispersed shareholders. 22 If successful, it would produce value of $15
per share, and if unsuccessful, a value of $5, for an average of $10 if
success is a 50-50 proposition. Shared development would reduce both
the risk and the return that the firm would receive. If successful, it would
produce a per share value of $12, and if unsuccessful a value of $6, for
an expected value of $9. Suppose that the circumstances make this
choice imminent: the potential partner has made a take-it-or-leave-it
offer to the firm. Although shareholders know what they prefer the
corporation to do, there is genuine uncertainty regarding what choice
REv. 37, 70 (1997) (testing and rejecting the proposition that, because irrational "noise" traders
receive compensation for carrying the excessive risk by the risk premium, they survive despite
taking excessive risks).
320. See Jay R. Ritter, The Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings, 46 J. FIN. 3, 23
(1991) (indicating that IPOs perform poorly because, among others, they are timed to coincide with
market highs); see also Tim Loughran & Jay R. Ritter, The New Issues Puzzle, 50 J. FIN. 23, 47
(1995). This is not a newly noticed phenomenon. See Roger G. Ibbotson & Jeffrey F. Jaffe, "Hot
Issue" Markets, 30 J. FIN. 1027, 1037-40 (1975).
321. See ROBERT J. SHILLER, MARKET VOLATILITY 131-48 (1989); John Y. Campbell &
Robert J. Shiller, The Dividend-Price Ratio and Expectations of Future Dividends and Discount
Factors, I REv. FIN. STuD. 195, 220 (1988) (arguing that stock markets are more volatile than
justified by subsequent changes in dividends); Sanford J. Grossman & Robert J. Shiller, The
Determinantsof the Variabilityof Stock Market Prices,71 AM. ECON. REv. 222, 222 (1981).
322. The shareholders of corporations with dispersed ownership are likely to be diversified.
Diversification reduces or eliminates idiosyncratic risk, the risk that any one firm in their portfolio
will have unusually good or bad luck. Instead, diversified shareholders care about overall
performance. If the managers of all the firms in their portfolio tried to avoid risk by giving up some
returns, the shareholders would enjoy a return that would be on average lower. If, by contrast,
managers in each company take the risk-neutral choice of maximizing expected value, even if some
of the investors' firms are unlucky, the lucky firms' gains will more than compensate investors. See
supra notes 282-86 and accompanying text.
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growth by appointing an able permanent CEO. The market had a
plausible fear. The potential existed for Thomas Lee to abandon the
upside on its equity investment and ensure no further erosion of the
value of the Conseco convertible preferred stock that they held. When
eventually the new CEO was appointed, that uncertainty was resolved.
The choice was Gary Wendt, a long-time head of GE Capital which
under his stewardship had grown into the most profitable business of
GE.3'2 Moreover, Gary Wendt's contract conveyed a multitude of signals
that he would serve shareholder rather than bondholder interests. He had
a five-year contract as opposed to a shorter term that might signal a
winding down of corporate affairs. 29 He would receive no salary for the
first two years.3 He would instead receive options, which only have
value to the extent that he would cause the stock price to rise.33"' His
incentive bonuses were stock price targets, rather than bond prices or
liquidation proceeds. 32 A week after his appointment, Conseco's
stock
333
was at $11, and by January 2001, had again exceeded $18
Without defenses, a takeover of Conseco for a significant premium
over its Spring 2000 trading range of $5 to $6 was possible and was
rumored 3 4 Would that be optimal for its shareholders or the economy?
The acquirer would pursue growth as opposed to liquidation. Despite the
doubts whether Thomas Lee would make the choice for growth that was

328. See Debra Sparks & Pamela Moore, Rescuing Conseco, Bus. WK., July 10, 2000, at 54.
329. See
Winners and Losers, WORTH
MAG.,
Oct.
2000,
available at
http://www.worth.com/contentprint/ZZZBXE8K6DC.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2001).
330. See id.
331. Seeid.
332. See id. For more details on Gary Wendt's compensation package, see Floyd Norris,
Conseco Chief Got Big Bonus for Signing On, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2000, at Cl. This $45 million
payment to Wendt, however, was claimed to be the assumption by Conseco of GE's obligations to
Wendt, in consideration for the release of Wendt from his noncompete agreement with GE. See
Joseph T. Hallinan, ForWendt, Conseco Post Cost $20 Million,WALL ST. J., July 12, 2000, at C16.
333. See Company Research, Conseco, Inc., N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2000, at
http://marketwatch.nytimes.com/custom/nyt-cormhtml-historicalquote.asp?symb=CNC&cl
(last
visited July 3, 2000); Company Research, Conseco, Inc., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2001, at
http://marketwatch.nytimes.r-om/customnyt-com/htmt-historicalquote.asp?symb=CNC&cl
(last
visited Jan. 29, 2001).
334. See InvestorMay Make $3.3B Conseco Bid, INDIANAPOLIS Bus. J., June 5-11, 2000, at 5
(discussing rumor of a $10-per-share bid by financier Irvin Jacobs for Conseco). Note, however,
that since Conseco was incorporated in Indiana, the voting power of an acquirer's shares is
contingent on the affirmative vote of the majority of outstanding shares, see IND. CODE. ANN.
§ 23-1-42-9 ('est 1989), and, if an acquirer of a majority does receive voting power, minority
shareholders have the right to have their shares bought out for not less than the highest price the
acquirer paid. See IND. CODE. ANN. § 23-1-42-11 (a)-(b) (vest 1989). These very strict obligations
on an acquirer reduced the potential of Conseco as a target of a hostile tender offer, but they clearly
did not eliminate the possibility of a hostile takeover.
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management will make. The extensive literature on agency costs
suggests that this setting allows for a deviation of the interests of the
managers (who are the agents) from those of the shareholders (who are
their principals). 3 The managers who do not reap the entire gain from
making the correct decision may prefer to limit their downside, thus
securing their jobs and the value of their talent in the market for "human
capital." If the correct decision will be made, the stock should be valued
at $10. In anticipation of this decision, the stock price can justifiably fall
below the $10. Thus, a takeover could occur at any price below $10. The
acquirer would do nothing more than make sure the management team
chose the value-maximizing alternative of independent development.
Much more extreme choices may be presented. Consider the
example of a barely solvent firm that has on its board of directors
representatives from investment firms that own convertible debt or
preferred stock of the firm. Will the board take the risks that maximize
shareholder value, or will they file for bankruptcy, or otherwise opt not
to jeopardize the value of the firm's senior securities? Such a situation
may have existed during the winter and spring of 2000 at one of the
largest insurance corporations in the United States, Conseco, Inc.324 The
firm's stock had tumbled from over $50 in 1998 to under $20 at the
beginning of 2000." 5 At that point, the Thomas H. Lee Co. investment
firm made an infusion of $500 million of capital in the form of preferred
stock that could be converted to a stake of about 7% in the company
with a cost basis of $17 and received a seat on the board.326 A few
months later, in April of 2000, Conseco' s price having dropped to under
$6, the previous CEO was temporarily replaced by the Thomas Lee
representative on Conseco's board.327 The stock price did not recover, as
it should if the market were to assume that the new CEO would pursue
323. See, e.g., Victor Bnmdney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of
Contract,85 COLuM. L. REv. 1403, 1411-12 (1985).
324. Conseco's revenues of $8.4 billion exceed the $7.5 of John Hancock and the $6.8 of
Lincoln National. Larger domestic independent insurance companies are AEG with $28.5 billion of
revenue, MetLife with $32.1 billion, and Manulife Financial, with $9.2 billion. Credit Suisse may
have larger earnings in the aggregate, but the part attributable to its insurance operations could not
be disaggregated for the purpose of this ranking. See generally MARKET GUIDE/PROVESTOR PLUS
COMPANY
REPORT,
CONSECO,
INC.
(2001),
available
at
http://www.iulaw.indy.indiana.edu/instructors/georgakopoulos/prof/CNCMarketGuide.pdf
(last
visited Oct. 19, 2001).
325. See id. at 2.
326. See Conseco Completes Sale of Convertible PreferredStock to Thomas H. Lee Company,
BUS. WIRE, Dec. 15, 1999, at http://www.businesswire.com (last visited Dec. 31, 2001); Bernard
Condon, Thomas Lee to the Rescue, FORBES, Dec. 27, 1999, at 32.
327. See Christopher Carey, Top Conseco Execs Hilbert, Dick Resign, INDIANAPOLIS STAR,
Apr. 29, 2000, at Al.
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implicit in the stock price, they did make that decision. Moreover, the
friendly solution, Gary Wendt, appeared on the scene with as much
credibility and as well-networked in the financial community as any
acquirer. A hostile battle in early 2000 would have been devastating for
the firm and its economic productivity. Instead of focusing its efforts on
finding an effective new CEO, the interim management would have had
to expend effort thwarting a takeover. Shareholders would have lost the
upside that the best CEO choice would bring; the Thomas Lee firm, in
particular, would have been forced by a hostile acquisition to sell part of
its investment at a loss. The economy would have lost in that the
acquirer would have needed to line up a CEO with less information than
Thomas Lee had already accumulated, producing a greater potential for
error. Moreover, to the extent that working for a privately controlled
company is not as attractive as being the head of an independent
corporation, as will be argued below, an acquirer would not have had
access to the same talent that the independent Conseco had.
The circumstances surrounding Conseco during the winter and
spring of 2000 illustrates a crucial lesson for corporate law. Stock prices
can be temporarily low, either because of market errors or because of
uncertainty regarding impending corporate choices. In both cases,
defenses allow incumbent management to devote its undivided attention
to the firm and its productivity. Takeover defenses that delay hostile bids
prevent hostile suitors from initiating a takeover during a temporary low
price because the bidder knows the temporary nature of the situation and
the delay that defenses create. Thus, the management team of the target
never has to initiate a defense since a threat will not materialize. The
delay that defensive tactics give to incumbent management produce
more than extra time for an auction. They prevent hostile fights at times
of temporarily low prices and increase corporate productivity by
insulating management from financial bids at such times.
Defenses allow the firm to devote its undivided attention to
productivity at times when the price of its stock leaves it temporarily
vulnerable to an acquisition. Often, this timing will have increased
importance because it will coincide with a crisis at the firm. The
existence of a crisis is very likely to correlate with the low price of the
stock. It is at such times that management needs to focus most on
running the business without the distraction of a control fight.
A persistently low stock price, by contrast, without the urgency of a
temporary corporate crisis, suggests long-term mismanagement and
allows a hostile takeover despite the delays that defensive tactics
interpose. Again, the delay built into hostile threats by the available
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defensive tactics prevents wasteful takeovers. The example of Conseco
provides an illustration.
Conseco was built out of a collection of insurance companies that
were acquired in sequence."' The market rewarded the acquiring firm,
that eventually became Conseco, with a high valuation for its stock
because of the synergies apparent between the companies that were
being combined by means of this acquisition spree. The high valuation
enabled the acquirer to use its stock as an exchange medium and
facilitated the acquisitions. When the time came to integrate the acquired
companies, the management team that was so adept at assembling this
desirable mix of assets proved inept at consolidating the numerous
companies and realizing the synergy gains. The stock price drifted for
almost a year from its high of $58 in the spring of 1998 to under $5 in
the early summer of 2000.336 This was no temporary crisis. The financial
markets were looking for implementation of a strategy they had
expected. Every day that this implementation did not materialize, the
confidence in Conseco's management eroded. Eventually, the previous
CEO and CFO were displaced by internal forces, by virtue of the strong
position of the Thomas Lee firm on the board and the strong institutional
ownership that backed Thomas Lee.337
Should a hostile takeover take place at the very instant that
Conseco's undervaluation appeared? Hindsight shows that the change of
control that was necessary to preserve the productivity of Conseco did
take place, despite the lack of a hostile takeover. The disruption of a
takeover was not necessary to achieve the change of control because
internal forces led to that change peacefully. The staying of the previous
management in place would have signaled a different situation, one
where the internal pressures were insufficient to displace the ineffective
management. In such circumstances, a hostile takeover would be the last
bastion of economic productivity, the only means to effectuate the
change of control that would realize Conseco's productive capacity.
It should be obvious that the delay defensive tactics induce works
in a similar way in both the cases of persistent mismanagement and
335. See
Conseco,
Inc.,
Conseco
Company
Acquisition
History,
at
http://www.conseco.com/csp/ about-conseco/ac-companyprfile history-acquisitions.htm
(last
visited Sept. 24, 2001).
336. For the prices, see Norris, supra note 332.
337. Institutions owned about 70% of Conseco's stock. See John Pletz, StandardPushes On:
But Wall Street Isn't Paying Attention, INDIANAPOLIS BuS. J., May 24-30, 1999, at 17. The
institutions' opposition to the old management team is reported in Michael Fritz, They'd Hang
Conseco Execs from Green Tree: InstitutionalInvestors Pushfor Ouster, Sale, INVESTMENT NEWS,
Apr. 10, 2000, at 6.
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temporarily low stock prices. Just as the delay allows the undistracted
management of the corporation during the price break, it also grants the
time for an internal change of control during the time of persistent
mismanagement. The waste of a takeover will only be necessary if the
powers of internal corporate governance cannot produce the change of
control that is necessary.
It is worth noting that a hostile acquisition at a time of low prices
may force shareholders to sell at a loss. Given the potential for false low
prices or for rational low prices, a shareholder may reasonably assume
that he will not sell at such a time. But undefendable hostile offers may
well force him to sell at such a time and erode his total expected return.
The investment of the Thomas Lee firm in Conseco is a typical example.
Identifying a good investment and reaching an agreement with
management for a friendly and large financing like the $500 million
convertible debt that Thomas Lee bought338 does not happen every day.
If the hostile acquisition that Irvin Jacobs threatened was to occur,
Thomas Lee's returns would have been disastrous. The ability to
engineer a friendly turnaround, on the other hand, would allow Thomas
Lee's firmn to obtain all the hoped-for returns. A hostile takeover that
would hurt Thomas Lee would hurt turnaround financing generally.
Unfettered hostile takeovers would lead investors to require higher
returns to compensate for the possibility of a hostile takeover that would
freeze them out of their investment. In the example of Conseco, the
timing would have been particularly egregious. The Thomas Lee firm,
after all, managed to identify the time that the stock of Conseco hit
bottom with only a five month error.339 This should be cause for
celebration rather than fear of being frozen out by a hostile offer.
To summarize, the benefit of the delay that defensive tactics induce
consists of giving the internal structures of corporate governance the
latitude to function. When able management is not distracted at times of
short-term crisis, when inept management is changed with no hostile
fight at times of a long-term display of incompetence, the economy
gains. The gains consist of increased productivity and faster turnarounds
in the case where defenses protect able management. In the case of
incompetent management where defenses allow management
replacement without a takeover fight, the gains consist of the savings of
the cost of the hostile takeover. By having increased the costs of hostile

338. See Sparks & Moore, supranote 328, at 54.
339. Thomas Lee bought the stock about five months before the price reached its lowest level.
See supranotes 327, 336 and accompanying text.
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changes, defensive tactics have induced change that comes by means of
cooperation and negotiation among large investors and the firms.
If management needs to be changed, however, the question arises
whether the dispersed ownership that defensive tactics protect is
desirable. After all, one could argue that a majority controlled firm
would be able to change managers the fastest. The next section will
argue that majority control by an individual or a family does not
necessarily lead to easy changes of control.
2. The Market is a Nice Boss to Have
One could counterargue that the fear outlined above is chimerical,
and takeovers at times of low prices do not induce any loss of
productivity. Despite no empirical support for such a proposition, the
argument that acquisitions can be nonevents for senior management has
credibility because it can take a very simple and persuasive form. If it is
best for the firm to retain its exact current management, a self-interested
acquirer will not upset the management structure. The fallacy of this
argument lies in the idea that the top management of the target will
consider the acquisition a nonevent. Being acquired, however, radically
changes the circumstances in which top management performs its job.
Instead of being accountable to the diffuse market, in essence to the
analysts and speculators whose consensus is reflected in the stock's
price, the acquisition brings a definite boss, a single entity to whom
strategies must be justified and whose estimate of the future determines
the safety of the jobs of senior management.
The difference is more than the psychological demotion of
suddenly having a boss. When the CEO is accountable to the market, the
loss of the confidence of a single analyst or shareholder means little.
Effectively, the market consensus determines the price of the firm's
stock. While the safety of the CEO's position does depend on the stock
price, the sale of one shareholder's stake or the downgrading by one
analyst will have a small effect on the stock price. Moreover, the able
CEO will easily find a different analyst who does believe in the firm's
strategy. Effectively, when the senior management's performance is
evaluated by the market, the evaluation is collective. Management has a
diversified portfolio, not of stocks, but of evaluators. The CEO who is
evaluated by the market has a reduced risk. Idiosyncratic changes in
evaluations by the different shareholders and analysts cancel out,
reducing risk.
Thus, even if an acquirer desires to keep current management, top
management is not likely willing to stay. Not only does staying involve
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loss of independence and authority, but it also consists of an increase of
the risk under which senior management operates. Finally, the market
for human capital may punish a CEO's decision to stay after an
acquisition. If the acquisition implies a demotion because of the loss of
authority and increase of risk, the fact that the CEO stays after being
acquired is equivalent to accepting a demotion.
In sum, the corporate defenses that preserve dispersed ownership
protect senior management not only from losing control without having
shown incompetence, but also from sudden increases in their evaluation
risk.
3. Assured Replacement of Ineffective Management
While dispersed ownership combined with Delaware-style defenses
prevents accidental replacement of management, it also consists of a
mechanism that ensures that ineffective management will get replaced.
The argument that defenses allow incapable managers to retain control
has often been made. Delaware's defenses, however, allow changes of
control. Delaware's semi-entrenched control does not prevent changes
of control '" Incapable management of corporations under dispersed
ownership can only remain entrenched under defense law that is stronger
than Delaware's, such as Indiana's. 2 However, even under Delaware
law, a merger is delayed for three years. 3 Since simple acquisitions of
shares are unimpeded, we must compare their treatment to that of
mergers. The likelier strategic motivation of mergers suggests they
should be easier than acquisitions, which are more likely to be driven by
speculation.
The popular Delaware-style defenses, however, do not afford
incumbent management nearly as much time. The Delaware courts treat
poison pills as a means to conduct an orderly sale of the firm, rather than
a means to insulate management in perpetuity from acquisitions.'
Shark-repellent defenses in the voting machinery give management
advance notice of the threat, and the few defenses that allow limited
rescheduling of the shareholder meeting give management some lead
time." With these defenses as a backdrop, incompetent managers cannot

340. See discussion supraParts IH.A & I]I.B.
341. See discussion supraPart 3.B.3.
342. See discussion supraPart lI.B.2.
343. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 2000).
344. See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1350 (Del. 1985).
345. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Case Against Shark Repellent Amendments: Structural
Limitations on the Enabling Concept, 34 STAN. L. REv. 775,780-81 (1982).
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expect to retain control for long in the face of a hostile attack. The
defenses that Delaware provides to corporate managers are surmountable
when compared with those of other jurisdictions. The surmountable
nature of Delaware defenses ensures that lack of skill will eventually
cause the replacement of the management team. The ease with which
control can change, however, does not depend only on defenses, but also
on ownership dispersion.
At this point it is worth digressing to discuss terms in the
managerial contract that may compensate for the reduced security of not
having takeover protections. The paradigmatic term of this type is the
golden parachute, the granting to the managers of a handsome severance
package that is triggered by the change of control. This and other
equivalent terms are crucially important for the analysis because by
compensating the manager for the risk of a change of control, they can
make the managers indifferent to a hostile takeover. Thus, the managers
would consider equivalent employment in a corporation with defenses
(semi entrenched control) and employment in a corporation without
defenses but which offers a golden parachute (ephemeral control with
compensation).
This equivalence suggests that since firms do not choose to
substitute defenses with golden parachutes, defenses are superior from
the shareholders' perspective. This conclusion would support the thesis
of this Article because it would indicate that shareholders prefer
management continuity over rash takeovers.
Golden parachutes would provide a bias to management, however,
that may make them costly. By compensating managers for a change of
control, golden parachutes insulate against a risk that has also the
desirable effect of motivating management to avoid the market's
discipline. Managers protected by golden parachutes have a reduced
incentive to run the firm well because they can profit by their own
failure. Thus, one could still argue that shareholders prefer fewer
defenses but find the compensation that managers would require too
costly.
The objection, however, does not trump the support for defenses
that is drawn from their preference. Any compensation of managers for
change of control would blunt the disciplining effect of the market for
control. If managers fear false changes of control and defenses that
produce semi-entrenched control counter this fear, defenses are superior
to an insurance system that would blunt incentives. The preference for
defenses compared to golden parachutes absolutely shows that semientrenched control is superior to ephemeral control. Semi-entrenched
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control is superior because it offers a more beneficial management
contract and more beneficial performance incentives, which is what my
arguments have been about all along.
C. Solving the Collective Action Problem ofAdapting to
TechnologicalChange
The last major advantage of dispersed ownership and defenses may
be one of the most important ones as well. Concentrated ownership
implies reduced agency costs because managers are directly responsible
to the controller for performance. Corporate defenses and dispersed
ownership produce semi-entrenched management. Management does
promote the interests of shareholders, but management is also more
independent from shareholders than under concentrated ownership. This
agency cost produces a paradoxical advantage that has its source in the
change of technology and the retraining of the labor force.
Technological innovations can have a dramatic impact on the
nature and methods of production in the industries where they occur.
Technological change may often occur in a dispersed and haphazard
fashion. Only one or a few industries may be influenced by the
innovation. Other times, however, the technological change may be so
sweeping that most industries change shape. Historical examples of
sweeping technological change abound, starting with fire, the wheel, the
development of agriculture, through the industrial revolution, electricity,
mass or chain production, all the way up to computerization,
networking, and the telecommunication revolution that is still unfolding.
Be it haphazard or sweeping, change means that the actual
employees will be forced to change their ways or will be replaced by
people with the new skills. Roughly speaking, hunters were forced by
agriculture to become farmers, farmers were forced by the industrial
revolution to become craftsmen and workers, craftsmen were turned to
laborers by mass production, and clerical workers are changing into help
desk employees by the technological revolution.
1. The Difficulties of Retraining
These are not easy changes for a society to make. If the workforce
can survive the retraining, the economy can achieve a higher level of
welfare. A successful transition, however, can be extraordinarily
delicate. Fast retraining may require that workers abandon their
productive work to focus on their retraining. An economy may not be
able to afford to retrain all its workers at once because their removal
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from production eliminates the product that is necessary for their
sustenance and retraining. If change is too sudden, it will produce a
transition bottleneck, which may transmute into a real economic shock.
A typical scenario of such a bottleneck would have firms and individuals
estimate the cost of retraining before the massive increase in demand
caused by the simultaneous adoption of the new technology. After
making the capital investment for the new technology, firms cannot use
the old skills, and employees cannot afford to acquire the new ones. The
result would be massive destruction of productivity and wealth. 6
The recent experience of the Soviet economies with their transition
to capitalism is analogous. This sudden technological transition has
destroyed a large part of Russian productivity.M 7 The contrast between
the destruction of the Soviet economy and the relative success of the
gradual reform of the Chinese economy is a case in point.3s
2. Management and Modernization
Dispersed ownership and corporate defenses allow managers to
resist modernization pressures, but only for a limited time. The result is

346. An attenuated version of such transitions is in RODY MANUELLI, TECHNOLOGICAL
CHANGE, THE LABOR MARKET AND THE STOCK MARKET (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. W8022, 2000), which argues that during technological transitions, new firms
attract capital and labor by offering high returns and wages, but the result is gradual adoption of
new technology and transitional unemployment. See also WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & EDWARD N.
WOLFF, PROTRACTED FRICTIONAL UNEMPLOYMENT AS A HEAVY COST OF TECHNICAL PROGRESS

1-2 (Levi Econ. Inst., Working Paper No. 179, 1996) (indicating that the sunk-cost nature of
retraining expenses leads to distributional effects, by which classes of workers do not train in the
new technology, producing "protracted frictional unemployment"); MARTIN ZAGLER, AGGREGATE
DEMAND, ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND UNEMPLOYMENT 9 (Working Paper, 2000) (indicating that at
transitional times, new firms facing risky demand for new products are forced to offer risk
premiums on their risky jobs, reducing technological implementation and producing transitional
unemployment), availableat http://papers.ssm.com (last visited Sept. 12, 2001). Very similar is the
problem of transitional unemployment as an economy changes from state-directed to a market
orientation. See Zuzana Brixiova & Tarik Yousef, Labor Market Adjustment in Transition
Economies with On-the-Job Search, 67 ECON. LETrERS 223 (2000) (deriving the optimal speed of
closures of firms in the state sector as employees search for jobs); Edward X. Gu, From Permanent
Employment to Massive Lay-Offs: The Political Economy of "Transitional Unemployment" in
Urban China (1993-8), 28 ECON. & SOC'Y 281, 281-82 (1999) (providing a case study of the
Chinese transition, which produced massive unemployment); Halvor Mehlum, Why Gradualism?,7
J. INT'L TRADE & ECON. DEV. 279, 294 (1998) (arguing in favor of gradual rather than sudden
removal of import tariffs to address transitional unemployment).
347. About half of the Soviet Union's economic activity had been lost by 1997. See Sherman
Garnett, Russia'sIllusory Ambitions, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 61, 61-62 (1997).
348. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. OVERHOLT, THE RISE OF CHINA: How ECONOMIC REFORM IS
CREATING A NEW SUPERPOWER 32-36 (1993); Susan Tiefenbrun, Piracyof IntellectualProperty in
China and the FormerSoviet Union and its Effects Upon International Trade: A Comparison, 46
BUFF. L. REV. 1, 5-9 (1998) (providing further citations).
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that the technological shock hits industry in two stages. Firms under
concentrated ownership first feel the incentive to change. 49 In contrast,
firms under dispersed ownership can resist, but only temporarily, the
incentive to adopt the new technology. The gains from modernization
are, of course, the same for both types of firms. The personal discomfort
of laying off long-time workers is also the same. The increased agency
costs of dispersed ownership induces managers to veer from the narrow
path of immediate maximization of shareholder value. Corporate
defenses allow them to resist even pressures to change that come from
the threat of hostile acquisitions. As developed under Delaware law,
however, the defensive measures will not operate in perpetuity. The
inefficiencies will soon be large enough to overcome the collective
action problems of dispersed shareholders and if management continues
to not modernize, it will be replaced.
An example will illustrate how this agency cost that burdens
shareholders becomes a paradoxical advantage for society. The society
has one thousand workers, divided into one hundred firms, with ten
workers at each firm. Workers produce value of $550 per month using
the old technology. Ten percent of the workers acquire the new skill and
their productivity becomes $600 per month. The rest must be retrained.
First, consider that a society chooses to shift methods of production and
to finance this expenditure from tax revenue. As soon as the new
technology arises, all of the 900 old technology workers are let go. The
government must support them and retrain them. Suppose that each
worker requires $500 per month to survive during the three months of
retraining.
Compare this to a situation in which the 900 workers who are to be
retrained do so gradually. They are retrained at the same cost on the job
or after hours while maintaining their old jobs. The economy does not
lose three months of productivity for each of the 900 workers and does
not need to produce welfare expenses. However, the increased
productivity will come at a later time, say in eight months instead of
three. Thus, this society loses five months of increased productivity (five
months times $50 per worker times 900 workers is $225,000) but saves
349. One might interject that the argument here seems to contradict the previous analysis that
concentrated ownership cannot escape inefficient management by owners. No contradiction exists
because not all firms with concentrated ownership are inefficient. The point of the argument here is
that firms with concentrated ownership that is skilled will face the strongest time pressure to adopt
the new technology, lay off their workers, and hire new ones that are adept in the new technology.
Indeed, the previous argument implies that inefficient firms with concentrated ownership will fade
away, so that at any time there will only be the average number of inefficient firms with
concentrated ownership.
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three months of lost productivity (three months times $550 per worker
times 900 workers is $1,485,000). Clearly, the society would elect
gradual change. Individual fm-s, however, do not take into account the
social problems of retraining so as to graduate their adoption of the new
technology. If the new technology promises increased productivity
they
3 50
will adopt it and demand that their employees produce it
The operation of the markets may counter this push toward the false
choice of immediate mass retraining. A wage differential might develop.
Workers familiar with the new technology will command higher wages,
perhaps, and that will lead firms to retain the old-technology employees.
The computer revolution presents a different possible outcome. The new
technology may be so pervasive that everyone has some exposure to it
and employees cannot differentiate efficient from inefficient users of the
new technology at hiring time. All employees obtain the same wage but
competitive pressure pushes for productive use of the new technology.
Left to the pressure of competition, firms may well press workers for
immediate retraining. Hostile acquirers may be able to realize gains from
immediate retraining if the target's management does not press for
retraining. Defenses that protect firms from immediate takeovers allow
management the otherwise wasteful luxury of resisting the pressure for
immediate retraining.
Rules concerning severance pay may change the incentives of
firms. Similarly, the conclusion may be different if the change in
productivity is so great that the gains from switching earlier outweigh
the costs of the abrupt change. In these cases, defenses may have no
effect on the speed of adoption of the new technology.
The transition to a new technology is more than a problem of
choosing the appropriate pace of retraining. The danger exists that a
market with restraints will fail to address the problem of adapting to the
new technology. Each firm needs to retrain its employees in order to
reach the new greater productivity, but each firm fears that if it were to
retrain its employees, the other firms will simply hire them away. The
reluctance of firms to provide general skills is generally

350. This example assumes that a centralized welfare and retraining system would produce the
same outcome as a retraining system governed by the market forces. To the extent that government
is considered an inferior decision-maker, preventing the government-led plan will have additional
advantages. If we suppose that elected officials would be biased in favor of employees' interests
because they are more numerous, we would expect a governmental transition to be slower than that
instituted by concentrated owners or by managers of dispersed firms who face the threat of the
market for control.
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acknowledged.35" ' General skills are acquired at workers' own expense at
specialized schools and universities. 52 Firms are willing to provide firmspecific training.353 A broad new technology, such as computerization,
depends on a general skill which firms are reluctant to provide.
Takeover defenses that preserve dispersed ownership do not solve
the problem, but the graduated technological change that they induce
prevents the complete breakdown of modernization incentives. Firms
under concentrated ownership fear that if they retrain their employees,
other firms will hire them away.3"4 The attenuated incentives to
modernize that firms having dispersed ownership face mitigate this fear
of being poached. Modernizing firms know that the opportunistic
strategy of mass layoffs and replacements is slightly less likely to be
adopted by dispersed-ownership firms because the agency cost of their
management makes mass replacements less appealing. Moreover, the
defensive capacity of firms with dispersed ownership means that they
can resist acquirers who may be willing to adopt the opportunistic
strategy after an acquisition.
D. MarketAttraction: PreservingMarketReturns
In addition to all the above desirable social consequences of
takeover defenses, defenses have positive consequences for investors.
However, these are often ignored because of the large premiums that
hostile offers entail. This section argues that the large ex post premiums
are not so large when viewed ex ante. Hostile offers have numerous
negative tax and transaction cost consequences, which shows that
investors do not lose nearly as much as it appears by defenses that delay
hostile offers.
Hostile takeovers, when successful, force an exchange of investors'
securities with cash-rarely with securities.35 This produces a strong
impetus for a reinvestment trade on the part of the investor. This forced
351. See, e.g., Paul Ryan, The Costs of Job-Trainingfor a Transferable Skill, 18 BRrr. J.
INDUS. REL. 334, 345, 350 (1980). See generally Marino Regini, Firms and Institutions: The
Demand for Skills and their Social Production in Europe, 1 EUR. J. INDUS. REL. 191 (1995)
(exploring the alleged advantage in the provision of general training that the German system has
because it prevents a nontraining employer from poaching the employees other employers train).
352. See, e.g., Ryan, supranote 351, at 342.
353. See John A. Litwinski, Regulationof Labor Market Monopsony, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 49, 62 (2001).
354. See, e.g., Ryan, supranote 351, at 337.
355. In all of the hostile takeovers studied in Part I, the consideration was always cash, except
in Unocal. In Unocal, Mesa's second-tier was securities and after the decision in that case, such a
strategy is avoided. See supra text accompanying notes 82-174.
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sale and the nearly forced purchase that follows it impose on the investor
numerous negative consequences. Investors are made to face tax,
transaction cost, and gambling disutility burdens at unanticipated times.
Most of these costs simply reduce the returns that investors can expect
from the stock market. This creates incentives to move capital away
from the market into alternative investments, such as real estate or
private business dealings, or channeling their investments through
intermediaries such as insurance companies. Some of these incentives,
such as that produced by the risk of double short-term-gain treatment
(instead of the single long-term gain treatment investors expect after a
long-term investment) distort investors' choice by having a more
negative impact on investors with a shorter investment horizon.
1. The Tax Burden of Unanticipated Takeovers
Unanticipated hostile takeovers have two negative tax effects on
investors. For long-term holders, periodic takeovers reduce the total
return by accelerating the time at which the capital gains tax is paid.35 6
For shorter-term investors and traders, the tax effect of takeovers is to
reduce the profit from identifying a trading opportunity (a mispriced
stock).357 The two effects are best illustrated in examples.
a.

Reducing Returns for Long-Term Holders by
Accelerating Tax Payment

A typical example will illustrate the effect of takeovers on an
investor who saves for retirement in ten years. Our investor faces the
question whether to put $100 in the stock market or in the bond market
where some tax-free bonds and bond funds exist. The stock market
offers an expected return of about 10%, all of which is, for simplicity, in
the form of capital gains. The investor is taxed, say, at an 18% rate on
capital gains.
Putting $100 in the stock market that performs 10% on average
suggests that in ten years this will have grown to $100 * (1 + .10)o =
$259.40, for a gain of $159.40 before taxes and $130.71 after taxes. If in
year five, takeovers occur at one-third of the firms in our investor's
356. The takeover act creates a realizing event, for the selling of stock can lead to gains, thus
triggering tax consequences. See I.R.C. § 61(3) (West 2001). Of course, if the holding period
requirement is met, these gains would be taxed at the long-term capital gains rate. See id. §§ 1(h),
1222-1223.
357. Short-term capital gains are defined as the gains from the sale or exchange of a capital
asset held for less than one year. See id. § 1222(1). These gains are taxed at regular income tax
rates, rather than at the long-term capital gains rate. See id. § 1(h).
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portfolio, capital gains will have to be paid at that time. Thus, in the fifth
year, after the portfolio has grown to $100 * (1 + .1)S = $161.05, the
gain of one-third, i.e., $20.35 of the $61.05 total gain, will be taxed at,
say, 18% and $3.66 will be removed from the investor's portfolio for the
tax payment. The remaining $157.39 continues to grow at 10% for
another five years. By then, the portfolio has grown to
$157.39 * (1 +. 1)5 = $253.48, before taxes. Of this, a fraction
corresponds to the reinvested proceeds of the firms that were taken over,
so that the capital gains must be calculated using the increased basis. In
the fifth year the investor received cash for a third of the $161.05
portfolio, namely $53.68, from which $3.66 was paid as capital gains
taxes, leaving $50.02 for reinvestment. All told, the investor ends up
with $228.86 after taxes,35 which corresponds to an 8.63% annual return
after taxes. By contrast, the same investment with no early taxation will
leave our investor with $230.79 after taxes,359 and an 8.72% annual
return after taxes.
The difference from an annual after tax return of 8.72% to one of
8.63% is not staggering, but it would still persuade some investors to
switch to alternative investments. Over the long time periods involved,
the accelerating of tax payments has an effect that is compounded by the
fact that the investor loses the benefit of being able to invest the taxed
part of his capital.
The next tax effect of takeovers influences mostly traders rather
than diversified investors. While no tears may be shed for the hardships
of a trader's life, traders do provide the service of correcting false prices,
a service that allows the capital allocating function of the securities
markets to operate smoothly.3 6 The tax effect of takeovers makes traders
refrain from correcting prices because it can dramatically reduce their
profits, particularly because it may switch the trader from a long-term
capital gain treatment to the higher tax rates of a short-term gain.

358. The $50.02 continues to grow at 10% and five years later becomes $50.02 * (1 + .1) =
$80.56. The gain these last five years was $80.56 - $50.02 = $30.54, and payment of 18% of that
leaves $75.06 of original capital plus gains after the tax payment. The other two-thirds of the
portfolio, namely $66.67 of the original $100, has grown without taxation for ten years. It has
grown to $66.67 * (1+.])"°= $172.92, producing $106.25 of capital gains for taxation. After paying
the 18% tax on these the investor is left with $153.80 of original capital plus gains. Thus the $100
investment has become after tax $153.80 + $75.06 = $228.86.
359. The $100 grows to $100 *(1 +. I)J = $259.40. The investor is left with gains of
(100% - 18%) * 159.4 after paying the taxes on this, or gains of $130.79. Thus the $100 investment
has become after tax $230.79.
360. See Georgakopoulos, Informed Traders,supra note 287, at 424.
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b. Reducing Profits From Identifying an Undervalued Stock
The incentives on investors can be restated by focusing on the
margin of error investors require before buying and, thus, contributing to
a correction of the false price. Without defenses, buyers may incur
income treatment of their gains. With defenses, however, they are
(almost) assured that they can wait past the cut-off between short-term
gains,361 which are treated as regular income,3 62 and long-term capital
gains, which are taxed at a lower rate. 364 Since the prospective after-tax
gains are larger with defenses, they will buy at smaller discounts and
contribute more to the accuracy of market prices.
A simple example shows how an investor who identifies an
undervalued firm is influenced by the prospect of a hostile takeover that
may force short-term gain tax treatment. Ms. Ina Vestor identifies a firm
which trades at 90% of its value, its shares trading at $0.90 instead of
their true value of $1. Ina estimates that in two years, a point in time
comfortably past the cutoff point for her profits to be treated as shortterm gains, the market as a whole will on average be 20% higher. The
undervaluation of the firm, which has average market risk, will have
been corrected. Her $0.90, in effect will become $1.20. At an 18% tax
treatment of long-term gains, she will net a profit of $0.246 for every
$0.90 she invests, or a 27% return after tax.
This calculation changes, however, if Ina considers a hostile
takeover a likely possibility. If a hostile takeover occurs, her shares will
be bought from her at a tender offer, which will not allow for
reorganization tax treatment that would prevent capital gain realization
by shareholders.3 65 Suppose the takeover occurs a year after Ina buys, at
$1.10. Ina's short-term gains are taxed at, say, 39%, and she nets after
taxes $0.122. Adding these to her capital of $0.90, she will participate in
the 10% additional return of the second year, but again, if she must sell,
any gains would be taxed at the short-term rate. Were she able to earn
another $0.90, which is less likely after the tax bite has reduced what she
can invest, she would still end up with $0.061 after tax, for total gains of

361. SeeI.R.C. § 1222(1).
362. See I.R.C. § 1(h).
363. See I.R.C. § 1222(3).
364. See I.R.C. § 1(h).
365. Friendly corporate combinations that observe some formalities can be completed without
triggering capital gains. The exchange of the shareholders' old securities for the new ones is not
considered a trade but a continuing interest in the changed firm. See I.R.C. § 368 (West 2000).
Hostile acquisitions will typically not be able to comply with the terms of section 368 for
reorganization treatment, and are realization events.
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12.2 + 6.1 = $0.183. All this assumes that she will not have to pay
brokerage fees or any other commissions in order to reinvest her money.
Instead of 27%, Ina is looking at 20%. But 20% is what she could do by
investing in the market, staying with her diversified index fund, and
incurring none the idiosyncratic risks of investing in a single firm.
Hence, investors who, like Ina, consider a hostile takeover likely, will
probably not correct the 10% error in the stock price. If, by contrast,
investors know that financial buyouts offering no more than to correct
market errors can be blocked by defensive tactics, then they know that
their investment period will not be cut short by hostile offers devoid of
synergy gains. The investment in the undervalued firm becomes once
again attractive.
Ina Vestor can overcome the problem of short-term gain treatment
by extending her investment horizon. A stock that she will hold for two
years will produce two taxations of her gains as income. Unless the
hostile takeover occurs in the beginning or the end of the two-year
period, both the gains it produces as well as the gains of the stock with
which it is replaced will be taxed at the income tax rate. Investors can
avoid one of the two short-term gain treatments by only investing in the
market if they have a long enough or a flexible enough investment
horizon to wait out any hostile takeover. This, in turn, means that some
short-horizon funds will not be placed in the stock market. In fear of
being eroded by the tax and other ramifications of hostile takeovers,
short-term funds (that with defenses would go into the market) will stay
in deposit accounts. As with the removal of funds of any horizon, this
implies a slight pressure upwards for firms' cost of capital. Short-term
funds perform an additional role-the frequent trading they imply fuels
the market's liquidity. Their removal casts the spell of reduced liquidity.
Prices become more sensitive to trades, informed trading is discouraged,
market efficiency is reduced, and investors become more hesitant to
invest in the market."'
2. The Transaction Costs of Unanticipated Takeovers
Hostile takeovers also impose on investors the payment of a new
bid-ask spread and a new brokerage commission and all the fees
associated with a market trade. The investor's portfolio is balanced
before the hostile takeover. The takeover replaces a portion of the
portfolio with cash. If the investor does not want to reduce his

366. This spiraling effect of liquidity was explained above. See supra text accompanying
notes 287-95.
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investment, he must reinvest this money. Reinvestment implies the
investor will bear the trading costs, which are the bid-ask spread and
brokerage fees and commissions.
The bid-ask spread is the spacing between the prices at which other
market participants stand ready to buy (what others bid for the stock)
and sell (what others ask for the stock).36 7 Depending on the investor's
trading strategy the investor will pay or receive some fraction of the bidask spread. "Market" orders (orders to trade at the current market price
without any limit as to what that price is)36' effectively "pay" a large
fraction of the spread.369 The alternative strategy to market orders is for
investors to place "limit" orders, which are orders to trade at a specific
price, too good for the current market conditions, too low if the investors
are buying, too high if they are selling.3 7 As investors are more willing
to risk having their order remain unfilled by placing a "limit" order, they
increasingly avoid the burden of the bid-ask spread. They may even
receive the spread if their order is met by a favorable "market" order.
For example, suppose the spread is "$99 bid by $100 asked." An
investor who places a limit order to buy at $99 and whose order is filled
because of a market order to sell, receives the benefit of the spread.
Although brokerage commissions are much lower than they have
been and may have even disappeared for small market orders, they still
exist for larger orders and all sizes of limit orders.37' Moreover, fullservice commissions are often paid by investors as compensation for
using the research that the brokerage house provides. 372 Thus, in addition
to the bid-ask spread, investors who suddenly find their positions in a

367. See BLACK'SLAwDICIONARY, supra note 5, at 154, 1411.
368. See id. at 1124.
369. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Bucidore & George Sofianos, Liquidity Provision and Specialist
Trading in NYSE-Listed Non-U.S. Stocks, 63 J. FIN. ECON. 133 (2002) (stating that non-United
States stocks have wider spreads because of higher information asymmetry; the greater spreads,
paid by traders to the market-making specialists, compensate them for this greater risk); see also
infra note 375.
370. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 1124.
371. American Express, for example, offered no-commission on-line trading in 1999 to
customers with accounts of $25,000 or more. See Robert Barker, This Mess Will Cost AMEX, Bus.
WK., Oct. 30, 2000, at 144.
372. Regardless of how low the commission may be, market orders still pay the bid-ask spread.
The low-commission trading is possible because some brokerage houses pay other brokers for
directing these small market orders to them, and they essentially profit from the bid-ask spread. For
a study of the payment for order flow, as this arrangement is called, see Marshall E. Blume &
Michael A. Goldstein, Quotes, OrderFlow, and PriceDiscovery, 52 J. FIN. 221, 226-27 (1997). See
also Allen Ferrell, A Proposalfor Solving the "Paymentfor Order Flow" Problem, 74 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1027 (2001).
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stock liquidated by virtue of a hostile takeover, will also have to bear
these transaction costs.
Let us see, however, the effect of a takeover on a customer of a
discount broker, our hypothetical Ms. Ina Vestor. Ina has a substantial
investment portfolio of $800,000, which she has diversified among ten
firms, with about $80,000 in each. Using the rough average price of
stocks in the New York Stock Exchange of $40, in order to reinvest
proceeds from a hostile takeover of $80,000 she would have to purchase
on average 2000 shares. 3 Suppose she is a customer of Charles Schwab
& Co, Inc, a large discount broker, and trades on-line which entitles her
to a further discount. The special $29.95 per trade commission only
applies to trades of less than 1000 shares. 74 Ina will pay $0.03 per share,
or on average $60 if she invests the entire amount at once (actually in a
single day and in one stock-daily trades in a single stock are
aggregated for commission purposes). If it takes three trading days of
660 shares each to fill her order, then Ina Vestor will get hit with three
$29.95 commissions, totaling $89.85. Compared with her tax hit, this
may seem trivial. We must not forget to take into account the effect of
the bid-ask spread as well, which after decimalization has been
preliminarily estimated at an average of $0.07. 375
If we add these transaction costs to the effect of taxes, however, her
return from investing in the market drops further. Using the average
stock price of $40 and the $0.03 per share commission schedule suggests
a percentage brokerage fee of .03 - 40 = 0.075%. If we were to repeat
the above calculation of her total gains after having paid this fee in year
five for the one-third of her investment that was subject to a hostile
takeover, we find that her $100 capital grows to $228.80 instead of
$228.85 by year ten.376 Because of the compounding effect, the loss of
373. The size of this trade also makes it ineligible for a free trade by virtue of a payment for
order flow. See infra note 376.
374. For example, Schwab's commission schedule is available on-line at
http:/lwvwv.schwab.comlSchwabNO V/navigationlmainFrameSetO,4528,717,00.html (last visited
Aug. 23,2000).
375. After the first stage of decimalization-the transition of the pricing of stocks from
fractions to dollars and cents--a preliminary study finds the spread to have narrowed by 28% for
the few NYSE stocks that were included in that first stage. See Gaston F. Ceron, Decinalization
Cuts Wall Street Profit, NarrowingBid-Ask Spreads, Says Study, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 2000, at C6
(citing a preliminary report by Professors Robert Wood and Sugato Chakravarty, of the University
of Memphis and Purdue University, respectively).
376. The only difference is that instead of investing the full $50.02 she received after taxes in
the takeover, Ina will pay 0.075% of that as brokerage commission, and only invest the balance,
which will grow, in turn, for five years to (1 - 0.00075) * 50.02 * (1+.1)= 80.49729, say $80.50.
After paying the 18% capital gains tax on the gains of $80.50 - $50.02, Ina is left with (1-.18) *
($80.50 - $50.02) + $50.02 = $75.01 of gains plus capital instead of the $75.06 she would have if
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the transaction fee grows and becomes noticeable even if the fee was
trivial at the time it was paid.
3. The Implicit Trading Costs of Unanticipated Takeovers
The trading of stocks involves one more cost that is not made
explicit in the form of a measurable fee or tax. In our world of imperfect
information and imperfect ability to process information, the price of
any one stock may be higher or lower than its perfectly accurate
valuation would suggest. Thus, investors could fully rationally fear that
they are buying the overpriced stocks and selling the underpriced ones.
Moreover, in addition to this fear which is completely compatible with
the evidence about market inefficiencies that we have, investors may
also believe that overall prices may not be accurate, that the entire
market or sector is mispriced. Then they will fear even larger, more
frequent and systemic price discrepancies. Both types of fear create a
disincentive to trade. The investor will either not reinvest the takeover
proceeds or reinvest and suffer some disutility due to these fears.
Investors will fear trading at false disadvantageous prices for two
reasons. First, the evidence of accurate pricing that does exist, only
applies to average reactions and does not show that any single stock is
accurately priced. Second, there is mounting evidence of inaccurate
prices across the entire market. The evidence of accurate pricing that we
have is created from averaging across multiple stocks. Most studies find
that these aggregated averages react accurately to new pieces of
information.3" However, they cannot speak about the accuracy of the
pricing of each disaggregated stock. The study of uncertainty necessarily
involves aggregation, because only in the crowd will the average be
captured. Even when we find that aggregation produces correct
reactions, the component prices may be inaccurate-some too high,
some too low-and the aggregation may hide their inaccuracies. An
example will illustrate.
Suppose the uncertain event is a coin toss, one for each of six
corporations in a statistical study. If the coin toss comes out heads, the
value of the stocks studied will be $2, while if it comes out tails the

she had not paid the brokerage fee. Essentially, the $0.03 commission of year five has grown to
influence the outcome of the tenth year by about $0.05.
377. The champion of market efficiency is Eugene Fama. In 1970 he mostly saw indications of
efficiency. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 416 (1970). It took a major market crash for Fama to acknowledge some
limitations of markets. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient CapitalMarkets: 11, 46 J. FIN. 1575, 1601-02
(1991).
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stocks will be worth $1. The question is whether on the eve of the coin
tosses, the market values of these stocks are correctly at $1.50. Given the
transparency of the example, we know the correct price for each stock.
Let us change the coin toss, however, to an uncertain event like the
realization of a hostile offer for a corporation. The statistician will
aggregate the prices of stocks before and after the realization of the
event and see if the price change corresponds to the realized frequency
of the event in order to see whether the market anticipates the probability
of a hostile offer correctly. Thus, if the offer were the coin toss, the
statistician would observe that three corporations received different
offers that averaged $2 and thereupon the rest of the corporations' stocks
dropped to different prices that average $1. Given that half of them
received an offer, the statistician infers the probability of an offer to be
50% and examines whether the average price was indeed $1.50 before
the offer. The statistician will be equally satisfied if all were at $1.50 as
if half were at $2.50 and half at $0.50, which still averages $1.50. While
the latter passes the statistician's test of an efficient market, it is a cause
of great concern to the investor because it would be disastrous to buy
stock that is at $2.25.
The effect of the potential price inaccuracy in a world of prices that
are on average accurate suggests that the investor fears trading solitary
stocks. If the investor decides to purchase stock in a particular
corporation, the investor can be assured that the price is on average
correct, but the price may be wrong. The investor is only assured of
trading at the correct average price if instead of a solitary stock, the
investor purchases many stocks at once. As long as the investor is
trading one or even just a few stocks, the investor is justified in fearing
that the purchase may be overpriced and the sale underpriced.
In addition to such doubts about the accuracy of prices, there is
some evidence that the market as a whole is subject to crowd
psychology. Optimistic self-perpetuating buying that raises share prices
and panicked selling are frequently reported in the press and in historical
accounts.378 There is even statistical support for the crowd psychology
that ranges from the discount of closed-end funds to the frequency of
IPOs of new stocks. 379 Thus, investors have the fear of false prices not
only if they trade a few stocks at a time, but even if they trade many
stocks at once.
378. See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Waives Some Rules to Try to Ease Market Volatility,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2001, at C1 (describing moves by the federal government to ward off
panicked selling after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks).
379. See supra note 319.
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Hostile tender offers that replace investors' stockholdings with
cash, by forcing the investors to trade in order to replace their
investment, expose investors to the risk of inaccurate prices of individual
stocks and inaccurate market levels. 3 0 A risk-neutral investor would be
indifferent to this risk because the over- and undervaluations cancel out.
Investors are not risk-neutral but risk-averse with respect to trading
because they do not trade diversified-numerous stocks simultaneously.
For risk-averse investors, the fear of the possibility of a purchase at a
price that is too high is not canceled out by the statistically equivalent
possibility of a price that is too low. This prospect is equivalent to a
gamble that a prudent person would try hard to avoid. 8' Thus, the
investor will either avoid reinvesting and miss out in market
participation that would on average be beneficial, or will suffer through
the gamble of trading. The investor in both cases is worse off than
without the hostile tender offer.
4. Preserving Market Attractiveness in the Face of Price Errors
A further danger that undefendable hostile takeovers pose for
investors is a phenomenon known as adverse selection. The term adverse
selection denotes the availability of only the worst prospects for
investors.382 Takeover artists might cherry-pick the market,3 3 leaving
only the worst companies for public investment. This generally reduces
the possible returns for investors and the attractiveness of the market.
Again, if investors achieve superior returns in private investments, they
will leave the market, increasing the cost of capital for firms that seek
public financing. An example will illustrate this effect.
Suppose, first, that takeover artists are allowed to use hostile bids to
remove the firms that are the best candidates for turnarounds from the
380. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 267.
381. It is simple to analyze this situation mathematically in the context of an investor with
constant relative risk-aversion. When facing a fair gamble that half the time, say, increases the
investor's wealth by 10% and the other half reduces it by the same amount, the investor's utility
from the gamble is less than remaining with certainty at the current level of wealth. I offer such an
example. See Georgakopoulos, The Tortured Transition,supra note 287, at 699-701.
382. See Black, supra note 279, at 787.
383. The contrary evidence that fund managers cannot cherry-pick against investors is not
relevant because fund managers are subject to agency costs and career concerns that distort their
incentives against individuality and towards conformism, hence they follow the market. See, e.g.,
David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, HerdBehavior and Investment, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 465,
465 (1990) (stating that "professional managers will 'follow the herd' if they are concerned about
how others will assess their ability to make sound judgments"); cf. Abhijit V. Banerjee, A Simple
Model of Herd Behavior, 107 Q.J. ECON. 797, 798 (1992) (discussing the behavior of people in
general); Kenneth A. Froot et al., Herd on the Street: InformationalInefficiencies in a Market with
Short-Term Speculation, 47 J. FIN. 1461, 1481 (1992).
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public's investment possibilities. The firms that are likely to be attractive
to a hostile suitor will probably have management teams that are not
reacting to new circumstances. Investors are losing value, but change is
not forthcoming from the existing management team. Existing
management either fails to realize the need for change, or is resistant to
it. Suppose that an undefendable hostile bid arrives. The premise of its
level is the implementation of the new strategy for the target. Only a part
of the gains from the changed strategy is given to the target shareholders
in the form of a bid premium. Once the bid is successful, the further
appreciation in value of the target will be captured by the acquirer. Even
if the acquirer obtained no more than 50% of the target's shares, and
even if the acquirer split the gains so that 75% of the appreciation was
given to the selling shareholders of the target, the public loses some
stock returns. If defensive tactics could delay the hostile change of
control, investors may capture the lost returns.
Compare the same setting where Delaware-type defenses give
management additional time.3 ' Management will not be able to maintain
its resistance to the new strategy. If management tries to solicit a
friendly white knight, the viability of the existing strategy will soon
emerge as an issue in the negotiations. If management attempts to raise
cash for a defensive recapitalization, it will need to raise the productivity
of the assets in order to meet its debt payments. If we go down the list of
possible defensive measures, as long as management is susceptible to
being eventually ousted, the defensive measures that may be imposed
will not allow management the wasteful luxury of maintaining its
course. Once management is induced to increase the firm's productivity,
however, these gains flow to all the shareholders. Thus, even if we
suppose that the target management is less able than the hostile suitor to
create value, the public shareholders may prefer this gain, particularly
given the various tax and transaction cost disadvantages that accompany
hostile bids.
Hostile bids, in sum, have a host of ex ante negative effects on
investors: tax disadvantages; the imposition of quantifiable transaction
costs such as brokerage commissions and the bid-ask spread; the burden
of unquantified transaction costs, such as the disutility of more risky
trading; as well as the possibility of being prevented from participating
in turnarounds. All of these ex ante drawbacks mean that the large
premiums that investors realize once a hostile offer does materialize are
not a complete definition of the hostile offers' effect on investors, or of
384. See supra PartIl.
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the attractiveness that hostile offers contribute to the market. From a
social perspective, however, the advantage of hostile takeovers lies not
in the premium that investors receive, but in managerial improvement
and increased productivity. The possibility of hostile offers has a
disciplining effect on management. Defensive measures play a valuable
role by allowing target management some time to be disciplined and,
thus, have the opportunity of increasing shareholder value without the
costs of a hostile bid.
V.

ARGUMENT SUMMARY AND NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS

The argument on ownership dispersion and takeover defenses
covered such a broad range of fields that it is worth a brief review.
Part IV.A explained that dispersed ownership is necessary for high
quality financial markets.385 Dispersed ownership allows investor
diversification, which is necessary for the equity market to be a means of
saving.386 This not only increases the relevance of the equity market for
corporate financing, but also induces risk-neutral management of
economic resources. The trading activity that is motivated by investment
purposes creates market liquidity, which attracts informed trading.
Informed trading increases the accuracy of prices.3 Increased price
accuracy also means reduced risk, which further attracts investment
activity.3" Lack of takeover defenses would induce entrepreneurs to
retain control of their enterprises. This would counteract the benefits of
dispersed ownership and produce additional ills. Widespread retention of
control combined with decreased market quality would bias firms
toward internal growth as opposed to the financing of independent
startup corporations. This would slow economic mobility by both
producing large bureaucratic corporations and by reducing independent
innovation. Innovation is also directly facilitated by defenses. Defenses
increase the value of control, adding value to the venture capital
arrangement.
Part IV.B explained that dispersed ownership provides CEOs with a
substitute of diversified human capital because their performance is
evaluated by the entire market rather than a single boss.389 The danger of
temporarily low prices, however, exposes the management of the public

385.
386.
387.
388.
389.

See supra notes 287-95 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 297-99 and accompanying text.
See supra note 302 and accompanying text.
See supra Part IV.A.3.
See supra Part IV.B.2.
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corporation to the risk of a takeover that is not justified by their poor
performance. Takeover defenses mitigate this problem.390 At the same
time, dispersed ownership ensures that poor management will be
replaced. 39' Takeover defenses that produce entrenched control prevent
the operation of this crucial function.
Part IV.C explained that technological evolution presents the risk of
widespread workforce dislocation. Old skills lose value and the skills
required by the new technology are still being learned. Ownership
dispersion with takeover defenses retards the transition process.
Managers whose positions are protected by takeover defenses can afford
wasteful delay in adopting new technologies that would disrupt their
employees. This delay releases some of the socioeconomic pressures of
adapting to a new technology.
All these effects-diversification, risk-neutral management, market
liquidity, the enhancement of venture capital contracting, the evaluation
of CEOs by the market, and graduated technological adoption-have
benefits that are not appropriated in their entirety by each corporation.
Dispersed ownership in one corporation allows investors to diversify
their holdings in, and produces liquidity in, other corporations as well.3 2
The gains in terms of reduced cost of capital, risk-neutral management,
more liquid markets and accurate prices, are gains that are shared. Thus,
the amount of defenses that firms provide will tend to be sub-optimal
from a social standpoint.
Part IV.D explained that unanticipated takeovers erode investor
returns by triggering tax realization, exposing investors to explicit and
implicit transaction costs.393 Furthermore, unanticipated takeovers allow
buyout funds to cherry-pick the market, exposing investors to the
"adverse selection" cost of having the most promising corporations
removed from their portfolios. 9 4 Takeover defenses mitigate these
dangers. This makes equity investments more attractive and reduces
firms' cost of capital.3 95
The interaction of these arguments brings us closer to determining
optimal takeover defense intensity. The first and last arguments illustrate
390. See id.
391. See Zenichi Shishido, Japanese Corporate Governance: The Hidden Problems of
CorporateLaw and Their Solutions, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 189, 218-19 (2000); David A. Skeel, Jr.,
An Evolutionary Theory of Corporate Law and CorporateBankruptcy, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1325,
1339 (1998) (stating that "[p]oorly run firms may be subject to a takeover").
392. See Skeel, supranote 391, at 1334.
393. See supranotes 367-77 and accompanying text.
394. See supranotes 382-84 and accompanying text.
395. See supraPart IV.D.4.
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that dispersed ownership and takeover defenses are required conditions
for the functioning of financial markets. The second and third arguments
relate ownership dispersion and the intensity of takeover defenses to the
market for control of corporations and the speed of technological
change. Ownership dispersion with weak defenses exposes skilled
management to false takeovers and their precarious hold on control
forces immediate adoption of new technologies. Concentrated ownership
with strong defenses allows the entrenchment of incapable managers."'
Thus, the optimal takeover defense intensity is a complex product of
various features of the economic environment, including ownership
dispersion, the speed of technological innovation, as well as the quality
of the financial markets.
Of course, even though Delaware law has reached the point where
the bidder's dispersion influences directly the intensity of the takeover
defenses that can be implemented, this sensitivity to dispersed
ownership is limited to the context of defending a merger. 97 The
examination of Delaware law showed that its structure indirectly
promotes dispersed ownership in all settings, not just merger defenses.398
Therefore, the question arises about what further sensitivity to ownership
dispersion should corporate law show?
The first issue is whether defenses should depend on the acquirer's
dispersion. Note that one of the most important contributions of takeover
defenses was the insulation of skilled management from false takeover
attempts. This contribution of takeover defenses would disappear if they
could only be used against acquirers of concentrated ownership. One
more advantage of defensive tactics was that it prevents adverse
selection: the removal from the portfolio of the public investors of the
most attractive opportunities. If the acquirer is a public enterprise, this
fear is not as strong. Truly well-diversified investors would still
participate in the opportunity, but through their investment in the
acquirer instead of through the target. Note, however, that this presents a
host of complications that may be desirable to avoid, such as the danger
of producing conglomerates, 399 and the loss of the evaluative function of
396. See supra Part H.B.2.
397. Delaware law is explicitly sensitive to dispersed ownership in this setting because of the
QVC decision. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text, where the court struck down
defenses protecting a merger that would give control of the combined entity to an individual.
398. See supra Part II.B.
399. The Time decision can be argued to indicate such a danger, but this fear is probably
wrong. The Time court allowed defenses to protect a strategic alliance of two public companies, see
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1155 (Del. 1989), and its decision
may be thought, therefore, to allow or induce conglomeration. The more optimistic outlook would
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the independent market for the target's shares. A drive toward
conglomerates would also narrow the managerial pool. This would make
rare innovations less likely, and would hinder their emulation because
the increased performance of the innovating company would be hidden
deep in a conglomerated firm.o Thus, although dispersed ownership is
an admirable side-benefit of defensive tactics, the argument that
defensive tactics should hinge on the acquirer's ownership dispersion is
not strong.
Optimal defense intensity appears to increase as ownership
becomes more dispersed. More dispersed ownership implies that the
management team owns a smaller fraction of shares in the finm than
under more concentrated ownership. Thus, their control is more
vulnerable to the development of an insurgent set of stockholders,
whether those are existing holders or a new acquirer. This vulnerability
implies that a temporary drop in the stock's price exposes management
to a greater risk of a takeover. Since the drop in price is not the result of
poor management, this is a takeover that has no direct or indirect
beneficial effects of disciplining management of either this or other
corporations. Moreover, the fear of such a situation is undesirable to the
management team. Takeover defenses cure this problem by preventing a
fast takeover at a time of temporarily low prices. Therefore, the more
dispersed ownership is, the stronger defenses a firm should have. This
analysis should be extended to the legal system as a whole. In order to
forestall disruptive, inefficient takeover attempts at times of temporarily
low prices, a legal system with very dispersed corporate ownership
should provide stronger defenses than one with less dispersion.
Optimal defense intensity also appears to increase with the speed of
technological innovation, provided that the legal system has managed to
produce dispersed ownership. Given dispersed ownership, defenses
allow managers some indulgence of not pressing for immediate adoption
of new technologies. The transition to the new technology may produce
a bottleneck of mass layoffs and retraining pressure. Allowing
management some inefficient delay may be desirable for society as a
argue that the quality of the strategic alliance was part of the court's thought process and that the
protection of Time would not be afforded to inefficient conglomerations. A different concern about
Time would be that it may lead to a reduction of the number of available investments, creating
concerns about diversification and market liquidity. Neither are correct. Strategic mergers do not
reduce diversification of investors because the component firms are still indirectly part of investors'
portfolios. Market liquidity should actually benefit from strategic mergers since the reduction in the
number of tradable companies implies that the combined entities are traded even more intensely.
400. These benefits of dispersed ownership were discussed above. See supra notes 295-96 and
accompanying text.
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whole. Takeovers are not as threatening when firms are under
concentrated ownership. The pressure to adopt the new technology may
not be as strong. Defenses may reduce this pressure even further, but this
delay may be excessive. Therefore, optimal takeover defense intensity
depends on both the speed of technological progress and the
concentration of ownership. Strong defenses will not help resolve
retraining bottlenecks in legal systems with concentrated ownership as
much as in those with dispersed ownership.
Finally, the premise of these arguments, the possibility of false
prices, shows one more direction in which the law could move. If the
degree of accuracy of the price of a stock can be ascertained, then the
intensity of available defenses should vary accordingly. Defenses should
be allowed more generously if the firm's stock price is inaccurate,
because the possibility of an inaccurately low takeover price is stronger.
Defenses to protect from takeovers at inaccurately low prices are
unnecessary if a stock's price is very accurate. Therefore, optimal
takeover defense intensity depends on the ex ante accuracy of stock
prices. This sensitivity, however, is already evident in the Delaware
courts. Target management often makes the argument that the hostile
offer undervalues the target and its shareholders should be protected
from accepting the inadequate offer. In response, a significant part of the
Delaware courts' efforts is already expended in the task of ascertaining
price accuracy."
In sum, optimal takeover defense intensity should depend on
ownership dispersion, pace of technological innovation, and the
accuracy of stock prices. Counterintuitively, the acquirer's dispersion
may not be of significant concern.
A.

Whither Europe?

The stance of the European legal system on takeover defenses
contains several paradoxes. The Second Directive on Company Law
precludes the development of the discriminatory defenses that have
allowed corporations in the United States to avoid running into the folds

401. That defenses seek to protect shareholders who will be induced to sell at an inadequate
price is such a consistent refrain in Delaware law that it has fueled significant commentary. See,
e.g., Robert B. Thompson, Shareholders as Grown-Ups: Voting, Selling, and Limits on the Board's
Power to "JustSay No," 67 U. CIN. L. REV.999 (1999); Neil C. Rifkind, Note, Should Uninformed
Shareholdersbe a Threat Justifying Defensive Action by Target Directors in Delaware?: "JustSay
No" After Moore v. Wallace, 78 B.U. L. REV. 105 (1998).
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of white knights.4 American corporations can elect to give their board
of directors the authority to issue securities, and the board has the
authority to repurchase shares of the corporation. 4 3 Poison pills are
implemented by the issuance of a security resembling convertible
preferred stock that gives friendly shareholders valuable rights in the
event of a hostile acquisition.4 Repurchases have been used defensively
by targets that threaten to dilute the target's value by excluding the
hostile acquirer from the repurchase.' °

Neither poison pills, nor greenmail, nor selective self-tenders akin
to Unocal's are possible under the Second Directive. 4°6 Thus, the
principal self-help measures that American targets use to avoid
inopportune hostile offers are precluded from developing in Europe. The
question of what discrimination against hostile shareholders may be
allowed is not reached under European corporate law. Moreover,
European law shows express hostility to defenses. Some legal systems,
such as that of the United Kingdom, expressly prohibit defenses. '
In order to facilitate the pursuit of dispersed ownership by a legal
system, such as that of the European Union, we must first establish how
the system might currently promote dispersed ownership. In the context
of Europe's hostility to defenses and the associated attempt to specify
and circumscribe the powers of managers, 4 3 the motivating factors are
not only a suspicion of corporate managers but also a tradition and

402. See Second Council Directive 77/91 of 13 December 1976 on Coordination of Safeguards
which, for the Protection of the Interests of Members and Others, are Required by Member States
of Companies Within the Meaning of the Second Paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, in Respect
of the Formation of Public Limited Liability Companies and the Maintenance and Alteration of
Their Capital, with a View to Making Such Safeguards Equivalent art. 19, sec. 2, 1977 O.J.
(L 26) 1, reprinted in FOLSOM, EUROPEAN UNION SOURCEBOOK 3.D.2 (1995). The Second
Directive mandates equal treatment of shareholders in article 42, precluding greenmail,
discriminatory self-tender offers for the shares of the target that would exclude shares held by the
acquirer, and poison pills which grant rights that do not accrue to the acquirer. Nevertheless, article
19, section 2 allows repurchases to avoid "imminent harm." The target's board can, if it has
followed the proper procedure and obtains authority every five years, issue shares without
shareholder approval. See id. art. 25 sec. 2.
403. See supra text accompanying notes 73-107.
404. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
405. See supranotes 93-107 and accompanying text, discussing UnocaL
406. See supranote 402.
407. See supraPart ll.B.1.
408. See SMON JOHNSON Er AL., TUNNELING (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 7523, 2000) (finding that the formalist protection of the minority by civil law systems
actually leads to overreaching by controllers who use technically legal transactions to divert or
"tunnel" value away from the minority).
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system of judicial passivity.'
Under the rubric of protecting
shareholders, continental European legal systems are reluctant to extend
the authority of corporate managers.4 0 While effective shareholder
protection will likely lead to dispersed ownership, continental Europe
does not seem to have achieved it, because truly dispersed ownership is
still the exception among continental corporations.' Furthermore,
European legislators cannot be argued to harbor a malicious intent, for
example that they pursue an objective other than welfare maximization
or that they are "captured" by hostile acquirers. Obviously, no support
can be garnered for such a belief--crossing the Atlantic does not change
the popularity of hostile acquirers. By contrast, many European
legislative choices would tend to lend support to a view that continental
legislatures may be captured by populist forces, making the welcoming
environment that Europe is creating for hostile acquirers all the more
paradoxical.4 2
The only possible way in which a bar on defenses can be
considered to promote dispersed ownership is by facilitating the
acquisition of less dispersed targets by more dispersed acquirers. In a
legal system that does not produce dispersion in the natural course of
corporations' financing and growth, it is conceivable that some
inducement of dispersed ownership is better than none. Note, however,
that one would not by design choose such a means of producing
dispersion. The mechanism is faulty because targets are more likely to
have dispersed ownership than acquirers. Because hostile takeovers
consist of a purchase of a controlling block, targets are by definition not
subject to a lock on control. Thus, targets are either subject to working
409. See Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Independence in the Careerand Recognition Judiciary,
7 CHI. ROUNDTABLE 205 passim (2000) (stating that the institutional structures of the civil bench
promoted the widely observed judicial passivity); Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Predictabilityand
Legal Evolution, 17 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 475 passim (1997) (stating that the rare large changes
of the law that perforce occur in a civil law system of judicial passivity are undesirable from the
perspective of risk-averse members of society who prefer the frequent small changes of common
law judicial activism).
410. See Black & Kraakman, supra note 42, at 1962 n.105.
411. See supra notes 250-52 and accompanying text.
412. In the very area of corporate law, consider the German choice of employee
"codetermination," the mandatory participation of employees in the "supervisory board" of all large
corporations. See Mark J. Roe, German Codetermination and German Securities Markets, 1998
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 167, 167. The European Union was ready to impose codetermination in the
early Seventies with the version of the Fifth Directive that was proposed then, and only the entry of
the United Kingdom into the European Union and its opposition to codetermination prevented
codetermination from becoming the European Union norm. See, e.g., Bridget Montgomery,
Comment, The European Community's Draft Fifth Directive: British Resistance and Community
Procedures,10 COMP. LAB. L.J. 429, 431-37 (1989).
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control or have truly dispersed ownership. Acquirers, on the other hand,
are not restricted in the way they are controlled. They are as likely to be
subject to a lock on control as to dispersed ownership. Essentially the
only stable state to which the device of ephemeral control can lead is the
lack of concentrated ownership in all corporations, which will occur
when the last corporation of dispersed ownership is acquired. At that
point takeovers disappear, as does the need for defenses. If,
counterintuitively, takeovers manage to expand dispersed ownership,
then the continent would need takeover defenses so as to protect this
dispersed ownership. The continental European takeover law, thus, is
inherently unstable from an evolutionary perspective. 413 However, this
point is not completely missed by European policymakers. It is
interesting to note the French government's attempt to establish semipermanent41shareholder groups as its firms try to produce more dispersed
ownership. 1
Accusing the European takeover law environment of being
defective must give way to constructive criticism. The defects of
European takeover law pale compared to the inability of continental
corporate law to produce dispersed ownership.
Before finding European takeover law innocent of being a principal
cause of concentrated ownership, we must remember that dispersed
ownership existed in the United States and the United Kingdom long
before the current ease of hostile takeovers. The ease of hostile takeovers
increased vastly when Michael Milken allowed easy financing of large
cash takeovers by applying the lessons of diversification so as to reduce
the risk of those who financed takeovers.1 The time at which hostile
acquisitions became a noticeable threat is relevant because, as I argued,
the possibility of a hostile takeover influences the attractiveness of the

413. It is easy to find historical traces of defenses following dispersed ownership. In the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the maintenance of dispersed ownership in Japanese cotton
mills was facilitated by measures that were essentially defensive, which reduced the voting power of
large blockholders by reducing the votes of shares beyond some number to one-fifth or even onetenth of a vote. See Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, Corporate Governance in Transitional
Economies: Lessons from the PrewarJapanese Cotton Textile Industry, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 171,
197-99 (2000). Similarly, Gilson & Roe assign to the cross-holdings of Japanese keiretsu an
antitakeover role. See Gilson & Roe, supranote 26, at 897-88.
414. Lauren Aste reports that as Soci~t6 G6ndrale, AXA, Crdit Lyonnais, Alcatel Alsthom,
and Rh6ne-Poulene have tried to reduce cross-ownership arrangements in which they participated
so as to produce privatized dispersed ownership, the French government has fostered the creation of
"stable shareholder groups" ("les groupes d'actionnaires stables"). See Aste, supra note 251, at 17.
415. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Essays of Warren Buffett: Lessons for Corporate
America, 19 CARDozo L. REv. 1, 102-03 (1997) (compiling and introducing essays authored by
warren E. Buffett).
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position of managing a firm under dispersed ownership. Go back to the
incentives of entrepreneurs to take their companies public and to
produce dispersed ownership by selling or allowing the dilution of their
stake. The founders' incentive to produce dispersed ownership is
weakened as the threat to control becomes more pronounced. In other
words, before takeovers it was easier for a legal system to produce the
incentives that would lead to dispersed ownership, because the fear of
takeovers was not a concern. Now that takeovers have become a
concern, for dispersed ownership to be produced, a legal system needs to
address two issues. Minority shareholders must be adequately protected
so as to reduce the minority discount. Furthermore, the legal system
must counter the founders' concern that the control they will be left
holding after dispersing their corporations' ownership may be
ephemeral. Thus, the "defense-less" takeover law of Europe is
increasingly accountable for the continent's failure to produce dispersed
ownership. The easier takeovers become, the stronger the founders'
disincentive to surrender their lock on control.
B.

Whither America?

The law in the United States, despite varying greatly between
Delaware, and Indiana's followers, agrees with my analysis. In some
aspects the agreement is striking. Delaware law has even expressly taken
ownership dispersion into account as a factor that determines the
appropriate defense intensity. The QVC decision invalidated
Paramount's defenses largely because they were protecting a transaction
that would lead not simply to concentrated ownership but to a lock on
control.4 6 As the Delaware Supreme Court remarked, the merger would
be scrutinized because it would result in the combined entity having a
majority stockholder:
In the absence of devices protecting the minority stockholders,
stockholder votes are likely to become mere formalities where there is
a majority stockholder.... The acquisition of majority status and the
consequent privilege of exerting the powers of majority ownership
come at a price. That price is usually a control premium which
recognizes not only the value of a control block of shares, but also
compensates the minority stockholders for their resulting loss of voting
power.

416.
1993).

See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 51 (Del.
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In the case before us, the public stockholders (in the aggregate)
currently own a majority of Paramount's voting stock.... Following

[consummation of the merger], there will be a controlling stockholder
who will have the [majority] voting power.1 7
Thus, the courts are already sensitive to ownership dispersion in
evaluating defensive tactics. This sensitivity, however, can be refined in
view of the additional light that this analysis has shed on its function.
Four aspects of the sensitivity to dispersion are open for the application
of the lessons of this Article.
First, the arguments of this Article suggest that we must evaluate
how the ownership dispersion of the target should influence the intensity
of the defenses its managers can use. Because the dispersion of the target
implies greater vulnerability for management, the potency of the
takeover defenses that management should be allowed to use should
increase as the stake of management in the firm becomes smaller. A
trace of such a sensitivity may be garnered in the, later reversed,
decision of the Court of Chancery in Unitrin.4 ' The repurchase plan that
management proposed would have increased its stake to allow an
absolute veto on corporate combinations due to a 75% supermajority
requirement in the target's bylaws.4 9 Since the board was starting with a
23% stake,4 0 its position was fairly safe, and it should only be allowed
weak defenses. Ironically, the reversal by the Delaware Supreme Court421
does not refute this statement. It allowed the defensive repurchase
because it considered that management's stake was already enough to
veto corporate combinations given the usual abstentions from
shareholder votes. Going forward, however, this Article argues that
courts should become less permissive with defenses as management's
share ownership increases. The increase implies reduced fear of a
takeover, and the use of defenses raises the concern that management is
avoiding the disciplining effect of the market for corporate control.
A further complication arises particularly in the case of a judiciary
as specialized in corporate disputes as that of Delaware. Great
confidence in the judiciary would imply that it may be given virtual
417. Id. at42-43.
418. See Am. Gen. Corp. v. Unitrin, Inc., Nos. CIV.A.13699, 13656, 13663, 13665, 13676,
13685, 13684, 1994 WL 512537 (Del. Ch. Aug. 26, 1994); In re Unitrin, Inc., S'holders Litig., Nos.
CIV.A.13656, 13699, 1994 WL 698483 (Del. Ch. Oct. 14, 1994), rev'd, 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
419. See Am. Gen. Corp., 1994 WL 512537, at *2; In re Unitrin, Inc., 1994 WL 698483,
at *3-4.
420. See Am. Gen. Corp., 1994 WL 512537, at *2; In re Unitrin, Inc., 1994 WL 698483, at *4.
421. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
422. See id. at 1383.
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carte blanche to establish the desirability of defenses on a case-by-case
basis. Perhaps the Delaware judiciary is able to balance not only defense
intensity but also managerial skill, the strength of competing strategic
visions and all concerns that influence the social welfare that takeovers
produce. Such an ad hoc system, however, would produce the desired
incentives for neither corporate management nor entrepreneurs. Thus,
even if some vague balancing remains, target dispersion should be a
separate express concern. This will allow clearer use of the other
undefined concerns by the courts. Moreover, the express influence of
target dispersion will sharpen the incentives for economic productivity.
The arguments of this Article suggest that courts must also evaluate
the two factors that influence the concentrating effect of takeovers-the
accuracy of the market price and the speed of technological
developments. The accuracy of the market price reduces the threat of
false takeovers. Therefore, courts should be more reluctant to uphold
defenses in the face of evidence of an active and accurate market for the
target corporation's shares. Delaware courts engage the question of price
accuracy already, because it is a consistent claim of the target
management that the hostile offer undervalues the target corporation
and, therefore, shareholders should be protected from selling their shares
at the low price offered.4 2 This is probably an aspect where Delaware
practice, although unacknowledged, is in perfect congruence with the
normative recommendations of this Article.
The speed of technological change increases the benefit from
graduating the adoption of the new technology. The benefit that defenses
bestow in this context is external to managers and shareholders. It
consists of the social gain from the reduction of the pressure to acquire
the new skills. The ramifications of the pressure to acquire new skills
will differ depending on the size of the market imperfections, which are
likely to be large, since the setting is akin to the market for education.
When technological change is unfolding at a brisk pace neither
employees nor employers are likely to be able to estimate the gains from
adoption with great precision so as to ration their demand for retraining
in the new technology. When courts see a new technological wave
building up, they can protect society from the dislocation and the shock
of a radical switch to the new technology by granting target management
some more latitude with defenses.
The problem with this point is that it is one that target shareholders
are not internalizing ex ante. Shareholders do not have an incentive to
423. See supra note 401.
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wastefully delay their own firm's adoption of the new technology in
order to alleviate the social pressures that a retraining bottleneck may
cause. The privately optimal decision of shareholders would lead to
underprovision of defenses from a social standpoint. This discrepancy
needs to be remedied, and solutions are easy to craft.
The solution to the underprovision of defenses lies in the ex post
divergence of interests between shareholders and management. After a
hostile offer has taken place, management has a strong incentive to
defend its control and exceed the ex ante limitations that shareholders
place on the use of defenses. To illustrate this effect, imagine that
shareholders could authorize defense use by the delay it would impose
on a change of control. Thus, even though shareholders would authorize
defense use up to a 120-day delay, management has the ex post incentive
to use defenses that will delay the acquirer more than 120 days in
obtaining control. Such precise description and authorization of defenses
does not correspond to reality.
The example points toward a solution to the conflict between
privately and socially optimal defense intensity. Shareholders cannot
authorize defense use according to the delay that defenses cause on
changes of control. Defense use is authorized in general terms, such as
the ability of management to authorize the issuance of new securities.
This authority, applied to defenses, means the ability to issue poison
pills. The vagueness of this type of authorization means that ex post
conflicts will arise, since managers will tend to push the envelope of the
tools that they have in the direction of more defenses. For example, they
may authorize and issue poison pills with stronger terms than
shareholders would have ex ante approved. To the extent this happens,
the solution is a simple deference by the courts to the managerial
decision. As long as management can exceed the ex ante authorization,
the privately excessive defenses that management institutes are likely to
approach the social optimal. Management should not be allowed too
much leeway, however, because it could be excessive and produce
control that is more entrenched than optimal. Particularly in the
interpretation of the propriety of poison pills and similar defenses of
broad discretion, courts can easily further social welfare, and they
arguably already do.
The law should not, however, be structured so as to prevent
shareholders from placing any limit on managers' ability to defend
control. The Unocal defensive self-tender is a typical example of a type
of transaction that can be crafted despite vastly exceeding the
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authorization for defenses that shareholders have• given.
Thus, it is only
424
appropriate that the SEC has banned such practices.
We have established, however, that the social need for defenses is
strong only in times of radical technological change, because of the
potential bottleneck that demand for mass retraining in transferable skills
may cause. As courts balance how much leeway to give to the
managerial choices regarding defenses, courts should take into account
the pace of technological change. The amount by which courts err in
management's favor should increase as the speed of technological
change increases.
The last concern takes us back to QVC. Either QVC may be
interpreted too broadly or the conclusions of this Article too narrowly. I
argue that we should not read QVC to only or mainly allow defenses
against concentrated acquirers. The problem is not so much in what QVC
does say, but rather in what the court might be interpreted as saying. The
narrow holding, that the courts should scrutinize defenses that protect a
merger that would concentrate ownership, is perfectly appropriate from
the perspective of promoting dispersed ownership. The expansion that
must be avoided would be the reverse of this positive holding: that
defenses of mergers that do not concentrate ownership are always
appropriate. Unfortunately, the Time decision that is so closely bound
with QVC does leave that avenue open. Indeed, Time was considered a
revival of the "just say no" approach to defensive tactics. Z According to
the "just say no" approach, the target has no obligation to ever remove

424. In response to Unocal's embracing of discriminatory tender offers, the SEC changed its
regulation of tender offers so as to preclude defensive discrimination in tender offers. See SEC
Tender Offers By Issuers Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-4(f)(8)(i) (2001); SEC Equal Treatment of
Security Holders Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14(d)-10 (2000) ("No bidder shall make a tender offer
unless ... The tender offer is open to all security holders of the class of securities subject to the
tender offer .. "). Thus, the Unocal discriminatory and coercive defense would no longer be
available without being incorporated into a preexisting poison pill. Although my arguments support
defenses, they do not argue for returning the regulation of tender offers to their old state so that
discriminating self-tenders would be available. The rationale for disallowing discriminating selftenders is bolstered by the fact that the same defense is available in the form of the poison pill, with
the additional advantage that shareholders can choose whether to allow their board to have or not
the authority to issue securities and, hence, the pill. Thus, shareholders can limit the use of
discriminatory defenses as long as the defenses must be implemented through a poison pill. If
discriminatory defenses could be implemented by means of a self-tender, then limiting their use by
management would be much harder if not impossible for shareholders.
425. See, e.g., Mark J. Loewenstein, Recent Judicial Developments In Delaware Takeover
Law, COLO. LAW., Jan. 1990, at 47, 48; Thompson, supra note 401, at 1007; Rifkind, supra note
401, at 126.
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defenses that thwart hostile suitors. 42 6 Naturally, such an approach would
decimate the market for control and its desirable disciplining effect on
management.
The inescapable realization is that optimal takeover defense
intensity is a much more complex concept than revealed by the few
considerations on which this Article focuses. Even the identification of
the factors that courts should use is shrouded in obscurity. Many cases
can be read as taking into account the inadequacy of the price that the
acquirer would offer. Interco can be read as taking into account either
poor strategy, or more specifically, a strategy of conglomeration without
427
operating synergies. In the same vein lies TW Services, Inc. v. SWT
2
Acquisition Corp.,r where inadequate price along with the existence of
synergies among the target's businesses and apparent lack of a strategic
motivation behind the acquirer, led the court to allow the defenses to
stand. 429 Defensive deconglomeration without any strategic justification

426. See John H. Matheson, Corporate Governance at the Millenium: The Decline of the
PoisonPillAntitakeover Defense, 22 HAMLINE L. REV. 703,730 (1999).
427. See City Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787 passim (Del. Ch. 1988). The
Interco decision also shows that the value of dispersed ownership is not absolute. See id. at 794-95.
Dispersed ownership will not be protected in the face of poor long-term strategy. See id. at 791. City
Capital was a concentrated acquirer, essentially owned and financed by two brothers. See id. at 791
& n.2. The target, Interco, was under dispersed ownership. See id. at 791. Faced with an all-cash allshares hostile offer, the Interco management planned a restructuring in which half of the income
producing assets of Interco would be sold, debt repaid, and preferred stock issued to existing
shareholders. See id. at 793. The ownership concentration of Interco would not change by means of
this defensive transaction, but neither would its strategy. Interco was a conglomeration of various
businesses. See id. at 791. Even in cases where Interco had several subsidiaries in the same
business, they may not be integrated, as in the example of its two furniture businesses, "Ethan
Allen" and "Lane and Broyhill." See id. at 793-94.
428. Nos. CIV.A. 10427, 10298, 1989 WL 20290, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989).
429. See id. at *11-12. TW Services validates the "just say no" defense. The target, TW, was a
collection of service businesses that remained from the old TWA, after airline and hotel operations
were separated. See id. at *2. It included restaurant chains and nursing homes. See id. The acquirer,
SWT, was a vehicle of Coniston Partners, an LBO fund of concentrated ownership and without
potential for acquisitions motivated by strategic synergies. See id. SWT acquired over 19% of TW
before launching its tender offer conditional on a removal of the poison pill. See id. at *3-4. TW
refused to remove the pill and refused to talk with SWT unless all of the conditions of the offer were
removed. See id. at *4-5. TW considered SWT's bid insufficient, designed to start a bidding war in
which SWT would profit by selling its TW shares to the highest bidder. See id. at *4-5. With the
argument that any merger or defensive recap would impair the ability of the corporation to raise the
financing that its Denny's chain needed, management refused to negotiate. See id. at *11.
Ultimately, the court agreed with management's argument that since the tender offer was
conditional on the board's agreement to a merger, the board actions must be judged under the
traditional business judgment standard for refusing a merger proposal. See id.
For a recent discussion of the Kohiberg Kravis Roberts & Co. strategy of synergistic
buyouts, see generally GEORGE P. BAKER & GEORGE DAVID SMITH, THE NEW FINANCIAL
CAPIrrALIsTS: KOHLBERG KRAViS ROBERTS AND THE CREATION OF CORPORATE VALUE (1998).
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seems to have also led the court to order the removal of defenses in
43 °
GrandMetropolitan.
After discussing so much of defense law, it would be negligent not
to revisit the issue of false biases against strategic mergers. As discussed
above, Delaware bars a merger for three years after a takeover unless the
target has opted out of this protection or the target approves the
acquisition.4 3' This is a biased defense because it has a different
influence on acquirers motivated by financial gain and those motivated
by a desire to achieve gains from implementing strategic synergies.
Financial buyers are not impeded by this provision, while strategic
buyers may need a merger in order to fully integrate the combined
corporations and implement the plan that will lead to the synergies. This
is clearly the wrong bias from a policy perspective, since strategic
mergers should be impeded less than acquisitions made from financial
gain alone. A surprising twist on this theme, however, is offered by the
proposal of the independent directors of Digex, Inc., to decline to waive
the bar on mergers for an undesirable acquirer.
Digex was put up for sale by its controller, Intermedia
Communications, Inc.432 The auction was conducted by the independent
directors on Digex's board.433 One of the several offers, however, was
not for Digex but for its parent, Intermedia. 4 The terms were less
favorable to Digex than other offers, but so favorable for the parent
shareholders that the parent accepted the merger. 4 One of the conditions
of the bidder was the waiver of the three-year prohibition on mergers
that Delaware imposes by default. 436 The acquirer desired the ability to
merge Digex with itself or subsidiaries.437 The independent directors of
Digex recommended that the prohibition on mergers not be waived.
Thus, the target minority shareholders were seeking to use against the
controller a provision that is intended to favor the controller. The court,
430. See Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1055-56 (Del. Ch. 1988).
The Board's proposed defense would spin-off Burger King (Pillsbury's crown jewel) and various
other businesses, without any strategic justification for separating the various food businesses of
Pillsbury. See generally id. The court ordered redemption of the pill and enjoined the spin-off or
sale of Burger King. See id. at 1061.
431. See supra note 343 and accompanying text.
432. See Deborah Solomon & Nikhil Deogun, Digex Sale Reflects Minority Holders'
Secondary Status, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 2000, at C1.
433. See id.
434. See id.
435. See id.
436. See id.
437. See id.
438. See id.
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on motion for a preliminary injunction, agreed that the plaintiffs had a
reasonable chance of success on the merits of their claim that the
removal of the three-year bar on mergers was a fiduciary violation.439
VI.

CONCLUSION

The ranks of academic research are brimming with new articles on
corporate governance. Since both takeover defenses and the strength of
the incentive to produce dispersed ownership are central elements in any
set of corporate governance choices, this Article comes to join those
ranks. As the vacillations of the corporate governance literature show,
the optimal corporate governance is a moving target and depends on the
surrounding environment of laws and other norms. Optimal takeover
defense intensity can only be conceived in a sterile environment of a
mathematical model. In the quest for the perfect corporate governance
mechanism, however, we must not forget its multidimensional texture
and constantly evolving dynamics. A recipe for perfect corporate
governance can no easier be created by black and white rules than justice
can be provided by automata. Thus, in all the strides that recent
scholarship may be making, we must remember that our answers are
always partial. The environment of rules and social norms, within which
corporate governance unfolds, will interfere with the transportation of
solutions from one jurisdiction to the other.
Incentives, however, are inescapable shapers of human activity. In
engaging a limited aspect of corporate governance-defenses and
dispersed ownership-rather than seeking an overarching and allencompassing view, this Article accomplishes necessarily less than more
general ones, but also much more. My conclusions apply to every
jurisdiction insofar as dispersed ownership requires some protection
from hostile attacks. However, the optimal protection in each
jurisdiction is very likely to differ from the protection of control that
Delaware provides.
Essentially, in this Article I have tried to examine dispersed
ownership as one of the elements that enter the mix of economic
productivity and to study how it is influenced by defenses. Defenses
alleviate a threat to control, but also mitigate the discipline that a
vigorous market for control imposes on managers. The above arguments
imply that ownership dispersion, the speed of technological change, and
the accuracy of the stock's price, predicts firms' choices regarding
439. See In re Digex, Inc., No. CIV.A. 18336, 2000 WL 33671760, at *1, 16 (Del. Ch.
Dec. 13,2000).
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takeover defense intensity. More importantly, these arguments
recommend the attitudes that courts should have in interpreting
managers' defensive powers. Furthermore, the study of corporate
governance benefits from this Article. Some of the complexity of
corporate governance becomes transparent. Further research that will
promote the understanding of corporate governance and its use to
enhance productivity, is facilitated. The idea that we can then take this
recipe and blindly apply it to French, German, or even Chinese and
Russian firms is ludicrous. The devastating effect of Western economics
and law in Russia warns of the results of such hubris. 440

440. Russian privatization was engineered by a Harvard economics professor of Russian
origin, Andrei Shleifer, and the reform of Russian corporate law was led by law professors at
Harvard and Columbia, Reinier Kraakman and Bernie Black. Their explanations for the failure of
the reforms are in ANDREI SHLEIFER & DANIEL TREISMAN, WITHOUT A MAP: POLmcAL TACTICS
AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN RUSSIA (2000), and Bernard Black et al., Russian Privatization and
CorporateGovernance: What Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1731 (2000).
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